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Impoverished Practices
ANTHONY V. ALFIERI*
Bertie Johnson sat in the waiting room all morning. She held a cane
upright in her right hand and a white plastic bag in her left hand clasped
against her lap. When I opened the main office door and called out her
name, she looked up and answered in a loud, hoarse voice. She then
propped her left hand against the seat of the chair next to her, gripped her
cane with her right hand, and stood up grimacing. Pausing for a moment
to steady herself, she turned, barely looking up, and hobbled through the
doorway, down the hall, and into my office where, braced by her cane, she
sat down heavily.
Seated stiffly, Johnson awkwardly lifted the plastic bag and with two
hands placed it on my desk. She pulled off the bag and pushed forward a
set of papers, stacked two inches thick, bound with brown cardboard. She
stated that the papers had "come in the mail" from "Social Security." She
then reached into the pocket of her overcoat, unfolded a second set of
papers, and handed them to me. She referred to the papers as a "letter,"
remarking that it had "just come."
Issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services pursuant
to a federal district court's remand order, the two page "letter" notified
Johnson that the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Appeals Council
had remanded her disability case back to an administrative law judge
(AU) for further proceedings, including a new hearing.' Pending the
hearing, the notice directed Johnson to attend a medical examination to be
conducted by a SSA consultative physician.
Johnson balked at this directive. She protested that the ALJ "didn't
like" her and "didn't believe" her. She accused him of acting "against"
her and cited the adverse decision as an illustration of his "bias." Charg-
ing that the AU had "already made up his mind," Johnson asked me
whether legal aid would represent her at the hearing.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; A.B., Brown University,
1981; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1984.
I am grateful to Marie Ashe, Naomi Cahn, Clark Cunningham, Wes Daniels, Stephen
Ellmann, Michael Fischl, Christopher Gilkerson, Ellen Grant, Peter Margulies, Michael
Perlin, Rob Rosen, Stephen Schnably, Jonathon Simon, Paul Tremblay, David Wilkins,
Steve Winter, and the editors of The Georgetown Law Journal for their comments and
support. I also wish to thank Julie Bork, Felicity McGrath, Juliette Merer, Eileen Moor-
head, Porsche Shantz, Jennifer Zawid, and the University of Miami School of Law library
staff for their research assistance.
This article is dedicated to my colleagues and students for their collective generosity
during an untimely illness.
1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.977, 404.983-.984 (1992) (authorizing Appeals Council remand).
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Johnson's question is well known to poverty lawyers. Poor clients pose it
daily in legal aid offices. Although the question is commonplace, the
answer is elusive. By elusive, I do not mean that the answer is unavailable.
Indeed, poverty lawyers answer the question routinely. Every day they
accept and reject cases. Nor do I mean that the answer is indefensible.
Poverty lawyers rally a number of defenses to justify decisions to accept
and reject cases. The justifications invoke client-centered, community-
centered, and even institution-centered theories of lawyer decisionmaking.
Instead, by elusive I mean that the answer to the question of representa-
tion is makeshift. In theory, the answer rests on formal claims of neutrality
and objectivity, or in the alternative, instrumental claims of purposivism
and practicality. In practice, the answer founders on its own claims. This
failure is troubling. Without a coherent theoretics of practice, poverty law
advocacy degenerates into a discretionary practice of lawyer moral and
political judgment. This gatekeeping practice is incompatible with a vision
of poverty law advocacy as a form of and forum for community education,
organization, and mobilization. That incompatibility stems from modern-
ist foundational assumptions about law and the lawyering process in impov-
erished communities. These assumptions will neither gain coherence nor
lose their moral-political dialectic through the renewed commitment or
heightened reflection of poverty lawyers. While commitment and reflec-
tion are necessary, they are insufficient. What will suffice in the end is
uncertain. Yet, uncertainty is not fatal to the lawyering process. In fact, it
is uncertainty that gives rise to this inquiry and to the larger project of
reconstructing poverty law practice.
The roots of this project grow out of a series of case studies based in the
field of poverty law.2 Throughout these case studies I have sought to
develop a method of internal critique forged out of the contemporary
movements of critical theory within the legal academy. This storehouse of
theory includes the works of interdisciplinary scholars as well as the writings
of law and society, critical legal studies, feminist, and critical race scholars.
2. These studies extend over a five-year period and cover a variety of federal-state income
maintenance and social insurance programs. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of
Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 659
(1987-88) [hereinafter Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law] (reviewing the Special Supplemen-
tal Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children); Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients,
Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992) [hereinafter Alfieri, Disabled Clients] (survey-
ing the Social Security Act's Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Supplemental
Security Income programs); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learn-
ing Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice] (discussing state programs under the Food Stamp Act); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619 (1991)
[hereinafter Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn] (considering Aid for Families with Dependent
Children and Medicaid programs).
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The intent of culling through this expanding literature is neither to
revive the custom of trashing3 nor to indulge a penchant for intellectual
voyeurism.4 Rather, the intent of this theoretical synthesis is to construct a
method of critique bridging theory and practice but tailored to the lawyer-
ing process. Here, as elsewhere, I define that process broadly to include
interviewing, counseling, investigation, negotiation, trial advocacy, litiga-
tion, and ethics.'
Internal critique discards the pretense of unsituated criticism: the idea
that we can stand outside of theory and practice and render meaningful
judgments. 6 Shedding this pretense allows the situatedness of conven-
tional accounts of the lawyering process to be acknowledged. That acknowl-
3. For a past, much-heralded defense of trashing, see generally Mark G. Kelman, Trash-
ing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984). Kelman characterizes "trashing" as a technique fashioned
by the critical legal studies movement to debunk legal texts. According to Kelman, trashing
entails three moves: "Take specific arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover
they are actually foolish ([tragi]-comic); and then look for some (external observer's) order
(not the germ of truth) in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos we've exposed." Id.
at 293; see also Alan Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1229, 1230-31 (1981) (advocating trashing as a "negative, critical activity" dedicated to
delegitimation and liberation).
4. For misplaced allegations of voyeurism, see Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal
Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79, 80 (1992) (deriding a class of interdisciplinary legal
scholarship as "intellectual voyeurism"); see also Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of
Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholar-
ship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 193-94 (1991) (claiming that legal scholars' "use" of nonlegal
disciplines to establish external authority and legitimacy often results in the intellectual
"abuse" of such disciplines).
5. Peggy Davis urges a similarly wide-ranging definition. She states:
The conceptualizations that determine legal outcomes begin to be formed in the
process by which a matter is reduced from a situation in the world of social reality
to an issue for resolution in the world of law. The thorough student of law therefore
takes as texts the full range of lawyering interactions-from the intake interview, in
which lawyer and client negotiate the meaning of a situation in the world to
determine whether and how it translates as a legal matter, through the varieties of
subsequent interactions among clients, advocates, and decisionmakers. The study
of lawyering as practice becomes essential to the study of law as an evolving, socially
constructed corpus.
Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and
"Feminine" Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1643 (1991) (footnote omitted).
6. For an elaboration of this distinction, see Susan S. Silbey, Loyalty and Betrayal:
Cotterrell's Discovery and Reproduction of Legal Ideology, 16 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 809, 813
(1991) (distinguishing critique from criticism); see also TERRY EAGLETON, CRITICISM AND
IDEOLOGY 20-21 (1976); MARTIN JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE
FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, 1923-1950, at 41-85 (1973);
Max Horkeimer, Traditional and Critical Theory, in CRITICAL THEORY: SELECTED ESSAYS
188 (M.J. O'Connell trans. 1988); Joseph B. Maier, Contribution to a Critique of Critical
Theory, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 29-54 (Judith
Marcus & Zoltan Tar eds., 1984); Alfred Schmidt, The Idea of Critical Theory, in FoUNDA-
TIONS OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra at 67-78.
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edgement implies foundational allegiances to certain ways of knowing,
thinking, and speaking. Disclosing such allegiances problematizes the
accounts, exposing an unarticulated theoretics of practice.7
To be sure, the project of deconstructing and reconstructing a theoretics
of practice risks error.8 Theory may commit materialist errors by blunder-
ing into structuralist hypotheses about discourse9 and history. ° Con-
versely, theory may inflict idealist errors by mistaking material constraint
or necessity for individual choice and group consensus.11 Alternatively,
7. For an introduction to the theoretics of practice movement, see generally Conference,
Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
717 (1992).
8. The risk of error is enhanced by the intertwining of criticism and construction. Roberto
Unger admits that "no hard-and-fast distinction separates criticism and construction."
ROBERTO M. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 143 (1987). To Unger,
"[a] critical analysis of an intellectual situation incorporates a hypothesis about constructive
opportunities. Conversely, our constructive ideas about better ways to explain social and
historical events alter retrospectively our understanding of the present circumstance of
social thought." Id.
9. For a rebuke of poststructuralist discourse theory, especially its Foucauldian strand,
see Isaac D. Balbus, Disciplining Women: Michel Foucault and the Power of Feminist Dis-
course, in AFTER FOUCAULT: HUMANISTIC KNOWLEDGE, POSTMODERN CHALLENGES 138, 138
(Jonathan Arac ed. 1988) [hereinafter AFTER FOUCAULT] (assailing Foucaldian deconstruc-
tion for exemplifying "a classically male flight from maternal foundations"); Nancy Hart-
sock, Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 157-75 (Linda
J. Nicholson ed., 1990) (condemning Foucault for failing to provide a theory of power
encompassing women); Vikki Bell, "Beyond the 'Thorny Question' ": Feminism, Foucault and
the Desexualization of Rape, 19 INT'L J. Soc. L. 83, 96 (1991) (reiterating that "power as it
upholds a non-egalitarian social structure between men and women, is not explored by
Foucault").
Reproof of Foucaldian discourse is not universal. Among feminists, for example, Jana
Sawicki argues:
Foucaldian discourse might serve as an effective instrument of criticism for
feminists who have experienced the oppressive dimensions of claims to know based
on the authority of male-dominated sciences; the inhibiting effects of radical social
theories that privilege one form of oppression over another and thereby devalue
feminist struggle; and the multiplicity of subtle forms of social control which are
found in the micro practices of daily life.
Jana Sawicki, Feminism and the Power of Foucaldian Discourse, in AFTER FOUCAULT, supra,
at 161, 176.
10. For a cogent analysis of structuralist errors in Marxist history, see generally E.P.
THOMPSON, The Poverty of Theory or An Orrery of Errors, in THE POVERTY OF THEORY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 1 (1978) (assailing Louis Althusser's reading of Marx).
11. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of
Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 352 (1993) ("Radin's work reveals a
characteristic common to much contemporary legal theorizing: a politics informed by an
instinct for consensus and an aversion to conflict."); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless
Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1561 (1991) ("The rhetoric of




theory may wreak paradigmatic errors by restricting the supply of permis-
sible beliefs, values, and techniques (e.g., analogies 12 and metaphors 13)
available to assay a particular field. 14 As a result, the field may become
less accessible to analysis, understanding, and change.
It is premature to conclude whether recent efforts to develop an internal
critique of poverty law have left the field more or less accessible to scholars,
practitioners, decisionmakers, or clients. If progress is discernible, credit is
owed to early expositors 5 and their descendants' studies of bureau-
12. For a sympathetic account of analogical reasoning, see Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogi-
cal Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 746-48 (1993) (cataloguing four main features of
analogical reasoning: principled consistency; a focus on particulars; incompletely theorized
judgments; and principles operating at a low or intermediate level of abstraction).
13. On the ambit of metaphor, see Steven L. Winter, Death Is the Mother of Metaphor, 105
HARV. L. REV. 745, 759 (1992) (reviewing THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE:
LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY (1991)) (configuring metaphor "as a cognitive function-
that is, as the imaginative means by which we conceive the multiple relations of a complex
world"); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1492 (1988) (asserting the reconstructive necessity of "employ[ing]
multiple metaphors to establish meaning"); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1222 (1989)
[hereinafter Winter, Transcendental Nonsense] (illustrating how metaphors "structure our
concepts of law and legal rights").
14. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 60, 174-210 (2d ed.
1970) (discussing the inner workings of beliefs, values, and techniques in field paradigms).
15. Prominent among these are Derrick Bell, Gary Bellow, Stephen Ellmann, Joel Han-
dler, Howard Lesnick, Gerald Lopez, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Bea Moulton, Austin Sarat,
William Simon, and Lucie White. See generally GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE
LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); Der-
rick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal
Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977.); Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness
Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Repre-
sentation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992); Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State,
and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999
(1988); Howard Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on
Perspectives, 1991 DUKE L.J. 413; Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven
Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989); Gerald P. Lopez,
Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic
Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices:
New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29
(1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on Women's Lawyer-
ing Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Austin Sarat, ".... The Law Is All Over:
Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
343 (1990); William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32
STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter Simon, Homo Psychologicus]; William H. Simon,
Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983); William H.
Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984) [hereinafter, Simon,
Visions]; Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency"from a Different Ground,
81 GEO. L.J. 1961 (1993); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and
Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter White,
Subordination].
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cracy, I6 deconstruction,1 7 gender,18 language, 9 and race.' The spirit of this
historical interchange is tempered by wariness. Expressed in admonitions of
caution,2" doubt, 22 and reproach,2 many warn of mislaid promises of resolution.
16. On bureaucracy, see generally Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyer-
ing, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947 (1992); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a
Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter, Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic].
17. On deconstruction, see generally Marie Ashe, Inventing Choreographies: Feminism and
Deconstruction, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1123 (1990) (reviewing ZILLAH ELSENSTEIN, THE FEMALE
BODY AND THE LAW (1988)); Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist
Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129 (1987).
18. On gender and feminism, see generally Naomi R. Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation,
14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1991); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992)
[hereinafter, Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language]; Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992) [hereinafter Cahn, Styles of Lawyering]; Phyllis Goldfarb, A
Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1599 (1991); Ann Shalleck, The Feminist Transformation of Lawyering: A Response to Naomi
Cahn, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1071 (1992).
19. On language, see Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as
Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNEiLL L. REV. 1298 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator]; Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients:
Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989) [hereinafter Cunningham, A
Tale of Two Clients].
20. On race, see generally Homer C. La Rue, Developing an Identity of Responsible
Lawyering Through Experiential Learning, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1147 (1992); Margaret M. Rus-
sell, Entering Great America: Reflections of Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal
Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749 (1992).
21. In a note of caution, Robert Dinerstein advises:
I believe the theoretics of practice movement has much to offer thoughtful
practitioners and writers about legal practice. Yet if the movement is to fulfill its
potential, it must confront honestly the difficulties that inhere in writing about the
open-textured world of law practice; it must speak plainly to those practitioners
who most need its insights; it must strive to capture the authentic voices of clients.
Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 971,
988-89 (1992); see also Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and
Scholarship, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1191 (1992) ("In the growth of this new clinical
scholarship two basic problems seem immanent: communication or the comprehensibility of
language, and the testing of theories.").
22. For an elegant expression of doubt, see Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty
Law Practice, 1 D.C. L. REV. 123, 142 (1992) (questioning "how the ideals of the Critical
View [of practice] might be reconciled, even if they indeed will be compromised, with the
street-level bureaucracy of most poverty law practices.").
23. Reproaching my own "imperial" style of theorizing, Lucie White asserts:
[Alfieri] seems to envision theoretical work as the bringing of static, prepackaged
insights to poverty lawyers from a perspective that is curiously freed from the
concrete engagement, the partiality, and hence the ambiguity of its own
vantage-point. In doing this kind of theory, Alfieri seems driven by a sense of
impatience.... [Hie seeks, singlehandedly, to produce a body of prescriptive
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In deference to such warnings, I confess that the instant inquiry neither
promises nor delivers resolution. My purpose is descriptive not prescriptive.
I investigate a set of assumptions which afford poverty lawyers the epistemo-
logical confidence to answer Bertie Johnson's question.24  But I do not
answer the question. For the moment, I leave the answer to others.
My unwillingness to interpose an answer to Bertie Johnson's question,
and thereby, reenter the debate over poverty law case triage regimes 25
enacts an unintended betrayal. The subjects betrayed are those deserving
of the highest loyalty: impoverished clients and communities. 26 Although
poor clients and communities daily construct new and valuable forms of
practice in their struggle against poverty, these constructions and their
attendant meanings must await reconciliation in future research. The
betrayal of alternative social constructions is an inherent aspect of rebuild-
ing a theoretics of poverty law practice. Even when patiently assembled,
theory suffers the infirmities of partiality and exclusion. 27 Both infirmities
plague this inquiry. The subject of the inquiry is the modernist lawyer
practicing in the context of poverty. To isolate the properties of modern-
ism, I distill out the discourse, institutions, and relations of practice. What
knowledge that might jar poverty lawyers out of their old routines. This kind of
"theory"-impatient, imperative-conceals or represses at the same time that it
appears to enlighten and enable.
Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 855 (1992).
24. Similar investigations are in progress. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek,
New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal Profession, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/
LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 1, 3 (Rob-
ert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES]
(investigating how "professional ideologies of lawyers shape and reflect the decision-making
processes of the legal institutions and organizational contexts in which they practice").
25. The triage debate often centers on the complexity of institutional or programmatic
application. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 2, at 2122-25.
Although this practical complexity is real, construing the debate at the level of practice
obscures the theoretical incoherence of the concept itself. I will return to this larger
controversy in a future work.
26. On loyalty and betrayal in the process of critique, see Silbey, supra note 6, at 814
("[C]ritique depends not on accurate, disinterested yet self-reflective reporting but on
loyalty to subordinate persons and groups and, in particular, the acknowledgement and
recognition of the critic's social location and identity.").
27. Both Silbey and White warn against slippage toward totalizing theory. See id. at
814-15 ("While critique seeks to explore social practices and to identify the structures of
subordination in order to engage them for liberatory purposes, it must not, however,
submerge fractured identities and multiple experiences in an effort to create a unitary
account of social life." (footnote omitted)); Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the
Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 863 (1990) (rejecting "unitary
argument" to embrace "the paradox inherent in the advocate's role[]" and "cede to 'clients'
the power to speak for themselves").
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is left in the aftermath of these exclusions is a local, lawyer-positioned
construction of ideology.
28
The modernist poverty lawyer is an ideal type, a heuristic figure invented
to cast the lawyering process in bas-relief.29 The modernist ideal inspires
two visions of practice I shall call formalism and instrumentalism. Both
visions are animated by the same cluster of assumptions. The assumptions
are foundational. They provide the epistemological framework for lawyer
decisionmaking. Stripped of its theoretical pretense, the framework shapes
a discretionary practice of moral and political judgment. Discretionary
judgment is intrinsic to the poverty lawyer's gatekeeping role in the mod-
ern welfare state.
Formalist and instrumentalist practice visions derive from four general
assumptions. The first is the assumption of autonomy. The second is the
assumption of cognitive capacity. The third is the assumption of communi-
cative rationality. The fourth is the assumption of juridical stability.
These assumptions generate two correspondent series of claims. In the
formalist series, the claims of neutrality, objectivity, empathy, and determi-
nacy predominate. In the instrumentalist series, the claims of purposivism,
practicality, translation, and indeterminacy prevail.
The assumption of autonomy elicits claims of neutral and purposive
discretion. In the poverty law context, discretion refers to the ability to
choose among clients in case selection and strategy. The formalist advo-
cates a neutral exercise of discretion. The instrumentalist champions a
purposivist exercise.
The assumption of cognitive capacity evokes claims of objectivity and
practicality. Poverty lawyers differ in estimates of their own capacity to
perceive and conceptualize the sociolegal world. The formalist declares
the capacity to discover objective truth. The instrumentalist doubts this
capacity, endorsing a provisional sense of truth ascertained through practi-
cal reasoning.
28. Here, my focus is on professional ideology. See Nelson & Trubeck, supra note 24, at
22 (defining professional ideology as "the body of thought and practices through which a
profession (6r its constituent groups) develops and promulgates ideas about the nature of its
work and the identities of its practitioners"). See generally Special Issue: Law and Ideology,
22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 623-823 (1988).
29. No doubt in sketching this figure I reveal my own crypto-normative stance toward the
modern-postmodern practice disjunction. See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of
Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 811 (1991) (rejecting "the routine objectivist habit of legal
thinkers to 'apply' or 'posit' 'models,' or 'ideal types,' or 'definitions' "). To propose, in the
alternative, a nonnormative descriptive stance-that is, a neutral stance-is to defy the
postmodern axiom that description necessarily implies normative commitments. See Francis
J. Mootz, Postmodern Constitutionalism as Materialism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 515, 524 n.26 (1992)
("[Olur descriptions are always symptomatic of normative commitments.").
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The assumption of communicative rationality leads to claims of empathy
and translation. The formalist proclaims a belief in empathy as a means of
understanding the world of others. The instrumentalist augments this
faith with a belief in translation as a method of normatively enlightening
others.
The assumption of juridical stability provokes claims of sociolegal deter-
minacy and indeterminacy. Sociolegal contexts encompass discourse (e.g.,
doctrine, statutes, regulations, case law), private and public institutions,
and social relations. The formalist argues that these contexts are relatively
determinate. They operate in a predictable, regularized fashion in which
choice is tightly constrained. The instrumentalist contends that the same
contexts are relatively indeterminate. They function in a more unstable,
variable manner in which choice is loosely constrained.
In this article, I examine both formalist and instrumentalist versions of
the modernist canon. The examination is spurred by Bertie Johnson's
question of representation. Again, my purpose is only to investigate the
foundational assumptions that enable the modernist lawyer to mount the
moral and political conviction to answer that question, not to provide a
correct answer. The investigation is implicitly guided by postmodern
theory.3 ° Among current jurisprudential movements,3 none offers a more
thoroughgoing nonfoundational critique than postmodernism.32 An ex-
press goal of postmodern jurisprudence is to reinterpret foundational
habits of description and prescription in order "to reveal practice in a way
that energizes it."' 33 The hope is that such interpretive ventures will infuse
30. An exhaustive summary of postmodern theory is well beyond the scope of this inquiry.
For helpful openings into the substantial literature of postmodernism, see generally STEVEN
BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY (1991); COSTAs DOUZINAS ET AL.,
POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE (1991); JANE FLAX, THINKING FRAGMENTS: PSYCHOANALYSIS,
FEMINISM, AND POSTMODERNISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WEST (1990); FREDERIC JAMESON,
POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991); JEAN-FRANCOIS
LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (1984); FEMINISM/
POSTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
31. Others have called for a turn to jurisprudence in the analysis of practice. Robert W.
Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/
LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 24, at 230, 238 ("The task of applying jurisprudence to the
lawyering role is relatively undeveloped and should be on the agenda of teachers of
professional responsibility.").
32. Mootz, supra note 29, at 522 ("Postmodern jurisprudence questions the received
wisdom about how law is practiced and offers instead a nonfoundational, critical account of
all understanding, including legal understanding, that describes practice in an attempt to
influence it." (footnote omitted)).
33. Id. at 522 (footnote omitted). Mootz contends: "[Jiurisprudential critique of legal
practice occurs when we reinterpret habitual thematizations, not from the privileged perspec-
tive of observer, but from the frontline perspective of one who shares in the labor of
articulating these thematizations." Id.
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legal practice with "critical bite.",34
Like my initial exploration of the modern-postmodern practice disjunc-
tion,35 I do not undertake this investigation merely to enliven debate.36ics haAlready, the debate is charged with acute criticism. That criticism has
not passed without postmodern rejoinder, especially the complaint of
errant modernist fidelity.37 No doubt postmodernists will echo that com-
plaint here, pointing out traces of the modernist canon in this very en-
deavor.38 Their scorn, fueled by the emerging critique of normativity,39 is
well targeted given my own slippage into modernist sentiment.
Modernist impulses notwithstanding, I proceed by dividing the article
into three parts. In Part I, I present a case study of Bertie Johnson's application
for Social Security disability benefits. In Part II, I put forward formalist and
instrumentalist visions of modernist lawyering. In conclusion, I note the
contradictions of postmodern rumination in modernist surroundings.
I. BERTIE JOHNSON
Bertie Johnson is a composite figure gleaned from the litigation records
of a sample group of Social Security disability cases.4" The cases reveal a
34. Id. Mootz adds: "Postmodern thought is significant for law because it opens the
possibility that legal practice might embody the critical bite that is always embedded, but
often unrecognized, in legal dialogue." Id.
35. Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233 (1992).
36. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26
LAW & Soc'y REV. 697, 698 (1992) (deploring postmodern deconstruction as a "disabling"
form of politics); Mark V. Tushnet, The Left Critique ofNormativity: A Comment, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 2325, 2336 (1992) (denouncing the "thin normativity of the leftist.., critique of
comprehensive normative rationality").
37. For a forceful reply to Handler and Tushnet, see Steven L. Winter, For What It's
Worth, 26 LAW & Soc'y REV. 789, 790 (1992) ("Both [Handler and Tushnet] presuppose a
deep attachment to rationalism and to the foundational status of their own normative commitments.").
38. The modern-postmodern quarrel encompasses the field of evaluation. Compare Ed-
ward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV.
889, 891, 910-40 (1992) (proposing a theory of scholarly evaluation grounded on the phenom-
enological experience of the individual evaluator and the criteria of clarity, persuasiveness,
significance, and applicability) with Pierre Schlag, Pre-Figuration and Evaluation, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 965, 977 (1992) (criticizing Rubin's theory of evaluation for presuming "that the
currently dominant practice of legal thought-namely, normative legal thought-has some
redeeming social or intellectual value").
39. For an introduction to the critique of normativity, see Richard Delgado, Norms and
Normal Science: Toward A Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933,
936 (1991) ("[Tlhe critique of normativity may help bring about a recognition of the way in
which complacent and self-satisfied normative reasoning obscures important political and
social issues."); Schlag, supra note 29, at 932 ("[T]he rhetoric of normative legal thought
establishes the identity and polices the bounds of legitimate legal thought."); Steven L.
Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 970
(1991) ("Persuasive normativity cannot be understood apart from its prescriptive dimen-
sions; in an important sense, every act of persuasion has its origin and end in prescription.").
40. Each claimant in the group retained a neighborhood legal services office or a law
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variety of factual and substantive controversies. Often the focal point of
these controversies is the procedure applied by the modern welfare state
to determine disability. The concept of disability is a socially constructed
mix of fact and law. Bureaucratic procedure governs the determination of
that mix.
The Johnson case presents an "easy" case for the conventional analysis
of disability representation. By easy, I mean that the case provides a set of
material facts and a cluster of legal issues favorable to a determination of
disability. My analysis of such factual and legal elements is arranged in six
sections. Section A reviews Johnson's administrative and judicial proceed-
ings. Section B introduces her personal history. Section C traces her
employment history. Section D catalogues her medical impairments. Sec-
tion E documents her medical history. Section F chronicles her daily life.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Bertie Johnson is a fifty-eight year old black woman. On September 31,
1987, she filed an application 4' for disability insurance (DI) 42 benefits
school clinical program to serve as her legal representative. For each, I was charged with the
primary duty of representation, though colleagues and students frequently contributed to the lawyering
process. In parsing the records of litigation, I have deliberately altered or omitted details, such as
names and dates, that might threaten the privacy of clients or prejudice their claims of entitlement.
41. HHS regulations establish a four-step administrative process to review applications.
20 C.F.R. § 404.900 (1992). The first step is the initial determination. 20 C.F.R. §
404.902-.906 (1992). See Eileen P. Sweeney, Representing Individuals with Disabilities in
Securing Social Security and Supplemental Security Income Disability Benefits, 25 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 860, 862 (1991) ("State disability determinations services (DDSs) make most of
the initial disability determinations for the [Social Security Administration]." (footnote
omitted)). The second step is reconsideration. 20 C.F.R. § 404.907-.922 (1992); see Swee-
ney, supra, at 862 ("At the reconsideration level, the DDS will conduct a paper review of the
file. In most cases, the result will be a decision upholding the original denial of benefits."
(footnotes omitted)). The third step is an ALJ hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (1988); 20
C.F.R. § 404.929-961 (1992); see Sweeney, supra, at 862 ("The chances of prevailing at the
ALJ stage are dramatically higher than at the reconsideration level." (footnote omitted)).
The fourth step is Appeals Council review. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967-.982 (1992); see Sweeney,
supra, at 862 ("In the past two years, partially in an attempt to prevent so many remands and
reversals by the courts, the Appeals Council has been somewhat more responsive to the
issues raised on appeal.").
42. Under the Social Security Act, an individual wage earner is considered to be disabled
if she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1988). The Act defines a physical or mental impair-
ment as "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnor-
malities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (1988). The Act provides:
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or
mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to
do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experi-
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under the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)43 pro-
gram of the Social Security Act. After the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) 4 denied the application at an initial determina-
tion and upon reconsideration,4 5 she requested a de novo administrative
ence, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in
which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would
be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991). According to the Act, the determination of medical
severity is to "consider the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments without
regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity."
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1991). Additionally, the determination of whether work
"exists" in the national economy contemplates "work which exists in significant numbers
either in the region where [the] individual lives or in several regions of the country." 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991).
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1988 & Supp. 1991). The OASDI program furnishes income
support to economically vulnerable populations. Women are especially vulnerable to eco-
nomic impoverishment. See Mary Corcoran et al., The Economic Fortunes of Women and
Children: Lessons from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, in WOMEN AND POVERTY 7, 22
(Barbara C. Gelpi et al. eds., 1983) ("Women and children have a much lower and more
unstable per capita family income over time-and a higher risk of falling into poverty-than
do white men."); Judith Resnik, Visible on "Women's Issues," 77 IOWA L. REV. 41, 47 (1991)
("Without [social security disability] benefits, many recipients who are already economically
marginal become desperately poor."). In 1992, women comprised approximately 36 percent
of DI recipients. SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 214 (1993).
For a comparative analysis of British social security programs and their treatment of
women, see Sharon Turner, Back to the Future: Women and Social Security, in LAW, SOCIETY
AND CHANGE 134-52 (Stephen Livingstone & John Morison eds., 1990). Turner writes:
Social security laws . . . [in Britain] have traditionally ignored women, focusing
instead on interruptions in men's capacity to provide. Such laws have successfully
marginalised and stereotyped women for decades. Discrimination within the social
security system is also part of a broader ideology of family responsibility and
women's role in society in which differential treatment is expected to be accepted as
part of a "natural social order."
Id. at 134 (footnote omitted).
44. The OASDI program is administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA) of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
45. HHS determines disability entitlement pursuant to a five-step sequential evaluation
process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1992). Step one reviews whether the claimant is working
and, if so, whether the work constitutes substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)
(1992). Step two evaluates whether the claimant suffers any impairment or combination of
impairments that significantly limit her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (1992). Step three considers whether the claimant's impairment
meets the twelve month duration statutory requirement and the listed body system medical
criteria or equals such criteria. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (1992). Step four assesses the
claimant's residual functional capacity and the physical as well as mental demands of her
past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1992). Step five considers whether the claimant's
residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience demonstrate the
ability to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (1992).
For recent discussions of the disability determination process, see Alfieri, Disabled Clients,
supra note 2, at 806-08; Sweeney, supra note 41, at 861-63.
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law judge hearing.46 The hearing was held on June 10, 1988. On August 5,
1988, the ALJ issued a decision finding Johnson "not disabled., 4 7 Johnson
next requested Appeals Council review of the hearing decision.
On February 10, 1989, the Appeals Council denied her request for review. 4'
Subsequently, Johnson commenced a pro se civil action in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking judicial
review 49 of the HHS decision denying her application for disability ben-
efits.50 Finding that the ALJ failed to weigh properly the opinion of
Johnson's treating physician in deciding disability, the district court held
that HHS misapplied5' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's
46. In 1990, SSA employed approximately 800 administrative law judges to adjudicate
over 250,000 cases. Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1346 n.18, 1354 (1992).
47. In a brief decision, the ALJ found that Johnson suffered from "minimal" osteoarthri-
tis of the hands, knees, and spine; hypertension; and bronchial asthma. Moreover, he found
that she could "move her arms and fingers" and "perform fine and gross hand movements."
He observed that she "handled the bottles from her purse with normal grasping and holding
and showed no impairment." He also noted that she "prepares food and cooks."
Further, the ALJ found that Johnson retained the ability to perform a "substantial
amount" of walking and standing, to use her hands for grasping and manipulation, and to lift
and carry up to twenty pounds. He rejected the contrary functional assessment of Johnson's
primary treating physician on the ground that it was "not compatible with a preponderance
of the evidence."
On these findings, the ALJ determined that Johnson "does not have an impairment, singly
or in combination, that meets or equals a listed impairment and that her allegations of
experiencing severe pain and of being unable to function are not consistent with a preponder-
ance of the evidence." He additionally determined that Johnson "has the capacity to
perform light work and does not have a nonexertional impairment which significantly impairs
her ability to perform light work, except for work involving heavy lifting and carrying."
Reasoning that Johnson's "past relevant work as a sewing machine operator did not require
the performance of work-related activities precluded by her limitations," the ALJ concluded
that she "has the residual functional capacity to do her past relevant work." Therefore, he
decided that she was "not disabled."
48. For an assessment of Appeals Council review mechanisms, see generally Charles H.
Koch & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of
the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199 (1990).
49. On judicial review in disability cases, see Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review
in Administrative Law, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1992). Bruff explains:
After the SSA's Appeals Council makes the agency's final decisions, judicial review
begins in the district courts, and now totals about 7500 cases per year. These cases
are spread around the nation. As the statistics reveal, judicial review touches only a
tiny fraction of SSA orders. Frequently the issue is the case-specific one of whether
substantial evidence supports the agency decision; no programmatic question arises.
Nor is there any way for a court to inform the particular bureau within SSA whose
decision it overturns that an error has been made or to provide incentives to change
the bureau's behavior.
Id. at 1210 (footnotes omitted).
50. Under the Social Security Act, individuals may obtain judicial review of HHS final
decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1992).
51. Advocates contend that such misapplications illustrate the injurious consequences of
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"treating physician" rule.52 Accordingly, the court reversed the decision
and remanded for further administrative proceedings.53
On remand, the Appeals Council ordered the AU to convene a supple-
mental hearing and to issue a recommended decision.54 Additionally, the
Council directed Johnson to attend a consultative medical examination
55
HHS policies of intracircuit rule nonacquiescence. See Sweeney, supra note 41, at 866
("Ongoing tensions exist in the way in which SSA uses evidence secured from nontreating
sources to undermine the evidence received from treating sources. These problems are
likely to continue in the future." (footnotes omitted)).
On the disputed legitimacy of agency nonacquiescence, compare Samuel Estreicher &
Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679,
735 (1989) (justifying agency intracircuit nonacquiescence as an "interim measure" permit-
ting uniform statutory administration following an adverse appellate decision pending the
agency's reasonable pursuit of national policy validation) with Matthew Diller & Nancy
Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to
Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 803 (1990) (arguing that Estreicher and Revesz's
"proposal upsets the balance between agencies and courts by rendering the judiciary
essentially powerless to enforce congressional limitations on agency conduct for long periods
of time").
52. See Schisler v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988). In Schisler, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit announced:
The treating source's opinion on the subject of medical disability-i.e., diagnosis
and nature and degree of impairment-is (1) binding on the fact-finder unless
contradicted by substantial evidence and (2) entitled to some extra weight, even if
contradicted by substantial evidence, because the treating source is inherently more
familiar with a claimant's medical condition than are other sources. Resolution of
genuine conflicts between the opinion of the treating source, with its extra weight,
and any substantial evidence to the contrary remains the responsibility of the
fact-finder.
Id. at 47; see also George Szary, The Treating Physician Rule: Morgan Presumption in Social
Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income Cases, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 303, 323 (1989-90) (proposing that a treating physician's finding of disability
should create a presumption "add[ing] evidentiary weight to the individual's claim through-
out the proceeding, thereby increasing the burden of proof to be met by SSA and shifting a
burden of persuasion to SSA to disprove the existence of the disability where . . . a conflict
between [treating and consultative] physicians exists" (footnote omitted)).
53. On the remedial import of federal court remands, see Richard E. Levy, Social Security
Claimants with Developmental Disabilities: Problems of Policy and Practice, 39 KAN. L. REV.
529, 579-80 (1991) ("Even if a claimant is successful before the courts, the normal remedy is
for the court to remand the case to the SSA for further consideration, which may lead to a
renewed denial of benefits .... [In many cases, claimants must be extraordinarily persistent
in order to secure benefits." (footnotes omitted)).
54. 20 C.F.R. § 404.983 (1992).
55. Commentators argue that "many claims for disability are denied on the basis of
consultative examinations" even though "the thoroughness of the examination and the zeal
with which it is undertaken may be less than adequate." Szary, supra note 52, at 333
(footnotes omitted).
In 1991, HHS promulgated a new regulation governing the relative evidentiary weight to
be accorded treating physician and consultative examiner reports. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.152(d)(2),
416.927(d)(2) (1992). Advocates have expressed trepidation about the doctrinal implica-
tions of this action, fearing that courts may construe the regulation to supersede the
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prior to the hearing.56
B. PERSONAL HISTORY
Johnson was born on April 29, 1931 in North Carolina, where she
attended elementary school until the seventh grade. When she reached her
early twenties, Johnson moved to New York.57 In New York, she married
widely-adopted "treating source" rule. See National Senior Citizens Law Center, The Law of
the Elderly Poor in 1992, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1245 (1993).
The troubling parts of the regulation relate to the "treating physician" rule. The
treating physician's opinion will be treated as controlling if it is "well supported"
and not inconsistent with other evidence in the record. If the report is not entitled
to controlling weight, it may still receive some weight depending on whether a
variety of factors is met. In contrast, the case law in most circuits requires that the
treating physician's opinion control or be given "special weight" if "supported" and
even if inconsistent with other evidence in the record. With this definitional
terminology, SSA has changed the relative weight of the reports so that the
opinions of the nonexamining DDS physician are accorded greater weight. This is
done by defining these opinions as "findings" rather than as "evidence." An
important but troubling statement in the regulation is that certain issues are
reserved for [HHS], including whether the person's impairments meet or equal the
listing, the final residual functional capacity determination, and determinations
regarding vocational factors.
Id. at 1261-62. Thus far, federal courts are split in their application of the regulation. See
Nelson v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363, 367-68 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that the new regulation
codifies the Eighth Circuit's treating physician rule); Black v. Sullivan, 793 F. Supp. 45
(D.R.I. 1992) (holding that the new regulation is retroactive in application); Aldrich v.
Sullivan, 800 F. Supp. 1197, 1202 (D. Vt. 1992) (upholding HHS's right to instruct adjudica-
tors in the use of the new regulation); Schisler v. Sullivan, No. 80-CV-572E, 1992 WL
170736, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. July 8, 1992) (holding that the new regulation does not preempt the
Second Circuit's treating physician rule).
56. HHS regulations provide for the government payment of a consultative physical or
mental examination of the claimant by an independent source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519 (1992).
Payment for such an examination is a matter of administrative discretion reserved to
circumstances "when the evidence as a whole, both medical and nonmedical, is not sufficient
to support a decision on [the applicant's] claim." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a(b) (1992).
57. For sociohistorical examinations of black northern migration, see CAROLE MARKS,
FAREWELL-WE'RE GOOD AND GONE (1989). Marks advances three propositions explicating
black migration:
First, a majority of the migrants of the Great Migration were urban, nonagricul-
tural laborers, not the rural peasant usually assumed. Second, black migrants left
the South not simply to raise their wages but because they were the displaced
mudsills of southern industrial development. Third, much of the mobilization of the
migration was orchestrated in the board rooms of northern industrial enterprises.
Id. at 3; see also Dernoral Davis, Toward a Socio-Historical and Demographic Portrait of
Twentieth-Century African-Americans, in BLACK EXODUS: THE GREAT MIGRATION OF THE
AMERICAN SOUTH 1-19 (Alferdteen Harrison ed., 1991) (assessing demographic and socio-
economic structures of black population); GEORGE W. GROH, THE BLACK MIGRATION: THE
JOURNEY TO URBAN AMERICA 47 (1972) (emphasizing economic necessity and population
pressure as root causes of black urban migration); DANIEL M. JOHNSON & REX R. CAMP-
BELL, BLACK MIGRATION IN AMERICA 124-51 (1981) (charting the activating forces of black
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and raised two children. She now resides with her sixty-one year old
husband in a three and one-half room apartment in the South Bronx.
Their sole source of income is public welfare. Their resources are meager.58
C. EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
Johnson worked as a "piecework" sewing machine operator 59 for thirty-
six years, devoting an average of seven to eight hours per day and thirty-
five to forty hours per week to the manufacturing of wool, cotton, dacron,
acetate, and silk garments.6" At the AU hearing, Johnson described the
migration during the 1950s); JACQUELINE JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED: AMERICA'S UNDER-
CLASS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE PRESENT 157-65 (1992) (tracing the intrarural, rural-
urban, and south-north migrations of black populations); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED
LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991) (compiling
oral histories of black migration).
58. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Elderly Americans: Health, Housing, and Nutrition
Gaps between the Poor and the Nonpoor, GAO/PEMD-92-29 at 16 (June 24, 1992) (finding
elderly blacks three times as likely as elderly whites to be poor or near poor in 1990).
59. In addition to operating sewing machines, Johnson handled scissors and tweezers. On
technological developments within the garment industry, see Ava Baron & Susan E. Klepp,
"If I Didn't Have My Sewing Machine... ": Women and Sewing Machine Technology, in A
NEEDLE, A BOBBIN, A STRIKE: WOMEN NEEDLEWORKERS IN AMERICA 20, 45 (Joan M.
Jensen & Sue Davidson eds., 1984) ("The greatest change in the occupational structure of the garment
industry after the development of the sewing machine was the creation of another unskilled
category-the sewing machine operative.") [hereinafter A NEEDLE, A BOBBIN, A STRIKE].
60. Johnson's employment history reflects the "disadvantaged position" of women in the
labor force. See Diana M. Pearce, Toil and Trouble: Women Workers and Unemployment
Compensation, in WOMEN AND POVERTY, supra note 43, at 146-47. Pearce comments:
Despite dramatic increases in the number of women working and in the sectoral
shifts of economy over the last four decades, women continue to be highly concen-
trated in a few areas of employment. Forty percent of them are still found in ten
traditionally female occupations: secretary, retail trade sales worker, bookkeeper,
private household worker, elementary school teacher, waitress, typist, cashier,
sewer/stitcher, and registered nurse. The decrease in some service-sector job catego-
ries has been matched by increases in white-collar clerical jobs, but with no net
improvement in the pattern of concentration and segregation of women workers in
sex-stereotyped occupational ghettos.
Id. at 147 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
For studies of women's labor and wage disparity, see MARY H. STEVENSON, DETERMI-
NANTS OF Low WAGES FOR WOMEN WORKERS 25 (1984) ("In the clothing industry [in 1890]
male sewing-machine operators earned $8.00 a week, and women earned only $4.00."
(footnote omitted)); PAUL E. ZOPF, JR., AMERICAN WOMEN IN POVERTY 123 (1989) ("Women
always have been much more likely to be underemployed and unemployed and to receive less
than their fair share of unemployment insurance, which was created largely for male
householders and full-time workers." (footnote omitted)); Roslyn L. Feldberg, Comparable
Worth: Toward Theory and Practice in the United States, in WOMEN AND POVERTY, supra, at
163, 164 ("The low wages paid for women's work set one of the basic parameters of women's
poverty."); Joan Smith, The Paradox of Women's Poverty: Wage-Earning Women and Eco-
nomic Transformation, in WOMEN AND POVERTY, id. at 121, 122 ("Although central to




operation of the machines. She testified:
[Y]ou have to open it up with your foot, your two feet, you have to use
your left foot to open it up and use your right hand to put the button in,
and use your right foot to sew the button on; then you pull it out with
both hands. And the buttonhole machine, you have to use both feet and
you have to use both hands. A Singer sewing machine, you have to use
both hands, but you have to lift the material this way and that way. And
on a merrow machine you have five needles on the machine. It carries a
lot of whatever you're making, and you have to do a lot of reaching. And
the machine, you have a bottom, you're making a bottom, and you have
to use your hands to go around the long ways, you have to lift it up or
hold it up, and you have to use both feet, because that machine has a
lever on the side, and you have to use a lever to open it up, to close it up,
that way.
Piecework production required Johnson to sit at her sewing machine for
seven to eight hours each day. She stated: "You would have to sit there
hours to work because that's piecework., 61 Production also required
Johnson to stand, walk, bend, lift, and carry. She explained that raw
material in twenty to twenty-five pound bundles would "pile up on a table"
eight to twelve feet from her work station depending upon "how fast [she]
finished the first bundle." She continued: "When you've finished what
you're working on, you have to go over, bend from the waist down, pick up
the work from the floor, and get the work for yourself. This is piecework."
Piecework production also required Johnson to reach and grasp. She
testified: "You have to reach to get the work and you have to be reaching
when you're making it on different machines. You have to hold it with your
hands when you're working to keep it from running under the machine."
61. In her economic history of the garment industry, Elizabeth Faulkner Baker points out
that the piecework (i.e., payment per garment) system "often induced serious overstrain
because the operators could control output by controlling the machine." ELIZABETH F.
BAKER, TECHNOLOGY AND WOMAN'S WORK 26 (1964) (footnote omitted). Workload intensi-
fication is characteristic of capital-labor conflicts in the domestic and international textile
industry. See generally Mary H. Blewett, Manhood and the Market: The Politics of Gender and
Class among the Textile Workers of Fall River, Massachusetts, 1870-1880, in WORK ENGENDERED:
TOWARD A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 94-95 (Ava Baron ed., 1991); see also FIONA
WILSON, SWEATERS: GENDER, CLASS AND WORKSHOP-BASED INDUSTRY IN MEXICO 6 (1991)
("Producing firms need to respond quickly to orders: labor is hired or laid off at short
notice; intensive work over long hours alternates with periods of little work."); Elizabeth
Weiner & Hardy Green, A Stitch in Our Time: New York's Hispanic Garment Workers in the
1980s, in A NEEDLE, A BOBBIN, A STRIKE, supra note 59, at 278, 283 ("[Sewing machine
operators] say the nonstop pressure to keep up pace with faster workers, or just to make
enough money, is oppressive.").
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During the early 1980s, Johnson experienced a high rate of absenteeism
and a high incidence of early departures. In December 1986, complaining
of daily arthritic pain and shortness of breath, she ceased her employment
altogether. Twice, in May and November 1987, she attempted to return to
work but failed due to her pain-"I had my hands swollen up on pain and
arthritis"-and to her functional limitations-"I tried other places, a
couple of other places; they said I was too slow."
62
In her testimony, Johnson described how pain rendered her unable to
return to work. She stated: "I was in too much pain and I couldn't do the
job. I was unable to work." When questioned by the AIJ about "other
gainful work in the economy," Johnson answered: "I don't know about
any other job because that's the only thing I've ever done in my life." She
added: "I would love to work."
D. MEDICAL IMPAIRMENTS
Johnson suffers from a combination of physical impairments including
degenerative osteoarthritis of the hands, wrists, knees, left foot and ankle,
and lumbar sacral spine; lateral epicondylitis 63 of the elbows; hyperten-
sion; angina pectoris; obesity; and bronchial asthma. Her symptoms in-
clude numbness, tenderness, swelling, and stiffness; dizziness and
headaches; weakness and fatigue; wheezing, hoarseness, shortness of breath,
and productive coughing; depression and pain. The pain affects Johnson's
hands, fingers, wrists, elbows, right arm, left leg, left foot and ankle, knees,
and lower back. Her hand and knee pain are marked by limited flexion
and deformity.
Johnson's exertional and nonexertional pain restricts her range of motion.
She is able to stand for twenty to forty-five minutes, sit "maybe one to two
hours," and rise only by "pushing up from a chair." Commenting on her
ability to walk, she testified:
I can walk approximately half a block. I have to stop three or four times
before I can walk it, but I try walking it everyday. I get out of breath and
I have to stop three to four times before I can walk half a block. I use a cane
because my right leg gives way on me. The doctor says that I should carry it.
62. It is uncertain whether the provision of transitional and supported employment
services or reasonable workplace accommodations would have enabled Johnson to continue
her employment. For a discussion of such alternatives, see Frederick C. Collignon, The Role
of Reasonable Accommodation in Employing Disabled Persons in Private Industry, in DISABIL-
ITY AND THE LABOR MARKET 196-241 (Monroe Berkowitz & M. Anne Hill eds., 2d ed. 1989);
Craig Thornton & Rebecca Maynard, The Economics of Transitional Employment and Sup-
ported Employment, in DISABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET, supra, at 142-70.
63. Epicondylitis is an infection or inflammation above or upon a rounded articular




Johnson's pain also limits her ability to lift and carry. At the hearing, she
asserted: "Yesterday I carried a five pound bag of sugar and that was as
much as I could handle and I couldn't cross the street with it without
stopping two times." Johnson's pain additionally hampers her ability to
reach, grasp, and handle objects. It also hinders her ability to bend, climb,
and kneel. She attested that she cannot bend her knees, climb stairs
"without stopping every two steps," or kneel in church.
E. MEDICAL HISTORY
The medical history of Johnson's impairments spans a fourteen year
period. The history is documented by outpatient clinic notes, treating
physician reports, and consultative examiner reports.
1. Outpatient Clinic Notes
Johnson's first signs of illness appeared in 1974 when she visited a
community health clinic complaining of dizziness, headaches, joint pain,
wheezing, and "asthmatic bouts" sometimes continuing "all week," accom-
panied by hoarseness and a phlegm-producing cough. Clinic physicians
diagnosed asthma and chronic bronchitis. Johnson revisited the commu-
nity clinic in 1977, complaining of muscle ache and joint pain, particularly
in the shoulders and knees.
Beginning in 1978, Johnson attended her union health center.6 4 Over a
ten year period, she received treatment for hypertension, bronchial asthma,
generalized arthritis, pain, and physical deterioration. She entered pre-
scribed physical therapy in 1985 and 1987 for treatment of her hands and
lumbar sacral spine. In February 1986, union physicians diagnosed arthri-
tis of the knees marked by pain, stiffness, swelling, and limited flexion, as
well as bronchitis and obesity.
64. The center's likely union affiliates include the International Ladies Garment Workers
Union (ILGWU) and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA). For
ILGWU and ACWA histories, see BAKER, supra note 61, at 153-56 (discussing national
founding); Elizabeth Faue, Paths of Unionization: Community, Bureaucracy, and Gender in
the Minneapolis Labor Movement of the 1930s, in WORK ENGENDERED: TOWARD A NEW
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 296-319 (Ava Baron ed., 1991) (examining local organizing
battles); PHILIP S. FONER, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 80, 175, 281-83
(1980) (studying union and labor force composition); Joan M. Jensen, The Great Uprisings:
1900-1920, in A NEEDLE, A BOBBIN, A STRIKE, supra note 59, at 185, 191 (analyzing union
conservatism); Joan M. Jensen, Inside and Outside the Unions: 1920-1980, in A NEEDLE, A
BOBBIN, A STRIKE, supra note 59, at 83, 88-92 (comparing mass organizing tactics); Roger
Waldinger, Another Look at the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union: Women,
Industry Structure and Collective Action, in WOMEN, WORK AND PROTEST 86 (Ruth Milkman
ed., 1985) (evaluating union growth and transition).
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In March 1987, Johnson complained of pain affecting her hands, right
knee, and lower back with corresponding tenderness, as well as wheezing
and coughing. Physicians diagnosed bronchitis and possible osteoarthritis
of the hands and knees. A radiographic report showed degenerative
changes in both hands. Johnson again complained of pain in her hands,
knees, and lower back in April 1987. Physicians discovered swelling of the
elbows and tenderness of the hands, knees, and lumbar sacral spine.
In June 1987, Johnson complained of radiating pain and numbness of
the arms, fingers, and elbow. Physicians found her left arm swollen and
fat. Johnson reiterated complaints of wheezing, pain, swelling, and numb-
ness in her hands, fingers, arms, and joints in August 1987. Physicians
observed disfigurement of the arms and fingers and diagnosed minimal
osteoarthritis of the hands as well as bronchial asthma.
In September 1987, Johnson reasserted multiple joint and elbow pain,
especially of the right arm. Physicians noted that she also suffered from
bronchitis and nervousness. In October 1987, Johnson complained of pain
and stiffness of the fingers and left ankle. She stated that the pain
interfered with her ability to operate machinery and to engage in hand-
finishing work. Physicians attributed the pain to arthritis. In addition,
they diagnosed bronchitis.
In November 1987, Johnson complained of asthma attacks and joint
pain with swelling and tenderness of the left foot. Physicians diagnosed
bronchial asthma, bronchitis, and arthritis. They mentioned that Johnson's
medication was "not relieving symptoms" and that she could not go back
to work.
In March 1988, Johnson renewed complaints of pain in her hands, right
thigh, and lumbar sacral spine. Physicians diagnosed arthritis of the hands.
In April 1988, Johnson also complained of coughing, wheezing, and chest
pain. Physicians diagnosed angina pectoris and bronchial asthma.
2. Treating Physician Reports
On September 29, 1987, a community health clinic treating physician
submitted a letter diagnosing Johnson's hypertension, asthma, and osteoar-
thritis. The letter affirmed Johnson's complaint of a "worsening" arthritic
condition during the previous six months.
In April 1988, a union health center treating physician furnished a
report rediagnosing Johnson's hypertension, bronchial asthma, and gener-
alized arthritis. The report concluded that Johnson's "worsened" condi-
tions left her disabled.
In March 1988, a community health clinic treating physician provided
two reports reviewing Johnson's fourteen years of continuous treatment.
The first report, dated March 8, 1988, diagnosed hypertension, arthritis,
and bronchial asthma characterized by shortness of breath and chest pain
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caused by years of bronchial spasms connected to weather changes, dust,
pollens, trees, grasses, smoke, and fumes. The report noted expiratory
wheezes of both lungs and joint pain of the hands, knees, and back due to
degenerative joint disease.
The second report, dated March 28, 1988, echoed the above diagnosis of
bronchial asthma, hypertension, and arthritis. Likewise, it cited Johnson's
shortness of breath caused by bronchial spasms, high blood pressure,
headaches, and degenerative joint disease denoted by joint pain in her
hands and back. The report concluded that Johnson was "unable to
work."
On June 2, 1988, the same treating physician furnished a third report.
This six page report reassessed Johnson's impairments and her capacity to
perform work.6 5 Tracking her monthly, biweekly, and sometimes weekly
treatment from July 1, 1974 to June 2, 1988, the report enumerated the
following symptoms: shortness of breath, hypertension, and degenerative
osteoarthritis of the back and wrists.
The report corroborated this symptomatology through clinical, labora-
tory, and x-ray studies establishing tenderness of Johnson's back and wrist,
limitation of flexion and extension, and degenerative changes in her back
and hands. Based on these studies, the report concluded that Johnson's
impairments had lasted or could be expected to last at least twelve months.
The report offered a "guarded" prognosis of recovery.
3. Consultative Examiner Reports
On December 19, 1987, an HHS consultative examiner filed a report
reviewing Johnson's seven to eight year history of hypertension, bronchial
asthma, and osteoarthritis. The examiner's report recited Johnson's claim
that her bronchial asthma required monthly emergency room treatment,
particularly in the winter when the cold aggravated her condition. More-
over, the report recounted her complaints of extensive arthritic pain and
her reliance on a cane to walk due to weakness of her right leg. The report
found "deformities" of Johnson's hand and right knee. On January 8,
65. The treating physician report estimated that Johnson's combined impairments limited
her to two hours of continuous sitting and a total of four hours of intermittent sitting, twenty
minutes of continuous standing, and one half block of walking during an eight hour work
day. The estimate delineated partial restrictions in her ability to lift and carry (i.e., up to
five pounds occasionally), and to bend and reach (i.e., occasionally), and total restrictions in
her ability to squat, crawl, climb, repetitively grasp with the right hand, repetitively push and
pull arm controls with both hands, and repetitively push and pull leg controls with the right
or left foot. The report noted similarly extensive restrictions in Johnson's ability to tolerate
workplace environments involving exposure to unprotected heights, moving machinery,
marked changes in temperature and humidity, and dust, fumes, or gases.
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1987, a second HHS consultative examiner issued a report verifying defor-
mity of Johnson's right knee.
F. DAILY LIFE
Johnson's impairments limit the scope of her daily life and compel her
to rely on the aid and care of her husband and neighbors.66 Her reliance
extends to the most intimate details of her life.6 7 With regard to bathing
and dressing, for example, Johnson testified: "When I have to take a bath
I need [my husband's] help, and when I'm putting on my clothes, I have to
have him help sometimes with my shoes or buttoning up my coat or
clothes, blouses or whatever, if they have buttons on them."
Johnson's husband performs nearly all household cleaning. In her testi-
mony, Johnson stated: "He vacuums the rug, he scrubs the floor, he
washes the dishes, and he also cooks." Johnson's range of physical activ-
66. For a discussion of informal support networks in black communities, see Dennis P.
Hogan et al., Race, Kin Networks, and Assistance to Mother-Headed Families, 68 Soc. FORCES
797, 810 (1990) (adducing evidence "that black families receive substantial assistance from
support networks and that this support is tied to extended family patterns"); see also
Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Population: A Challenge to the Law, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 683, 700-03 (1991) (discussing elderly social support networks). Frolik and
Barnes observe:
Both formal and informal networks provide support for the elderly. The need for
a formal network is great when an elderly individual is functionally impaired, has
numerous health problems, and is without informal network resources. Formal
resources are provided by institutions, agencies, and their representatives....
Informal networks typically are comprised of spouses, relatives, and friends. For
many elderly, informal networks provide the primary means of support. As individu-
als age, they generally rely on their marital partner for both instrumental and
psychological support.
Id. at 701-02 (footnote omitted); see also Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care
Financing: A Look to the Future, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 729 (1991) ("Most home care
services in the United States are provided today on an informal, non-paid basis by family
members (chiefly wives, daughters, and daughters-in-law) and friends of the older long-term
care consumer.") (footnotes omitted).
67. Empirical studies report that the deterioration in the health of a spouse encourages
the other spouse to reorganize the division of "household production," decreasing participa-
tion in the labor market and increasing household work. Mark C. Berger, Labor Supply and
Spouse's Health: The Effects of Illness, Disability, and Mortality, 64 Soc. Sci. Q. 494, 494
(1983) ("Increases in household work could take the form of caring for the person in poor
health or undertaking tasks formerly performed by the ill or disabled family member.").
Berger concludes:
The empirical evidence shows that after controlling for differences in nonlabor
income, the [labor market] participation probabilities and annual working hours of
women increase in response to the poor health or death of the husband, while men





ity, with respect to shopping, cooking, and laundering, is equally circum-
scribed. She is able to shop once a week but must be escorted by a
neighbor. She is able to cook "occasionally," perhaps "twice a week," but
prepares "mostly TV dinners." Additionally, she is able to "put laundry in
the machine" but her husband "takes them out and takes them to the
dryer."
Just as Johnson has been forced to relinquish her household chores, she
has been compelled to abandon her hobbies and curtail her outdoor
activities. The following colloquy reveals the extent of her surrendered
activities.
Q. What kind of hobbies do you enjoy?
A. I love to sew, but I can't sew now. I can't because I cannot function
with my hand. My right hand is my main hand to sew with and I can't
function with it because of the pains in it.
Q. Do you go outdoors very often?
A. I go outdoors every day when I feel up to it. Some days I have an
asthma attack and I cannot go out because I'm too sick from the
medicine.
Q. How far do you walk when you go out?
A. I go maybe a block around or half a block and come back slowly
walking because I'm out of breath. I cannot walk too far.
G. SUMMARY
Johnson's disability case history establishes that she suffers impairments
which compromise her physical ability to carry on a fully independent,
self-sufficient life. Without the aid of her husband and neighbors,68 she
might require home care services6 9 or, if unavailable, out-of-home institu-
tional placement. These circumstances, though sympathetic, fail to resolve
the threshold question of representation. To call the case easy is of no
help. Resolution hinges on lawyer-centered assumptions about the sociole-
68. For a review of state legislative "family support" initiatives to prevent out-of-home
placement, see H. Rutherford Turnbull III et al., A Policy Analysis of Family Support for
Families with Members with Disabilities, 39 KAN. L. REV. 739, 741 (1991) ("In the disability
field, family support refers to any policy that enables families to keep the member with a
disability at home, supports their efforts to do so, increases their caregiving capacities, and is
centered on the family's needs, not solely the members' needs."(footnote omitted)).
69. See Kapp, supra note 66, at 729 ("Many older persons do not have family or friends to
assist them in day-to-day living. For this population sub-group, the availability of profes-
sional home care services may be particularly crucial in avoiding or postponing
institutionalization." (footnotes omitted)).
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gal world. These assumptions fuel descriptive and prescriptive claims
about that world, especially claims of moral and political desert. Such
claims, here mixing fact and law, decide whether a client presents an easy
or hard case for representation. Before addressing the ultimate question
of representation, therefore, it is vital to retrace a sequence of antecedent
theoretical moves. For the modernist lawyer, these moves lead to both
formalist and instrumentalist positions.
II. MODERNIST PRACTICES
The modernist vision 70 of poverty law practice is historically situated in
the enclosure of liberal legalism. In its current situation, the modernist
vision arouses images of a sociolegal world in which law and the politics of
the state are separate. This imagined separation opens space for the
foundational assumptions of legal advocacy. Both formalist and instrumentalist
claims occupy this "free" space. Absent an unencumbered juridical space for
objective and rational forms of persuasion,71 the practice of poverty law advo-
cacy breaks down into discretionary judgments of morality and politics. 72
70. Modernism encompasses both philosophical and aesthetic traditions. For philosophi-
cal treatments, see Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics,
133 CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 298, 308 (1985) (recognizing the "hallmark of modernity" as the
belief in the autonomous subject independent of social role); Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces:
A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1208 n.62, 1213-17 (1989) (associating
philosophical modernism with Hegel, Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche); Mark Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 517
(1986) (classifying critical legal studies as "the form that modernism takes in legal thought");
Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 587 (1983)
(noting the modernist background of "cultural-revolutionary politics"); cf. Joan C. Williams,
Culture and Certainty: Legal History and the Reconstructive Project, 76 VA. L. REV. 713 (1990)
(examining traditional and pragmatic approaches to modernist legal history).
For aesthetic treatments, see Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric
of Reconstruction, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 351 (1992) (describing the cultural tendencies of
high modernism); Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative is Despair". European Nationalism
and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1792, 1804 n.51 (1993)
(distinguishing high modernism and the avant-garde); David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1656, 1656 (1986) (comparing critical legal studies to "an artistic avant-
garde" form of legal modernism).
Like Schlag's, my account centers on the epistemological and cognitive underpinnings of
modernism.
71. On forms of persuasion in legal advocacy, see Peter Goodrich, Critical Legal Studies in
England: Prospective Histories, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 195, 223 (1992) ("[L]aw cannot
escape its history of advocacy, of polemic and argumentation; nor can it deny that even at
the level of doctrine its functions have been institutional and didactic and have therefore
incorporated an ineradicable element of dialogue, even if the motive of such address has
often been that of silencing the auditor through the structures and uses of objective or
rational forms of persuasion." (footnote omitted)).
72. Cf. Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32
UCLA L. REV. 474, 485 (1985) (asserting "the inescapably political nature of legal aid").
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To preserve the integrity of the advocacy project, the modernist poverty
lawyer avows faith in the rule of law. This avowal resounds most power-
fully in the claim of juridical stability. Although formalists and instrumen-
talist differ in their assessments of stability, their differences lie at the
periphery of the determinacy-indeterminacy debate. At the core, their
differences dissolve into consensus regarding the relative stability of legal
discourse, institutions, and relations.73
In this way, the modernist faith in the rule of law, manifested in the
claim of juridical stability, implies a cohesive theory of law, politics, and
the state upon which practice may be built. The logic of that practice is
derived from the liberal notion of autonomy. For the modernist, au-
tonomy is both structural and subjective. Structural autonomy refers to
the independence of law from politics and the state. Subjective autonomy
alludes to the independence of the lawyer-as-subject from her institutional
role of advocate.
The structural autonomy thesis evokes E.P. Thompson's "middle ground"
historiography.74 Standing on the middle ground dividing idealism and
materialism, 75 Thompson decries "highly schematic" Marxist76 renditions
of the law as merely "a part of a 'superstructure' adapting itself to the
necessities of an infrastructure of productive forces and productive
relations."77 Under these crude sociolegal renditions, Thompson opines,
73. But see Steven L. Winter, Confident, But Still Not Positive, 25 CONN. L. REV. 893, 920
n.111 (1993) (attacking the viability of the conventional core-periphery distinction absent a
satisfactory account).
74. The phrase belongs to E.P. Thompson. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 258
(1975) (discussing British legal historiography).
75. For an enlightening exchange with Thompson, see E.P. Thompson, in VISIONS OF
HISTORY 5-25 (Henry Abelove et al., eds., 1983).
76. Thompson concedes that "the Marxist tradition is in the process of splitting apart into
several traditions and fragments." E.P. THOMPSON, WRITING BY CANDLELIGHT 181, 183
(1980); see also John Comaroff, Re-Marx on Repression and the Rule of Law, 15 LAW & SoC.
INQUIRY 671, 672 (1990) ("[Ilt is hardly necessary, after Thompson, to point out that there
no longer is a single, canonical Marxism-only marxisms." (footnote omitted)). He notes
that "very ancient philosophical, ethical and political arguments are now being conducted
within a common Marxist vocabulary and that incompatible positions (from terrorists to
statist bureaucrats to determined libertarians) have got entangled in a common network of
categories and terms." Id. at 182-83. Significantly, he laments the orthodox tilt of such
categories. See E.P. THOMPSON, WILLIAM MORRIS 763, 786 (1977) (discussing Marxist
orthodoxy, and especially "tendencies towards determinism and positivism").
For an inquiry into the relationship between Marxism and the rule of law, see Martin
Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of Communism, 15 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 633, 645-46, 652 (1990) (noting Thompson's earnest, albeit controversial,
defense of the rule of law). But see Richard L. Abel, Capitalism and the Rule of Law:
Precondition or Contradiction?, 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 685, 696 (1990) (dismissing Krygier's
argument as "trite and discredited").
77. THOMPSON, supra note 74, at 259.
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the law serves as an "instrument" of the ruling class:7 8
[I]t both defines and defends these rulers' claims upon resources and
labor-power-it says what shall be property and what shall be crime-
and it mediates class relations with a set of appropriate rules and
sanctions, all of which, ultimately, confirm and consolidate existing class
power. Hence the rule of law is only another mask for the rule of a class.79
Like Thompson, the modernist poverty lawyer accepts "some part of the
Marxist-structural critique," particularly the "class-bound and mystifying
functions of the law,"8 which inflict hardship on poor clients (e.g., ten-
ants) despite a ritual of proceduralism. But she rejects the reductionist
excesses of structuralism. In place of reductionism, she finds ideological
contest81 (e.g., landlord-property versus tenant-community) and internal
logic (e.g., case precedent).8 2 These conceptions construe legal forms and
definitions as arenas of conflict,83 rather than as "the institutionalized
procedures of the ruling class."8 4 Indeed, the modernist asserts that it is
"through the forms of law"85 that the dominant-subordinate relations of
social hierarchy-class, disability, gender, race, sexuality-are mediated
and legitimated.
The modernist's admission that the law serves mediating and legitimat-
ing functions8 6 in society does not discredit the strategy of using legal
forms. For the modernist, the law retains "its own characteristics, its own
independent history and logic of evolution.",8 7 This evolution 88 is discern-
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 260.
81. Id. ("The law may also be seen as ideology, or as particular rules and sanctions which
stand in a definite and active relationship (often a field of conflict) to social norms .. "); see
also Thompson, supra note 75, at 20 (identifying the mediating role of culture and morality
in certain modes of production and productive relations).
82. THOMPSON, supra note 74, at 260 ("[The law] may be seen simply in terms of its own
logic, rules and procedures-that is, simply as law.").
83. THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 96 ("[Law] afforded an arena of class struggle, within
which alternative notions of law were fought out.").
84. THOMPSON, supra note 74, at 261.
85. Id. at 262.
86. Id. at 266 ("It is true that in history the law can be seen to mediate and to legitimize
existent class relations.").
87. Id. at 262 ("It is inherent in the especial character of law, as a body of rules and
procedures, that it shall apply logical criteria with reference to standards of universality and
equity.").
88. I use the term "evolution" not to evoke the mainstream idea of "an objective,
determined, progressive social evolutionary path" of historical development, but to capture the
critical notion of the "relative autonomy" of legal forms and practices. Robert W. Gordon,
Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 61 (1984).
Within the critical tradition of American legal historiography, the relative autonomy thesis
2592 [Vol. 81:2567
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ible in the "forms and traditions" 89 of procedural and substantive law.
Although "complex and contradictory," 90 these legal forms regulate state
power, inhibiting but not eradicating violence and partiality. 9' Moreover,
the forms manufacture an ideological "infrastructure" or medium that
molds identity and conflict. 92 Thompson adverts to this infrastructure as
an aspect of ideology:
[Tihe rules and categories of law penetrate every level of society, effect
vertical as well as horizontal definitions of men's rights and status, and
contribute to men's self-definition or sense of identity. As such law has
not only been imposed upon men from above: it has also been a medium
within which other social conflicts have been fought out.
93
is notable in the work of Morton Horwitz. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 xiii ("Law is autonomous to the extent that ideas are
autonomous, at least in the short run."); MORTON J. HORWlTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 271 (1992) (asserting the "complex interrelationship between
law and politics"); Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 399 (1988)
("[I]t seems to be part of the indeterminate nature of rights discourse that it can be
deployed with equal logic to protect the existing structure of privilege as well as to challenge
and delegitimate that structure." (footnote omitted)); Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law:
An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977) (book review) ("[The rule of
law] undoubtedly restrains power, but it also prevents power's benevolent exercise."). But
see Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 YALE
L.J. 1019 (1993) (book review) (criticizing Horwitz's structuralist historiography).
For a background on the relative autonomy thesis, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 250 (1987) (reiterating the cls proposition "that legal decision
makers do feel constrained even in times of disorder to follow existing procedures, even at
the cost of some loss of control"); THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 97 ("Certainly, 'relative
autonomy' is a helpful talisman against reductionism-against collapsing art or law or
religion abjectly back into class or 'economics'; but, without substantial addition, and
substantive analysis, it remains as nothing more than a warning-notice."); Isaac Balbus,
Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 571, 573 (1977) ("[Tlhe relative autonomy of the legal form from the will of
social actors entails at the same time an essential identity or homology between the legal
form and the very 'cell' of capitalist society, the commodity form."); Gordon, supra, at 101
("[R]elative autonomy means that [legal forms and practices] can't be explained completely
by reference to external political/social/economic factors."); David Jabbari, From Criticism
to Construction in Modem Critical Legal Theory, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 505, 521 (1992)
("To overcome instrumentalism, critical legal theorists have employed a position known as
'the relative autonomy of law' whereby law can be viewed as influenced by economic forces,
but still possessing such a degree of autonomy in relation to those forces that it may in turn
be able to influence them.").
89. THOMPSON, supra note 74, at 264.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 266 ("The forms and rhetoric of law acquire a distinct identity which may, on
occasion, inhibit power and afford some protection to the powerless.").
92. Id. at 267.
93. Id.
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To the modernist, therefore, the practice of poverty law is a "struggle
about law" undertaken "within the forms of law.",94 It is a practice of
logical intricacy and rhetorical strategies bounded by formal rules and
procedures.95 Despite the inequalities of legal rules and procedures, it is a
practice where law "matters."9 6
The subjective autonomy thesis extends Thompson's structural analysis
to the study of the legal profession. Robert Nelson and David Trubek spear-
head this sympathetic extension.97 Echoing Thompson, they admit to an inter-
pretive stance that "straddles" the line between subjectivity and structuralism. 98
To brace this precarious stance, Nelson and Trubek fasten upon a
concept of agency derivative of Thompson's. On the strength of this
concept, they contend "that the actions of lawyers reflect choices that are
neither totally unconstrained nor totally determined structurally." 99 Be-
fore evaluating this contention, it is important to revisit Thompson's con-
cept of agency. Intended to serve as a theoretical bulwark against totalizing
sociohistorical accounts of law and totalitarian political regimes' contempt
for law, the concept is surprisingly modest. Indeed, Thompson makes the
claim of situated, rather than transcendent or radical subjectivity.
Against this background, Nelson and Trubek's contention may be under-
stood as a fairly modest attempt to reinvigorate the concept of agency to
permit the interplay of lawyer subjectivity and sociolegal structure. Like
Thompson, Nelson and Trubek revile structural accounts for the tendency
to overlook "actors or specific mechanisms of change" and "to concretize
structural features as immutable and beyond the control of human
agents."'' ° Also, like Thompson, they berate unsituated "interpretive or
phenomenological accounts" for the tendency to "ignore deeper patterns
that shape and explain the frame of conscious action."1 1
94. Id. at 266.
95. Id. at 266-69.
96. Id. at 268. While crediting Thompson's observation, Richard Abel quarrels with the
inference "that because some can invoke law as a shield against state power others can wield
it as a sword to alter fundamental class relations." Abel, supra note 72, at 593. Abel points
out, for example, that poverty lawyers "can require the welfare system to grant benefits
mandated by law, to desist from unconstitutional discrimination, and to observe due process,
but they cannot determine the amount and content of welfare entitlements." Id. at 610.
97. Nelson & Trubek, supra note 24, at 1-27.
98. Id. at 23.
99. Id. at 22 ("The choices lawyers make within their professional field, as that field has
been shaped by exogenous political and economic forces, are influenced by the 'objective'
options presented in the current moment and the historically constructed repertoire of
'legitimate' or 'permissible' professional responses.").




Endeavoring to escape these tendencies, Nelson and Trubek provide an
account of professionalism in which lawyer ideals,10 2 though originally
molded by the deep structures of sociolegal knowledge and discourse,
nonetheless break free, propelled by a "logic partially independent" of
those structures. 0 3 On this logic, Nelson and Trubek contend, ideals
marked by "heavy traces" of sociolegal structure "become the object of
competition among individual or collective actors who seek to appropriate
(or perhaps accommodate) elements of a professional tradition in order to
advance a particular mode of professional organization or pursue other
objectives." ' 4 Out of this competition flow "multiple visions" of lawyer
professionalism.' °5 Each vision reflects the institutional arena constructed
by law and the lawyering process.
10 6
The vision of professionalism in the poverty law arena is implanted in
the assumption of subjective autonomy. This assumption encircles the
spheres of economics and politics. In the economic sphere, autonomy
pertains to the workplace'0 7 and to the market.'0 8 Workplace and market
autonomy are realized in the pursuit of law as a craft. For the lawyer
craftsman, law promises independence not only from the regulation of the
workplace, but also from the discipline of the market. In the political
sphere, autonomy relates to the client'0 9 and to the state. 10 Client and
state autonomy are basic ingredients of discretion. They ensure that the
lawyer can defy the demands of client representation and the imperatives
102. Id. at 23 (envisioning "professional ideals partly as formed within the workplace and
partly as designed, consciously or unconsciously, by lawyers for the promotion of their
economic... power, and status goals").
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 177, 179.
106. Id. at 179.
107. See Eliot Freidson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/
LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 24, at 215, 219 ("Professionalism ... revolves around the
central principle that the members of a specialized occupation control their own work." (footnote
omitted)); Nelson & Trubek, supra note 24, at 177, 181 ("Autonomy means control of one's
own work processes."); see also Richard L. Abel, Taking Professionalism Seriously, 1989 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 41, 57 (endorsing the "ideal of autonomy in work").
108. Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism,
1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 24, at 144, 166-68 (citing
lawyer "autonomy over the market (monopoly control) and autonomy from the profit
motives of the market").
109. Id. at 155, 168 (designating political autonomy to mean independence of the lawyer
from the client); see also Nelson & Trubek, supra note 24, at 181 ("Independence means
freedom from the client's definition of the situation and the client's desire for a favored
outcome."); cf. Gordon & Simon, supra note 31, at 230, 236 (associating professionalism with
the ethical orientation of reflective-i.e., complex and autonomous-judgment).
110. Solomon, supra note 108, at 162, 168 (defining state autonomy in terms of the
separation of law and partisan politics).
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of state politics. Poverty lawyers draw on both economic and political
spheres of autonomy to exercise gatekeeping discretion, and hence, to
decide who to represent. These spheres intersect in formalist and instru-
mentalist modes of poverty law practice."1 '
A. FORMALISM
Formalism constitutes a weak version of modernist lawyering. 1 2 The
modernist canon presupposes lawyer autonomy and cognitive capacity,
lawyer-client communicative rationality, and juridical stability. These ab-
stract assumptions inspire claims of neutrality, objectivity, empathy, and
determinacy in legal reasoning. The claims describe a general theory of
lawyering that is process-oriented and value-free. The adoption of a
procedural orientation shields lawyer judgments from political assault.
Thus shielded, poverty lawyers are free to judge the merits of a case as a
natural and necessary part of the lawyering process. With the separation
of law and politics, lawyer discretionary judgment acquires ethical legiti-
macy, even when that judgment is steered by moral evaluation.
1. Neutrality
The formalist claim to neutrality pertains to the poverty lawyer's judg-
ment of merit in case selection and strategy. 1 3 Under this claim, lawyer
111. On the intersection of practice, ideology, and material reality, see Nelson & Trubek,
supra note 24, at 212. ("Practices that reflected the ideology of earlier generations, once
embedded in institutional structure, may appear as given or inherent in the nature of the
work or the organization itself. Ideological product thus becomes material reality.").
112. On the interconnection of formalism and modernism, see Richard Hyland, The
Spinozist, 77 IOWA L. REV. 805, 817 (1992) (noting the "modernist pedigree" of formalist
jurisprudence reflected in the work of Ernest Weinrib).
113. In a prior work, I argued that poverty law case triage is accomplished covertly
without institutional or community participation. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Prac-
tice, supra note 2, at 2122-25.
Adoption of th[e triage] method had been covert. There had been no internal
debate within the office regarding its appropriateness or efficacy. Nor had there
been external, public debate within the client community concerning its necessity.
There had been only weary assent, spurred by an implicit acknowledgement of
limits. Brokered under desperate circumstances, triage was seized as a permanent
stopgap method of allocating scarce institutional resources.
Id. at 2123; see also Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting
Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 348 (1978) ("Within
whatever broad limits a board may establish, the managing or chief attorney of the program,
or the lawyers themselves, have full discretion to make intake and case-handling decisions
and, unlike the board, may do so on a case-by-case basis." (footnote omitted)); James F.
Smurl, Eligibility for Legal Aid: Whom to Help When Unable to Help All, 12 IND. L. REV. 519,
528 (1979) (noting the "considerable discretionary power" of the legal aid staff director and
attorneys in local resource allocation decisions (footnote omitted)); Tremblay, Toward a
Community-Based Ethic, supra note 16, at 1136 ("The preference that a lawyer exercises
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judgment is process-oriented and value-free. At the institutional level of
case selection, judgment is purportedly guided by the demands of client
access and eligibility. At the interstitial level of case strategy, judgment is
professedly channeled by the routines and standards of practice. At both
levels, so the argument goes, lawyer discretion is constrained.
The formalist poverty lawyer's claim to the exercise of neutral, nondiscre-
tionary judgments in selecting cases and plotting strategy is bound up in
the tenets of liberal pluralism, especially the notion of evenhanded interest
group representation. The poverty lawyer embroiders these tenets to
fashion the doctrine of "equal access to law.", 114 Under this doctrine, the
poor are treated as an interest group entitled to equal representation
before the law. By now, the trope of "equal access" is familiar. Formalists
employ it in designing case intake systems on a "first-come, first-served"
basis.115 Alan Houseman explains the operation of these systems. He
states:
[Ulnder "first-come, first-serve," resources were allocated by who walked
in the door. Who walked in the door depended on: (1) where the office
was located; (2) how the staff members were viewed by the community;
(3) whether the people recognized a legal problem; and (4) whether they
could seek help because they lacked transportation, resided in an institu-
tion, were disabled or elderly, or had cultural, ethnic or language barriers.
among prospective clients is clear and direct-some become clients, the remainder do
not.").
My argument in no way precludes overt forms of participation in triage rationing schemes.
See, e.g., Bellow & Kettelson, supra, at 343-44 (posing an institutional reform litigation
model of triage); Tremblay, supra note 22, at 139-42 (evaluating a collective reform model of
triage); Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic, supra note 16, at 1129-49 (describing a
community-based model of triage).
The driving force behind such rationing schemes here and abroad is cost. See Brice
Dickson, Legal Services and Legal Procedures in the 1990s, in LAW, SOCIETY AND CHANGE 167,
174 (Stephen Livingstone & John Morison eds., 1990) (mentioning the British government's
complaint that legal aid schemes were "costing too much"); Alan W. Houseman, Legal
Services: Has It Succeeded, 1 D.C. L. REV. 97, 108-17 (1992) (noting the "severe financial
limitations" affecting the delivery of legal services).
114. Compare Abel, supra note 72, at 487 (mentioning that "[t]he image of legal aid as
equal access to law (embodied in courts) probably is the dominant conception today"
(footnote omitted)) and Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 2, at 663-64 (citing the
"minimum access" rhetoric associated with the "individualized problem-solving approach"
of direct service litigation) with Marshall Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual
Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 282 (1986) (proposing a nonutilitarian, client-oriented theory of
procedural access rights to legal assistance) and Mortimer Getzels, Legal Aid Cases Should
Not Be Limited, 27 LEG. AID BRIEFCASE 203, 206 (1969) (insisting that "the objective of
legal aid must be to make it impossible for any man, woman, or child in the United States to
be denied the equal protection of the laws simply because he or she is poor").
115. See Houseman, supra note 113, at 114 (1992) ("[Office of Equal Opportunity]
priorities were set either on a first-come, first-serve basis, or by the staffing and program
structural decisions made by program legal staff and boards.").
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Because there were limited resources, extensive waiting lists were cre-
ated, and many with serious legal problems were not being served. In
short, who was served depended on who was in line first and what, if any,
resources were then available to those at the end of the line.' 
1 6
Although well-meant, these open-ended legal service systems are under-
mined by a scarcity of institutional resources.' 17 Gary Bellow and Jean
Kettleson report that the institutional consequence of scarcity is a decline
in the "quality" of legal service." 8 They illustrate the path of decline in a
typical legal services office.
Faced with a choice of reducing service to each client in order to
increase volume, or turning clients away to maintain present case and
service levels, the office decides to try to help in some way anyone who
asks for and is otherwise eligible for assistance. Because there are so
many people in need, and no one can say that any one group "deserves"
service more than another, most of the staff and board think this is
preferable to turning people away, even if the quality of service suf-
fers. 119
The quality of poverty law advocacy under a formalist, equal access
intake regime suffers in two respects. First, advocacy is routinized. In a
previous work, I described routinization as "a formulaic and mechanical
convention devised to process individual cases on a mass scale.",1 20  I
116. Id. at 114-15.
117. See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 113, at 353 ("The same problem of scarcity that
produces decisions to turn clients away also results in efforts to take more cases than can be
properly handled.").
118. Id. at 354; see also Gary Bellow, Legal Aid in the United States, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 337, 342 (1980) (asserting that lawyers' desire to "increase the number of cases they
can handle" generates "self-imposed pressures to reduce the amount of care and energy
given to any particular case").
119. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 113, at 354; see also Abel, supra note 72, at 569 ("It is
extremely difficult, of course, both morally and practically, to close the doors of a legal aid
program and to turn people away because they have the wrong problem." (footnote omit-
ted)); Gary Bellow, Reflections on Case-Load Limitation, 27 LEG. AID BRIEFCASE 195, 195
(1969) ("The implications of promulgating rules or standards that will necessarily turn away
people in need-people who have, in fact, nowhere else to go for legal help-have been too
difficult to face .... "); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049,
1055 (1970) ("Turning people away is difficult: The values which made a lawyer want to
help poor people will make it hard to turn away a person with a problem; the professional
ethic is full of talk about representing all who need representation .... ").
120. Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 2, at 685 (footnote omitted); see also
MARJORIE GIRTH, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS 21 (1976) (observing that New Jersey publicly
funded poverty law programs "developed heavy concentrations of routine matters"); Abel,
supra note 72, at 570 (noting that "[1legal aid lawyers handle their cases in a routine fashion,
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traced the genesis of routinization to the "dominant traditions and institu-
tional economics of poverty law."' 121 It is the epistemic content-our
habits of thinking about the poor and poverty-of these modernist tradi-
tions, and not simply institutional economics, that makes routinization
inevitable. 122
Second, advocacy is standardized. As I have argued previously, standard-
ization occurs when "individual cases are slotted into standard patterns of
advocacy and resolution-notably settlement[.]' 23 Slotting instills a work
ethic of "reasonableness., 124 In his sociohistorical account of the evolu-
tion of Chicago legal services organizations, Jack Katz documents the
adoption of "reasonableness" as a work ethic.125 Katz observes that the
ethic allowed legal aid lawyers to "translate the procedural, day-in-court
jurisprudence into a means for personally accepting everyday professional
and moral limitations." 126
The formalist claim to neutrality in the exercise of case intake and
strategy judgments is undisturbed by the practices of routinization and
standardization. To the formalist, routine and standard advocacy practices
with the least possible expenditure of effort"); Bellow, supra note 119, at 196 (remarking that
"[t]here are just too many cases to give any one of them the time and attention it deserves;
the individual case is necessarily secondary to the demands of the mass-production process-
ing that envelops the office"); Gary Bellow, The Legal Aid Puzzle: Turning Solutions into
Problems, 5 WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW SOC'Y 52, 60 (1977) (condemning "the tendencies
toward routine, constricted service in legal aid practice"); Bellow, supra note 15, at 108
(asserting that "[piroblems presented by clients in legal services offices by and large are
dealt with routinely and perfunctorily"); Carol R. Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal
Services for the Poor: Why and How to Limit Caseload, 46 J. URB. L. 217, 226 (1969)
(commenting that the legal services "lawyer is limited to taking only those cases that do not
require more than a minimum of thought, effort, time, and skill").
121. Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 2, at 686; see also Abel, supra note 107,
at 56-57 ("Lawyers whose clients or employers are passive and endowed with limited
resources.., must cope with an excessive caseload; consequently, they do the minimum that
will get the client out of the office, often falling back on routine.").
122. Cf. JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 18 (1982) ("Routine treat-
ment is not inevitable in legal assistance, but pressure to treat legal problems without
making much of their differences is systematically implied by the social meaning of poverty.
However important as a political or moral issue, poverty is presented to legal assistance
offices in a stream of individual problems, each of which already has been defined as
insignificant in its social ramifications.").
123. Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 1, at 686 (footnotes omitted); see also
Bellow, supra note 119, at 196 (commenting that "[c]ases handled by legal aid offices are
compromised far sooner than they ought to be, and with far less benefit to the client");
Silver, supra note 120, at 227 (asserting that the burden of administering heavy caseloads
"militates against any interest in solving any more than the most immediate problem at the
lowest level of controversy").
124. KATZ, supra note 122, at 51.
125. Id. at 56.
126. Id.
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are an outgrowth of the commitment to equal access. This commitment
and the corollary principle of "first-come, first-served" case selection,
applied in accordance with mandated eligibility criteria, 127 establish the
127. The enabling legislation and implementing regulations of the Legal Services Corpora-
tion (LSC) mandate minimum levels of institutional and community participation in establish-
ing case priorities at intake and on appeal. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C)(i) (1988 & Supp.
1992). The statute mandates that LSC
insure that (i) recipients, consistent with goals established by the Corporation,
adopt procedures for determining and implementing priorities for the provision of
[legal] assistance, taking into account the relative needs of eligible clients for such
assistance (including such outreach, training, and support services as may be
necessary), including particularly the needs for service on the part of significant
segments of the population of eligible clients with special difficulties of access to
legal services or special legal problems (including elderly and handicapped individu-
als).
Id. (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(7) (requiring "recipients to establish
guidelines ... for a system for review of appeals to insure the efficient utilization of re-
sources and to avoid frivolous appeals (except that such guidelines or regulations shall in no
way interfere with attorneys' professional responsibilities)" (emphasis added)).
LSC regulations supply procedures for determining and implementing the above-
mentioned "priorities." 45 C.F.R. § 1620.1-.5 (1992). The regulations provide:
The governing body of a recipient shall adopt procedures for establishing priori-
ties in the allocation of its resources. The procedures adopted shall: (1) Include an
effective appraisal of the needs of eligible clients in the geographic areas served by
the recipient, and their relative importance, based on information received from
potential or current eligible clients solicited in a manner reasonably calculated to
obtain the attitude of all significant segments of the client population. The ap-
praisal shall also include input from the recipient's employees .... (2) Insure an
opportunity for participation by all significant segments of the client community and
the recipient's employees in the setting of priorities ....
Id. § 1620.2(a)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). This mandate buttresses income and resource
eligibility guidelines. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
Additionally, the statute requires LSC to establish "maximum income levels (taking into
account family size, urban and rural differences, and substantial cost-of-living variations) for
individuals eligible for legal assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(A). Specifically, the
statute directs LSC to establish "guidelines" to insure that client eligibility is determined on
the basis of particular "factors." The factors include:
(i) the liquid assets and income level of the client,
(ii) the fixed debts, medical expenses, and other factors which affect the client's
ability to pay,
(iii) the cost of living in the locality, and
(iv) such other factors as relate to financial inability to afford legal assistance,
which may include evidence of a prior determination that such individual's
lack of income results from refusal or unwillingness, without good cause, to
seek or accept an employment situation ....
42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(B). LSC regulations supplement statutory eligibility factors enumer-
ating maximum income levels, not to exceed 125% of the current HHS Federal Poverty
Income Guidelines, and asset ceilings. 45 C.F.R. § 1611.1-.9 (1992). For a family size of
two, HHS determines 125% of the poverty income level to be $11,488. 45 C.F.R. § 1611,
Appendix A (1992) (Legal Services Corporation Poverty Guidelines).
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groundwork for the formalist's general theory of process-oriented and
value-free lawyering. The crux of this theory is the denial of ethical
discretion.
The formalist contends that her case judgments, both at intake and in
advocacy, are dictated by considerations of access, eligibility, and routine.
These considerations allegedly curb discretion by limiting the poverty
lawyer's ability to choose among clients. Critics seeking to refute this
contention note the "practical exclusions" effected at intake.1 28 Bellow
specifies these exclusions in demonstrating the formalist's "choice" of case
priorities. He explains:
The standards of financial eligibility, the hours an office is open, its
geographical location, the way people are treated, all become methods
by which some cases are taken and others are turned away or discour-
aged. In most offices, cases are taken on a first-come, first-served
basis-with the delays, waiting time, and office hours serving as an
effective way to discourage excessive demand. Decisions on these mat-
ters clearly involve a choice of priorities.129
Although effective, Bellow's rebuttal of the formalists' "denial of ethical
discretion" contention is incomplete. As it stands, the rebuttal addresses
only lawyer judgments at intake. Full rebuttal requires evidence sufficient
to counter the formalist's claim to neutrality with respect to lawyer judg-
ments in advocacy as well. In an early work, Carol Silver outlined the
rough form of this rebuttal. 3 ' Silver probed lawyer decisionmaking in the
contexts of intake and advocacy, highlighting "decisions which reallocated
time from some clients to those clients whose cases eventually went to
court."'
13 1
Subsequent empirical studies of professional autonomy and decisionmak-
ing in poverty law practice have shown that legal services lawyers develop
128. Bellow, supra note 119, at 199.
129. Id.; see also Silver, supra note 120, at 224 (recognizing "that every program for the
distribution of legal (and other) services to the poor has some such [caseload limitation]
method, whether or not it is articulated; whether or not it is recognized by those who operate
it"); Wexler, supra note 119, at 1055 (arguing that "[a] seemingly neutral policy of 'first-
come, first-served' cuts against the least informed, the least mobile, and the most oppressed").
Eligibility guidelines are especially subject to manipulation. See, e.g., GIRTH, supra note
120, at 19 (noting that OEO attorneys "interpreted [income eligibility] guidelines in an
individualized fashion and managed to justify a finding of eligibility for anyone whom he or
she wished to serve"); KATZ, supra note 122, at 64 (stating that "Legal Aid's eligibility rules
functioned less certainly to impose uniformity on staff behavior than as a politically defen-
sible face to outsiders and as a precondition for the exercise of the power to make
exceptions, which was a treasured daily ritual").
130. Silver, supra note 120, at 225, 232.
131. Id. at 225.
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"highly personalized" methods of advocacy.1 32 Robert Meadow and Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow link such methods to a model of "personalized
justice., 133 Essential to this model is the ability of lawyers "to decide on
their own what and how much service to provide and to tailor the service
provided to particular clients, attorney notions of justice, or individual
attorney preferences." '134 Based on an assessment of that ability, Meadow
and Menkel-Meadow conclude that "[tihe professional autonomy of the
legal services attorneys resides not so much in what they perform or who
their clients are, but how they choose to perform."' 35
Silver maintains that the poverty lawyer chooses to perform "as judge as
well as advocate." 13 6 In spite of her role as advocate, the lawyer passes
normative judgment on her client. 137 This judgment is shrouded in strate-
gic decisionmaking. The lawyer, for example, "decid[es] that where a
defense to a debt is little more than colorable it should not be raised, that
where a procedural or technical nicety would vindicate an otherwise lost
cause it may not be employed .... ,,138 The normative judgment that
drives lawyer ethical decisionmaking at intake and in advocacy is the
judgment of moral character: the judgment of the "undeserving" poor. 139
132. See Robert G. Meadow & Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Personalized or Bureaucratized
Justice in Legal Services: Resolving Sociolegal Ambivalence in the Delivery of Legal Aid for the
Poor, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 397, 411 (1985) [hereinafter Meadow & Menkel-Meadow,
Personalized or Bureaucratized Justice in Legal Services]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Robert G.
Meadow, Resource Allocation in Legal Services, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 237, 240 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, Resource Allocation].
133. Meadow & Menkel-Meadow, Personalized or Bureaucratized Justice in Legal Services,
supra note 132, at 400.
134. Id. at 400-01.
135. Id. at 411 (emphasis added); see also Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, Resource Alloca-
tion, supra note 132, at 252 (finding support for the theory of "professional rather than client
dominance of legal services attorneys resource decisions").
136. Silver, supra note 120, at 232; see also GIRTH, supra note 120, at 21 (disclosing that
"individual applicants do not face a consistent screening process, but are subject to the
individualized criteria of the 'intake attorney' ").
137. Normative judgment is a fixture of modernism, providing the poverty lawyer with
both a philosophy and rationalization of practice. Cf. Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, Resource
Allocation, supra note 132, at 240 (noting that "legal services attorneys know they have more
legal work than they can possibly handle, so in addition to making either tacit or purposeful
decisions about what to work on, they may also develop an individual philosophy or
rationalization of resource allocation").
138. Silver, supra note 120, at 232.
139. Id. (asserting that "caseloads are reduced by eliminating service to the 'undeserving'
poor"); see also Houseman, supra note 113, at 99-100 ("Pressures from members of the
boards of directors of legal aid societies, particularly those with traditional moralistic or
religious backgrounds, were successful in prohibiting legal assistance for many types of cases.
Those not 'deserving' were excluded, and various legal services, often including divorces,
were considered luxuries and not offered." (footnote omitted)).
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The imposition of the poverty lawyer's judgment of client moral charac-
ter at intake and in advocacy discredits the formalist claim to neutrality.
The exercise of that judgment constitutes a covert method of institutional
and interstitial triage. Institutionally, moral judgment commissions the
poverty lawyer to choose among prospective clients. Interstitially, moral
judgment authorizes her to allocate resources (e.g., time and energy)
among represented clients.
The poverty lawyer's wielding of moral judgment summons a vision of
professionalism William Simon calls Progressive-Functionalist. 4 ° On
Simon's account, the Progressive-Functionalist model operates on two
premises: normative integration and functional differentiation. Norma-
tive integration underscores the importance of socialization and honor in a
social order. Functional differentiation highlights the specialized training,
knowledge, and skills acquired in connection with a professional role.
141
For the formalist poverty lawyer, professionalism entails the deployment
of her legal training, knowledge, and skill to achieve the moral integration
of her client into the social order.
Under the Progressive-Functionalist model, the poverty lawyer is de-
voted to client moral integration and, by extension, public morality.142 The
logic of this devotion is unadorned: client morality promotes the common
morality of the general public.143 This logic is related to the demand-
driven legal services market prevalent in impoverished communities.
144
140. See William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37
STAN. L. REV. 565, 565-66 (1985); see also Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a
Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 265 (1990) (outlining a vision of the "Progressive
lawyer-statesman"); David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41
VAND. L. REV. 717, 725 (reclassifying the Progressive-Functionalist model as "progressive
professionalism").
141. My analysis follows Simon's exposition. See Simon, supra note 140, at 566-67.
142. Id. at 568, 576-77.
143. David Luban ascribes this logic to the "New Wave of progressive professionalist
lawyers" who molded public interest law practice in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Luban,
supra note 140, at 731 (1988). Pointing to this logic, Luban asserts that "New Wave lawyers
would never have doubted that their own talents were devoted to the pursuit of the common
good." Id. at 732-33. As an example, he cites the liberal-Christian and Marxist New Wave
lawyers who "viewed their clients' interests as universal interests within society." Id. at 733.
On this view, "lawyers could advance the public interest simply by pursuing their clients'
interests." Id.
144. Bellow and Kettleson mention the elastic tendency of demand curves in low income
legal services markets. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 113, at 380. They assert:
[Dlefinitions of legal need are not static; they are elastic and have a tendency to
expand as potential beneficiaries see lawyers as capable of responding to their
problems. As has been demonstrated in legal services to the poor, demand for
services will increase to the limits of the available supply.
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There the poverty lawyer is insulated 45 from labor commodification.14 6
Like the Progressive lawyer ideal inspired by Louis Brandeis,147 the pov-
erty lawyer is immune148 to the disciplining forces of the market where
clients shop for legal services. 14 9 This scarcity-based immunity reproduces
the Progressive-Functionalist ideal of the lawyer working in the service of
clients to advance "a vision of the general social good."
1 50
The Progressive-Functionalist vision of the lawyer acting in the service
of the public displaces the client's private interest with the lawyer's concep-
tion of the public good. 51  Fundamental to this conception is moral
character.152 The formalist conflates client moral character and the public
good. On this calculus, elevating client morality enhances the public good.
The formalist constructs client moral character, erecting a metaphorical
universe of "good" and "bad" qualities.' 53 This assignment of character is
performed in the context of the lawyering process. 154 Because the mean-
145. Id. at 340-41. Bellow and Kettleson explain:
[E]conomic incentives and disincentives are not dominant factors in the ways
relationships and obligations are defined. Prospective clients have much less influ-
ence on who will get what kinds of service than in other areas of practice. It is not
client demand, but program defined, non-economic criteria that generally deter-
mine the content and character of representation.
Id. at 340-41 (footnotes omitted).
146. See Simon, supra note 140, at 581 (alluding to "the Progressive-Functionalist premise
that lawyers do not regard themselves as commodities").
147. See Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 313
(1914); see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 237-38 (1988)
(applauding the "Brandeisian vision of moral activism"); Luban, supra note 140, at 720, 734
(classifying Brandeis and New Wave public interest lawyers within the tradition of progres-
sive professionalism).
148. See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 113, at 341 ("[Tlhe ability of clients who are being
represented to keep their attorneys accountable is limited by their lack of economic leverage.").
149. For an examination of the professional labor market for lawyers and the demand for
legal services, see Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 215 (1992).
150. Simon, supra note 140, at 585.
151. See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 113, at 343 ("[Public interest lawyers] may risk
subordinating client interests to their own conceptions of the public or general good.").
152. The focus on moral character combines the Brandeisian technocratic vision of
progressive professionalism, particularly the belief that the lawyer possesses a special quality
of mind enabling him to render a "good judgment of people," with the New Wave progres-
sive professionalist sensibility of authenticity. See Luban, supra note 140, at 725-26, 731-32.
153. On metaphor and truth, see GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE
LIVE BY 159-84 (1980).
154. Steven Winter exposes the linkages of context, meaning, and performance. He notes:
The message lies not in the substance, but in the form. Words are not containers
of meaning but material substances-the forces and elements of palpable practices.
This reversal in which the manifest message of the content is supplanted and
superseded by the contextual meaning of its performance is what postmodernists
mean by performativity.
Winter, supra note 37, at 795 (footnote omitted).
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ing of character is constructed, the process of naming "good" and "bad"
qualities is unstable. 155 In the criminal context, for example, "good"
character corresponds to guilt as well as innocence. 156 In the civil context,
"good" character conforms to reductive categories of legal reasoning and
remedy."5 7 To be "good," the client must fit-conceptually and experien-
tially-the structure of these categories.'58 Those structures may demand
a particular factual profile (e.g., a disabled woman of color) or a specific
remedial design (e.g., injunctive relief or monetary damages). The client
who fits the appropriate "misery" profile or design is judged "good."' 5 9
Implicit in these constructs is the concept of moral desert. The formalist
aspires to find the client morally deserving of representation. 160  The
155. Given the use of metaphorical concepts, this instability is unsurprising. See LAKOFF
& JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 41-45 (exploring metaphorical coherence and contradiction).
156. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 178-79
(1983-84) (presenting a "black, poor, and ugly" female heroin addict guilty of drug posses-
sion as "good"); Charles Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 15 (1951)
(maintaining the ethical neutrality of "defending the guilty"); Martha Minow, Breaking the
Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 723, 741 (1991)
(celebrating the "politically-motivated lawbreaker"); John T. Noonan, The Purposes of
Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1487 (1966) (discussing
the client who is a member of the Ku Klux Klan); Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a
Bad Person?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (1986) (book review) (asserting that "some illegal
acts-civil disobedience at certain times-may be judged morally worthy").
157. Homer La Rue offers a student-lawyer's version of the "good" client taken from a
law school clinic setting. He explains:
The client is a "good client," . . . if she can articulate the facts of her problem,
preferably without emotion, and if she seeks an outcome which fits into the
definition of a legal remedy. Such behavior by the client comports with the
traditional definition of the lawyer's role, which emphasizes dispassionate assess-
ment of the problem to determine if it is recognized by the law.
La Rue, supra note 20, at 1152-53; cf. Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39
UCLA L. REV. 697, 715 (1992) (attacking misguided visions of the "good client").
Steven Winter refers to this standard analysis as "the reductive approach." Steven L.
Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 332 (1992). Winter
states: "Conventional legal reasoning attempts... to reduce a complex legal problem to a
principle, a set of propositional rules, or some other necessary and sufficient criteria. In
theory, these definitional criteria allow professionals to delineate legal categories with
greater precision and then to draw appropriate distinctions." Id. at 331 (footnote omitted).
158. See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2270 (1989) ("Thus, to tell a story that will be
both meaningful and compelling, the judge or other legal storyteller must make use of
preexisting cultural knowledge in ways that will seem natural to those subject to the legal
rule because already grounded in social experience and mediated by existing cultural
models.").
159. See Wexler, supra note 119, at 1062 (describing the experience of "[r]eveling in the
misery of one's clients").
160. Thomas Shaffer defines the "good" client in terms of moral goodness. Thomas L.
Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319, 329 (1987) (claiming that
the client "is capable of being and of becoming a good person, and is therefore worth my
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evaluation of moral worth is an act of perception 16' linked to the inves-
tigation of a client's grievances and claims.1 62 This act of moral "pre-
figuration, 163 occurs throughout the lawyering process. Its predictive power
hinges on the "reflexivity of its social meaning"-the extent to which a
community shares the meaning of moral worthiness.
1 64
The Johnson case demonstrates a strong reflexivity of social meaning,
and hence, correspondence of moral judgment within the poverty law
community. The record of Johnson's administrative and judicial proceed-
ings easily establishes the requisite facts-physical impairments, medical
history, and functional limitations-to survive institutional and interstitial
triage. The facts of Johnson's disability, though persuasive, contribute to
but do not compel a judgment of moral worthiness. That judgment rides
on additional factors such as Johnson's race, gender, and personal history
of migration, family, and work. The poverty lawyer's evaluation of those
factors occurs behind the gloss of objectivity.
2. Objectivity
The formalist claim to objectivity bears directly upon the evaluation of
Johnson's moral worth as a client. To appraise Johnson's moral character,
the formalist engages in fact finding. Facts constitute "descriptive claims"
' 165
about the sociolegal world. For the formalist, they are the constituent
elements of objective truth.
giving him moral advice" (footnote omitted)); cf. LUBAN, supra note 147, at 306 (mentioning
moral respect and stigmatization as a factor in triage justification).
161. On the influence of perception in the representation of the disabled, see Michael L.
Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals in the Commit-
ment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 167 (1982) ("Because a [psychiatric] patient's
appearance, manner, dress, or speech may be 'different,' the lawyer may feel somewhat
foolish or awkward representing his client's views to the court."); Bruce D. Sales & Lynn R.
Kahle, Law and Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill, 3 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 391, 393 (1980)
(contending that the "pejorative labelling of mentally ill people" may generate "perceptions
of behavior and negative attitudes").
162. On the function of grieving and claiming in dispute generation and processing, see
generally Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 525 (1980-81).
163. Winter, supra note 37, at 799 (explicating prefiguration as a process "in which the
very act of perception already entails a transfiguration and assimilation of the idea or event
in terms of an existing conceptual framework") (footnotes omitted).
164. Winter, supra note 157, at 337 ("[T]he predictive power of... [a] concept is contin-
gent on the reflexivity of its social meaning-that is, on the assimilation of that meaning both
by the observer and by the actor under observation." (footnote omitted)).
165. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992) ("[Conventionally
defined] propositions of law and fact may describe different kinds of facts, whose discovery
might require somewhat different modes of inquiry, but that does not alter their epistemologi-
cal equivalence as descriptive claims about some feature of the physical, mental, or moral
world.").
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The formalist pursues fact finding in search of truth. Enacting the role
of trial judge, her "paramount objective" is factual truth. 166 The formalist,
however, is a partisan truth-seeker. Her partisanship is epistemological:
she seeks to discover 167 truth through a theory of knowledge 168 that posits
the cognizability of moral identity. 169 Before representation may com-
mence,170 therefore, Johnson's moral identity must be ascertained. 171
Ascertaining Johnson's moral character in the context of her disability
case entails "reasoning towards conclusions of fact.' 17 2 The ultimate fact
in controversy is disability itself. Reasoning involves "blame" and "respon-
sibility" attributions. 173  To be found morally worthy, Johnson must be
166. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1033 (1975); cf. Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 133 (1987) ("How closely [adversary trial] 'truth' comports
with the 'real truth,' whatever that might be, is indeterminable.").
167. The metaphor of discovery regarding "truth" receives wide usage in the literature of
lawyering and ethics. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809,
810 (1977) ("The purpose of testimony is to permit the fact-finder to discover the truth.").
168. The formalist is unmoved by Monroe Freedman's epistemological demurrer that
"knowledge is always uncertain in nature." MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN
AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 57 (1975); cf. Joseph D. Grano, Ascertaining the Truth, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1061, 1064 (1992) (bemoaning the academic "denigration of the search for truth").
169. Jurisprudentially, this proposition presumes the lawyer's commitment, openness, and
cognitive competency to recognize the meaning and value of human good. See DAVID
GRANFIELD, THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW 257-62 (1988); MICHAEL PERRY, LOVE AND
POWER 33, 99 (1991).
170. On the lawyer's exercise of moral judgment at the commencement of the lawyer-
client relation, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37
MERCER L. REV. 647, 664-65 (1986).
171. Kent Greenawalt makes a similar claim concerning cultural morality in the judicial
realm. See KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 196 (1992).
172. WILLIAM TWINING & DAVID MIERS, How To Do THINGS WITH RULES 279 (3d ed.
1991).
173. See Isaac M. Lipkus, A Heuristic Model to Explain Perceptions of Unjust Events, 5 Soc.
JUST. RES. 359, 379 (1992). Lipkus's study of attributional models explores the cognitive
perception of moral character. Illustrating "the belief in a just world" principle of attribu-
tion, he explains:
[I]nnocent victims are blamed so that the observer can feel relief that negative
outcomes only happen to individuals who deserve it. Consequently, the poor and
the ill are often viewed disparagingly. The implication this has for the self is that
assuming responsibility for a negative outcome implicates him/her as an unworthy
person. After all, only "bad" people deserve negative outcomes.
Id. 361-62 (footnotes omitted). On sociolegal applications of attribution theory, see Dan
Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 655, 659 (1980-81) ("Attribution theory holds that people prefer to find order and
meaning in the world, and usually develop explanations for why events happen and why
people behave as they do." (footnote omitted)); see also William L.F. Felstiner et al., The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & SoC'Y
REV. 631, 641 (1980-81) ("Attribution theory asserts that the causes a person assigns for an
injurious experience will be important determinants of the action he or she takes in response
to it; those attributions will also presumably affect perception of the experience as injurious."
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blameless. She must be excused of responsibility for her impairments.
Blame must be assigned elsewhere: to the garment industry, to her em-
ployer, or to piecework production. These attributions create the "illusion"
of a valid disability. 174 The illusion of a rationally validated disability
instills overconfidence 17 5 in the lawyer's judgment 7 6 of Johnson's moral
character. Overconfidence is boosted by the well-documented record of
her impairments: osteoarthritis, hypertension, and bronchial asthma.
Alone, these impairments are not dispositive of moral character.
When combined with her thirty-six year work history, North Carolina
migration, intact family household, race, and gender, Johnson attains a
virtuous moral character.
The objectivist categorization of a disabled client's moral identity indi-
cates the use of an idealized cognitive model of disability.177 The formalist
(footnote omitted)); Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary
Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 17-18 (1990) ("[A]ttribution
theory teaches that, once a person adopts a stereotype, a wide variety of information will be
seen by that individual to reinforce that stereotype." (footnote omitted)).
174. Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic
Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329,
345 (1992) ("The illusion of validity occurs when decisionmakers make stereotypical predic-
tions, and the evidence on which they make their predictions 'is scanty, unreliable, or
outdated.' " (footnotes omitted)); Perlin, supra note 173, at 15 ("We tend to make intuitive
predictions by selecting an outcome most similar to a pre-existing stereotype and express
extreme confidence in such predictions, even where we are given scanty, outdated, or
unreliable information about an unknown." (footnote omitted)).
175. Overconfidence is a problem-solving heuristic used in complex decisionmaking and
probabilistic judgment. See Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Process-
ing and Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, 15 LAW & SoC'y REV. 122, 143 (1980-81) ("People
tend to be overconfident in their judgments. Not only do individuals tend to overestimate
how much they already know, but they also tend to underestimate how much they have just
learned from facts presented in a particular context." (footnote omitted)); see also Perlin,
supra note 173, at 16 ("We tend to overestimate how much we already know and underesti-
mate how much we have recently learned." (footnote omitted)).
176. There is a wide social science literature on the heuristics of judgment. See, e.g., Paul
J.H. Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limita-
tions, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 529 (1982) (examining expected utility model of individual decisionmak-
ing, particularly principle of utility maximization); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (describing
judgmental heuristics used to assess probabilities and to predict values); Amos Tversky et
al., Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice, 95 PSYCHOL. REV. 371 (1988) (identifying
the heuristics and computational schema of choice and preference); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. 251 (1986) (proposing a
descriptive model of choice).
177. Steven Winter introduces the concept of an idealized cognitive model (ICM) to
elucidate the mistaken assumptions of legal reasoning and judicial decisionmaking. Winter
explains: "An ICM is a 'folk' theory or cultural model that we create and use to organize
our knowledge. It relates many concepts that are inferentially connected by means of a
single conceptual structure that is experientially meaningful as a whole." Winter, Transcen-
dental Nonsense, supra note 13, at 1152 (footnote omitted); see also GEORGE LAKOFF,
WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND
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utilizes this idealized model in fact finding, for example, when investigating
impairments and pain.178 Under this model, the formalist wants to see
pain and disfigurement. She wants to see Johnson grimace and hobble.
She wants to hear her complaints of pain and functional limitation. When
such evidence is not visible or announced, she fixates on a belief in
objectivity, 79 overlooking the difficulties of client articulation18 ° and blam-
ing the client for factual inconsistencies or omissions.'
The properties, duration, and etiology of disability, however, defy objec-
tivist categorization.' s 2 Physical18 3 and mental 84 impairments are not
68-77 (1987); Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 699
(1989) (presenting a paradigmatic approach to classification "focus[ing] on the way in which
[a communal] tradition is defined and expressed through concrete exemplars which serve as
models and as problem-solving devices"); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 3 n.1 (1984) (labeling the knowledge structures of lawyer problem-solving as "stock
stories").
178. On the nexus of impairments and pain, see Resnik, supra note 43, at 47 ("The
questions in disability cases often involve finding 'facts' about the relationship between an
individual's described experience of pain and her or his capacity to obtain gainful
employment." (footnote omitted)).
179. On theory construction and "belief fixations," see BRIAN ELLIS, TRUTH AND OBJECTIV-
ITY 169 (1990) (contending that belief fixations prevent appropriate inferences).
180. See Resnik, supra note 43, at 47 ("Not only are [social security disability] cases often
filed by litigants who lack lawyers, but the claims themselves may be exceedingly difficult to
articulate.").
Factual inconsistencies or omissions sometimes may be attributable to the SSA's failure to
provide adequate bilingual services to non-English-speaking claimants at the application
stage, at consultative physician examinations, and at administrative law judge hearings. See
Kim Savage, Lack of Bilingual Services at Social Security Offices: Why Non-English-Speaking
Clients Are Not Getting Help, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 911, 911 (1992) ("Nationwide,
non-English-speaking persons who are poor, are elderly, or have disabilities are denied
access to benefit programs because the Social Security Administration (SSA) fails to provide
translated written notices and bilingual staff or interpreters.").
181. For a discussion of the social and ethical construction of client narrative inconsisten-
cies, see Naomi Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475 (1993).
182. The framework of this analysis is taken from Steven Winter's discussion of the
"constituent features" of an idealized cognitive model. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
supra note 13, at 1153; see also LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 122 ("On the standard
objectivist view, we can understand and hence define an object entirely in terms of a set of its
inherent properties.").
183. On the social construction of physical disability, see CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABIL-
ITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 19-106 (1988) (examining the social, political, and normative
construction of disability in the legislative treatment of physically impaired people);
MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT 78-94 (1990) (clarifying the ideological
influences at play in the social construction of disability).
184. On the social construction of mental disability, see THOMAS J. SCHEFF, BEING
MENTALLY ILL 190 (1984) (exploring labeling theory to demonstrate that " 'mental illness'
may be at least as much a social fact as it is a physical fact"); Phil Brown, The Name Game:
Toward a Sociology of Diagnosis, 11 J. MIND & BEHAV. 385 (1990) (outlining a sociology of
clinical diagnosis); Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to
Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 660-61 (1992)
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right triangles conforming to a Pythagorean Theorem. 85 Unlike Euclid-
ean geometry, 186 medical impairments may frustrate objective investiga-
tion. 87  The truth of disability is neither metaphysical I 88  nor
mathematical.1 89 In Johnson's case, the truth of her disability is contin-
gent on the poverty lawyer's overlapping sociolegal judgments concerning
the nature of disability, the scope of statutory entitlement, and the content
of moral desert.
The plasticity1 90 of disability permits the formalist poverty lawyer to
sanctify a client's moral character. Without recourse to moral character,
the formalist resorts to a kind of "soft conventionalism ' 9' of community
norms and practices. The key to actualizing these norms and practices is
(noting the value-laden politics of clinical diagnosis, diagnostic categories, and treatment
protocols); cf. ROBERT ENDLEMAN, DEVIANCE AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: THE SOCIOLOGY
AND PSYCHOLOGY OF OUTSIDERS 133-55 (1990) (denigrating the labeling sociology of mental
illness in favor of psychoanalytic theory).
185. On the Euclidean measurement of right triangles under the Pythagorean Theorem,
see John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential
Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992, 998 (1992).
186. For an exposition of Euclidean geometry and the significance of the rise of non-
Euclideanism in law and the social sciences, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 47-73 (1973);
see also GERALD HOLTON, THEMATIC ORIGINS OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT: KEPLER TO EIN-
STEIN 437 (1975); LAKOFF, supra note 177, at 219-28.
187. Cf. Rogers & Molzon, supra note 185, at 998 ("In Euclidean geometry it was possible
to test certain theorems for truth by checking them against objective reality.").
188. On metaphysical truth, see Lawson, supra note 165, at 866 ("The bedrock, or
metaphysical, conception of truth is correspondence with a reality that exists independently
of its acknowledgment by the conscious mind of a perceiver; and a (metaphysical) truth
claim is warranted or justified when it identifies some feature of that reality beyond a
rational doubt." (footnote omitted)).
189. On mathematical truth, see Rogers & Molzon, supra note 185, at 998 ("Truth may
just mean 'consistent with all other axioms and proven and provable theorems.' ").
190. On the genesis of plasticity, see PURCELL, supra note 186, at 54, 69-70 (showing the
non-Euclidean inception of the concept of plasticity); see also ROBERTO M. UNGER, PLASTIC-
ITY INTO POWER: VARIATIONS ON THEMES OF POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL
THEORY 153, 206-12 (1987) (discussing plasticity of socioeconomic arrangements); Alfieri,
Disabled Clients, supra note 2, at 837 (describing plasticity of institutional roles).
191. For treatments of "soft conventionalism," see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 124
(1986) ("[S]oft conventionalism insists that the law of a community includes everything [e.g.,
moral and political convictions] within the implicit extension of [legal] conventions.");
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on Dworkin and the Two Faces of Law, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 533, 583-84 (1992) ("[S]oft conventionalism provides a plausible account of how
ideology and moral argument can permeate legal debate while at the same time playing a
subordinate role limited by the facts of social practice."); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 186, 191 (1985) (noting the conventionalist's emphasis on situated
practice and professionalism); Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice &
Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937, 966 (1990) (contending that practices "function as
conventions"); Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 203 (1982) (insisting that "law rests at its foundations on a complex
set of conventions regarding proper law-identifying and law-applying activities of both
officials and citizens").
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lawyer-client empathy. In impoverished communities, the judgments of
empathic understanding are no less socially constructed than the categori-
zations of objectivism.1 12
3. Empathy
The formalist claim to empathy stems from the modernist experience of
exile.'9 3 The poverty lawyer experiences exile in the disjunctions of client
difference (e.g., class, gender, and race). These disjunctions separate the
lawyer and client, partitioning their respective worlds. The "exile-
motif" '94 is a recurrent feature of current poverty law scholarship.' 95 Its
emergence signals a crisis of "epistemological confidence 19 6 marked by
the slow renunciation of the traditional lawyer-client, subject-object di-
chotomy of legal objectivism. 197 The formalist evades this crisis by pro-
pounding the claim of empathy.
192. Lucy Williams traces such constructed judgments to a fundamental ambivalence
about the poor. See Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification
Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 721 (1992) ("The United States has always
been ambivalent about assisting the poor, unsure whether the poor are good people facing
difficult times and circumstances or bad people who cannot fit into society." (footnote
omitted)).
193. See David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1656, 1667 (1986) ("Who we
are, according to the modernist, are exiles.").
194. Id.
195. See generally Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 2, at 2110
(describing an Hispanic female foster parent-welfare client); Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn,
supra note 2, at 637 (depicting a twenty-seven year old Hispanic female welfare client);
Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language, supra note 18, at 1429 (discussing a black female
battered welfare client); Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 19, at 1311
(discussing black male client); Dinerstein, supra note 21, at 972 (recalling a black female
West African immigrant client); Gerald P. Lopez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42
STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989) (recounting an Hispanic female welfare client); William H. Simon,
Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991) (portray-
ing a sixty-five year old black female lower middle class client); White, supra note 27, at 861
(chronicling a group of welfare clients); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the
Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-88)
(picturing rural disability recipients and urban homeless people); White, Subordination,
supra note 15, at 5 (sketching a black female welfare client).
The upshot of exile is "arrogant perception." See Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Percep-
tion, World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 199 (1991-92) ("A key aspect of arrogant perception is the
distance between 'me' and 'the other.' The 'I' as arrogant perceiver is a subject to myself
with my own perceptions, motivations, and interests.").
196. Thomas McCarthy, Doing the Right Thing in Cross-Cultural Representation, 102 ETHICS
635, 637 (1992) (book review) (probing the crisis of representation in anthropology).
197. On the import of the subject-object dichotomy, see Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy
and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1450 n.24 (1990)
("[T]he underlying assumption of the subject/object dichotomy is what unites objectivism
and subjectivism.").
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The concept of empathy is pivotal to the formalist lawyering process.
Canonized in the works of David Binder, Paul Bergman, and Susan Price,198
empathy is the "stabilized matrix"1 99 of lawyer-client interviewing and
counseling. 20 Steven Winter derives the notion of a "stabilized matrix"
from Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, specifically his conception of a
"disciplinary matrix. ' 20 1 Under Kuhn's terms, disciplinary "refers to the
common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline;" matrix
points to the "compos[ition] of ordered elements of various sorts, each
requiring further specification.,'
2 2
Kuhn notes four main components of a disciplinary matrix. The first he
labels "symbolic generalizations., 20 3 Expressed in symbolic form and words,
198. See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH 40-41, 53 (1991); DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 14-15 (1977); see also John L. Barkai &
Virginia 0. Fine, Empathy Training for Lawyers and Law Students, 13 Sw. L.J. 505, 510-17
(1983) (endorsing and testing empathy skills). For an astute analysis of empathy and the
client-centered approach, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal
and Refinement, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 501, 556-84 (1990) [hereinafter Dinerstein, Client-Centered
Counseling]; Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, supra note 157, at 707-11; Stephen
Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 733-39 (1987); Simon, Homo Psychologi-
cus, supra note 15, at 506-25 (1980); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural
Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 130-44 [hereinafter Simon, The Ideology
of Advocacy].
199. Winter, supra note 197, at 1452-53.
200. In the lawyer-client context, many scholars treat empathy as a formalist skill consist-
ing of nonjudgmental listening, understanding, and acceptance. See, e.g., BINDER ET AL.,
supra note 198, at 40-41, 53 (denoting the empathic ideals of nonjudgmental listening,
understanding, and acceptance); ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH HARBAUGH, INTERVIEW-
ING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING 116-18 (1990) (defining empathic reflection as a set of
subskills involving listening to, understanding, and communicating the client's feelings);
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 73-83
(1987) (characterizing "empathic regard for the client's feelings" in terms of active listening
and acceptance).
Cf. Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 993-94 (1992) (argu-
ing that the "positive judgment latent in empathy" should sometimes extend to explicit
"approval" of the client's world view); Diana T. Meyers, Social Exclusion, Moral Reflection,
and Rights, 12 LAW & PHIL. 217, 227-28 (1993) (reviewing MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE (1990)) ("Empathic thought takes into account the agent's strengths and
weaknesses along with that individual's moral ideals, and it commends action that responds
to others in a manner that is consonant with that self-concept.").
For applications beyond the lawyer-client context, see Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and
Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987) (examining empathic narrative and understanding in
legal discourse and decisionmaking); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the
Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989) (reconciling formalist
and empathic models of judicial decisionmaking); cf. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court
1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (examining differ-
ence and judging); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations
for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988) (discussing feminist ethics and judging).
201. Winter, supra note 197, at 1453.




these "formal" or "readily formalizable" generalizations serve both
"legislative" and "definitional" functions.20 4 The second component he
describes as a "shared commitment" to particular heuristic and ontological
"models," including the supply of "preferred or permissible analogies and
metaphors. 2 0 5 The third component he denotes as "values," especially
concerning standards of prediction and judgment.20 6 The fourth he identi-
fies as "exemplars," contemplating the concrete and technical "problem-
solutions" acquired in education and applied in practice. 0 7
Informed by Kuhn, Winter argues that, within the stabilized matrices of
law, "the epistemic and the political are already mutually entailed in a
manner that is likely to be imperceptible to the participant. 2 8 The
formalist denies the mutuality of epistemology and politics, rejecting the
intersection of knowledge and power. For her, empathic understanding is
apolitical both in purpose and operation.
Binder, Bergman, and Price contend that the purpose of empathy is to
"give[] clients feelings of trust and confidence in an attorney-client relation-
ship and thereby motivate[] clients to participate fully in conversations., 2 9
Encouraging these feelings enables the lawyer "to receive information that
clients might not otherwise disclose," and incites clients "to participate
actively in the solutions to their problems., 2 10 The operation of empathy,
Binder, Bergman, and Price continue, involves the lawyer's exhibition of
"nonjudgmental understanding. 2 1 1
The formalist principle of nonjudgmental understanding is contingent
on a priori claims to neutrality and objectivity. Without such claims, the
formalist stands situated in a context that is "simultaneously constituting
and constituted., 212 It is constituting because it entangles the lawyer and
client in contested social practices that are partisan and subjective.213 It is
constituted because its constructed conditions-class, disability, gender,
race-antecede entry into the lawyer-client relationship.214
Envisioning context in this "double sense"-as simultaneously consti-
tuted and constituting-locates the lawyer as a situated subject imbued
204. Id. at 182-83.
205. Id. at 184.
206. Id. at 184-85.
207. Id. at 187.
208. Winter, supra note 197, at 1452.
209. BINDER ET AL., supra note 198, at 40.
210. Id. at 41-42.
211. Id. at 41.
212. Winter, supra note 197, at 1486.
213. Id. at 1486 ("We are constituting because meaning arises in the imaginative interac-
tion of the human being with the environment." (emphasis added)).
214. Id. ("We are constituted because the situated quality of human existence means that
both the physical and social environment with which we interact is already formed by the
actions of those who have preceded us." (emphasis added)).
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with the "imaginative, social constructions" of meaning and category.215
The accretion of these imaginative constructions-objectivist categories of
"good" and "bad" moral character-produces both cognitive and norma-
tive "sedimentation. ' ' 216 Winter explains:
Sedimentation is the "deposit" of the subject's past interactions with its
physical and social situation. It operates as a gestalt that, once inte-
grated, can be invoked without being fully reactivated. Once a meaning
is sedimented, it can become self-reinforcing. Sedimentation is another
way of describing the process by which we form, internalize, and then
operate by means of idealized cognitive models.
217
The sedimented context of poverty law entrenches normative categories
"good" and "bad" moral character, and thereby, undermines the formalist
claim to empathy and its core principle of nonjudgmental understanding.
The collapse of this claim and its corollary deprives the formalist lawyer of
a consensual, intersubjective theory of meaning. 218 Absent voluntary con-
sensus, meaning must be coerced; in a sense, it must be "outed." Ritual-
ized coercion occurs when the poverty lawyer prods the client to confess to
a litany of pain, impairments, and functional limitations.
215. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 13, at 1157.
216. Winter, supra note 197, at 1487 ("[T]he concept [of sedimentation] expresses the way
meanings and assumptions build up within the subject and, once internalized, operate
without the subject's conscious awareness." (footnote omitted)).
217. Id. at 1488.
218. The collapse of the formalist claim to empathy may be slowed by reflection on
lawyer-client difference. Cf. Meyers, supra note 200, at 227. Reasoning from the premise of
difference, Diana Meyers imagines empathic thought as "an interactive model of moral
reflection." Id. at 228. She explains:
To think empathically, one must ask, "Who are you?" and "How can I best respond
to your needs?" Empathic thought requires people to attend to others in order to
learn to see the world from their point of view ... to apprentice themselves to
others. One's own point of view may ultimately prove to be a permutation of
another group's basic interest profile, but it may not .... Although empathic
thought relies on the deliberator's accumulated experience of people and human
relations, it assumes no standard case. Rather, it pays attention to individuals and
seeks to understand and respond to each individual's distinctive ensemble of
strengths and weaknesses, hopes and fears. Difference is presumed to be the norm
(every person is unique), and the task of moral reflection is to devise action that is
gauged to particular persons. Thus, making allowance for difference carries no
connotations of favoritism or exploitation. Rather, empathic thought relishes and
honors difference.
Id. at 227; see also ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN 178 (1988) ("I cannot
provide here an account of what I take real knowledge [of the oppressed] to be, but I do
want to say here that the acquisition of such knowledge requires a kind of apprenticeship;
and making oneself an apprentice to someone is at odds with having political, social, and
economic power over them.").
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The metaphor of "outing," 219 borrowed from the literature of gay and
lesbian sexuality, is illuminating. Like disability, sexuality is socially con-
structed. 220 Like people with disabilities, gay and lesbian people are often
labeled deviant. 221 Further, like the outing of disability, the outing of
sexuality is an act of power, albeit punitive rather than benevolent.222 The
exercise of that power deprives the individual-whether gay, lesbian, or
disabled-of an opportunity to "come out" as an act of self-determination.
William Eskridge describes the "coming out process" as "central to gay
consciousness., 223 To compromise that process is to sever the connection
219. The term "outing" is conventionally used to describe "the exposure of prominent
'closet' homosexuals for politically progressive ends." John P. Elwood, Outing, Privacy, and
the First Amendment, 102 YALE L.J. 747, 747, 750 (1992). These ends may include "greater
public acceptance of homosexuals, more sympathetic civil rights legislation, and increased
funding for AIDS research." Id. at 747. Elwood distinguishes two types of "outing." The
first type, called "gratuitous" outing, "merely identifies an individual as gay, and does not
attempt to imbue this fact with greater significance or relate it to some greater controversy."
Id. at 770 (footnote omitted). The second type, called "political" outing, "discloses a
person's sexuality in the context of a controversy in which he is involved." Id.; see also
RUTHANN ROBSOMN, LESBIAN (OuT)LAw 75 (1992) ("The outing controversy captures
important issues for lesbians, such as passing, heterosexism, and the boundaries of lesbian
identity."); Larry Gross, The Contested Closet: The Ethics and Politics of Outing, 8 CRITICAL
STUD. MASS CoMM. 352 (1991) (explicating the underlying conceptual and political bases of
outing); Jon E. Grant, Note, "Outing" and Freedom of the Press: Sexual Orientation's
Challenge to the Supreme Court's Categorical Jurisprudence, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 103, 104
(1991) (" 'Outing' is the intentional exposure by gay people of the sexual orientation of
public figures." (footnote omitted)); Ronald F. Wick, Note, Out of the Closet and into the
Headlines: "Outing" and the Private Facts Tort, 80 GEO. L.J. 413, 413 (1991) (defining
"outing" as the act of "making public allegations of homosexuality in an effort to force the
subject to 'come out of the closet' and go public with his lifestyle" (footnote omitted)).
220. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's SEX AND
REAsoN." Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 366 (1992) (book review)
(claiming that "sexuality is socially constructed and historically contingent"). To Eskridge,
"social constructionism posits that the concept of and content of sexual orientation is not a
natural category, biologically or otherwise fixed across time and space." Id. at 366-67. On
the contrary, "each society creates its catogories [sic]." Id. at 367.
221. Id. at 369 (citing the historical creation of "homosexuality as a deviate form of
personhood"); see also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling,
Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.
511, 537-633 (1992) (probing the pernicious consequences of the "sex-as-lifestyle
assumption").
For historical portraits of sexual deviance, see generally JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY,
SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE
BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1980); 3 MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE CARE OF THE SELF: THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1986); DAVID F. GREEN-
BERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988); JONATHAN N. KATZ, GAY AMERICAN
HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. (1992).
222. This distinction-benevolence and punishment-is significant. Outing disability,
though frequently demeaning, is materially beneficial: the party will enjoy public benefits.
Outing sexuality, by comparison, is punitive: the party will suffer public or private sanction.
223. Eskridge, supra note 220, at 373 ("Coming out involves, first, recognition that one's
sexuality profoundly involves feelings toward people of the same gender, and that these
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of the body-disability, gender, race, sexuality-to identity.224 The pov-
erty lawyer's act of coercing a confession of the meaning of disability from
the client severs the connection of the body to identity, thus undermining
the claims to empathic, nonjudgmental understanding and intersubjectivity.
4. Determinacy
The formalist claim to determinacy rises from the assumption of juridi-
cal stability. This assumption accords predictability and regularity to legal
discourse, institutions, and relations. The poverty lawyer emphasizes the
discursive stability of legal rules and reasoning. In this regard, stability is
characterized by immanent rationality, determinacy, and apolitical decision-
making.225 Immanent rationality implies the internal coherence and intelli-
gibility of legal discourse. 2 6 Determinacy suggests the deduction of legal
solutions227 from positive or natural norms.228 Apolitical decisionmaking
feelings are important to one's identity; second, knowledge that this self-recognition links
one to many others with similar feelings and identity; and, third, acknowledgement to others
of these discoveries and conclusions about oneself." (footnote omitted)); see also Sylvia A.
Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 212 ("For gay
people, leaving the closet is a difficult and profoundly important act of self-affirmation of
their identities and core human relationships."). For commentary on the "coming out"
process, see generally Barry M. Dank, Coming Out in the Gay World, 34 PSYCHIATRY 180
(1971); Gary J. McDonald, Individual Differences in the Coming Out Process for Gay Men:
Implications for Theoretical Models, 8 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 47 (1982).
224. Eskridge, supra note 220, at 374; see also Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet:
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915,
932-63 (1989) (exploring the formation of homosexual identity).
225. These characteristics are symbolic of formalism. See, e.g., Michael Corrado, The
Place of Formalism in Legal Theory, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1555 (1992) (proffering a
"genuine" version of formalism entailing "the autonomy of the law and the existence of a
specifically legal realm of investigation."); Ken Kress, Formalism, Corrective Justice and Tort
Law, 77:2 IOWA L. REV. iii (1992) ("[I1f formalism is correct, law is coherent and internally
intelligible, autonomous and distinct from politics, economics, moral philosophy, history,
and social science."); Frederick F. Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 546 (1988)
(sketching a theory of "presumptive formalism"); Frederick F. Schauer, Rules and the Rules
of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 664 (1991) (focusing on formalism as "a style of
decisionmaking in which the decisionmaker denies having made a choice when in fact the
decisionmaker did so"); Ernest Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of
the Law, 97 YALE. L.J. 949, 953-57 (1988) (describing formalism in terms of rationality,
immanence, and normativity).
226. See Dennis Patterson, The Metaphysics of Legal Formalism, 77 IOWA L. REV. 741, 744
(1992) (" 'Immanent' to law means 'inside' legal discourse.").
227. On formalist modes of legal reasoning, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 38 (1960) (describing the "Formal Style" of legal reasoning
where "[o]pinions run in deductive form with an air or expression of single-line inevitability");
Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564 (1983)
(defining formalism as the "belief in the availability of a deductive or quasi-deductive
method capable of giving determinate solutions to particular problems of legal choice").
228. Anita Allen and Maria Morales offer a view of formalism "as inherently conservative."
Anita L. Allen & Maria H. Morales, Hobbes, Formalism, and Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
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indicates that law is separate from politics.2 29 On this account, legal
judgment obtains justification independent of consequentialist concerns.23 °
The poverty lawyer discerns the immanent rationality of legal discourse
from the "ensemble of authoritative materials" deployed in practice.231
The authoritative principles of poverty law practice in the context of
disability largely consist of statutes, regulations, and case law. These
principles shape the necessary232 form and content of disability. To
"mediate" legal decisionmaking, 233 the meaning of a principle (i.e., its
form and content) must correspond to the external world. 234  For the
formalist, that unity of meaning-whether over or under inclusive 23 5-
provides a "sufficient basis for deciding any case that arises.,
236
REV. 713, 735 (1992). They explain:
[Formalism] instructs those who reason about law and decide legal cases to look to
established positive or natural norms. Members of politically powerless, disadvan-
taged groups who cannot accept that there could be legitimate legal barriers to
empowerment and welfare may be inclined to balk at positivistic formalism.
Id. at 735.
229. See, e.g., John Stick, Formalism as the Method of Maximally Coherent Classification, 77
IOWA L. REV. 773, 774 (1992) (reciting the formalist claim that "legal analysis is determinate
and apolitical"); see also Patterson, supra note 226, at 742 ("From the point of view of
epistemology, formalism presupposes that one universe of discourse, here law, can be
demarcated from competing normative enterprises, most especially the political.").
230. See Steven J. Heyman, Aristotle on Political Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 851, 851 (1992)
("Legal justification involves the working out of principles that are immanent in the law,
rather than looking to the instrumental realm of politics.").
231. George Brencher, Formalism, Positivism, and Natural Law in Ernest Weinrib's Tort
Theory: Will the Real Ernest Weinrib Please Come Forward, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 318, 319
(1992) (noting the formalist's tendency to gather "an ensemble of authoritative materials" as
a "text" from which to draw understanding); see also Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic
Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of
Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Uses, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 867 n.4
(1981) (noting the formalistic tendency to trace law to "an authoritative source").
232. See Allan C. Hutchinson, The Importance of Not Being Ernest, 34 McGILL L.J. 233,
235 (1989) (defining immanence as "the idea of law as the rational embodiment of an
indwelling necessity").
233. On formalist mediation, see Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 13, at 1110
("The traditional approach assumes that principles 'mediate.' But mediation is possible only
if two conditions are met: (1) the principles must accurately correspond to our social world; and (2)
there must be a logical, propositional trajectory from principle to concrete application.").
234. On the foundational entailment of formalism, see Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering
the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 793 (1989) (" 'Formalism' is the view that there exists a
mind-independent reality consisting of certain first principles either of fact or value.");
Alicia Juarrero-Roque, Fail-Safe Versus Safe-Fail: Suggestions Toward an Evolutionary Model
of Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1758 n.100 (1991) ("The first requirement [of formalism] is
that principles not only be value-free in their mirroring of the world, but that they also be
'objective,' i.e., out there, not of our doing.").
235. Cf. Robert S. Summers, Theory, Formality and Practical Legal Criticism, 106 LAW Q.
REV. 407 (1990) (formulating constitutive grounds for over and under formality).
236. David Lyons, Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism-A Pathological Study, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV. 949, 950 (1981).
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The poverty lawyer claims to deduce determinate substantive meaning,
and thus, legal solutions from the logical application of principle to fact.2 37
This claim of determinacy is asserted in the context of practice. 238 The
application of principle to fact in order to obtain the "right" answer 239 in
selecting a case or a strategy is experienced as a routine part of poverty law
practice.24 °
The poverty lawyer contends that her method of selecting cases and
strategies is apolitical. 24 1 To her, poverty law is a practice separate from
politics. In a sense, it is a "rule-following game ' 2 12 located "outside the
battleground of ideology. '24 3 Within this game the rule is an end-in-itself,
a self-generated constraint on the power of the state. 44
In Johnson's case, the legal principle at issue is the treating physician
rule. The poverty lawyer views the rule as internally coherent and intelli-
gible. The rule governs the evidentiary weight to be accorded treating
physician opinion. She believes not only in her ability to apply that rule,
but also that application of the rule to the facts of the Johnson case-
multiple treating physician reports supported by clinical, laboratory, and
x-ray studies-will produce determinate results. The results, in turn, will
dictate whether Johnson is disabled, notwithstanding the regulatory poli-
237. On the interconnection of modernity and formalist deduction, see Juarrero-Roque,
supra note 234, at 1757-58 ("Modernity's insistence on deduction as the only legitimizing
process finds its counterpart in law in the traditional objectivist of formalist approach,
according to which law is constituted by a set of ideals and principles that are applied to
specific cases in the process of adjudication.").
238. Cf. Hutchinson, supra note 232, at 254 ("Determinacy and indeterminacy are polari-
ties on the plain of praxis.").
239. See Radin, supra note 234, at 793 ("Traditionally, legal 'formalism' is the position
that a unique answer in a particular case can be 'deduced' from a rule, or that application of
a rule to a particular case is 'analytical.' ").
240. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and
the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 543 (1992) ("Formalist writers stress the law contains
a good many rules, and that in many contexts, the application of those rules requires little
more than a grasp of English usage.").
241. This contention may be set forth self-consciously for reasons of institutional preserva-
tion. Abel, supra note 72, at 575 ("[Legal aid] lawyers may anticipate political attack and
seek to neutralize it by appearing apolitical.").
242. James Penner, The Rules of Law: Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Weinrib's Formalism, 46
U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 488, 517 (1988) ("The essential claim of formalism... is that law
is a rule-following game, which can only be understood completely as a thing in itself-to be
mastered by practicing it until one can do it.").
243. On the neutrality of formalism, see Thomas Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings
Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 415, 416 n.174 (1986) ("One could easily construct a
formalistic model which advance leftist political principles."); James G. Wilson, The Morality
of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431, 458 (1985) (asserting doctrinal formalism to be "more
or less politically neutral").
244. For a discussion of formalism as a constraint on the "exercise of coercive social
power," see Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1502, 1519 (1985).
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tics of the Social Security Administration. Thus, the process of analyzing
and applying the treating physician rule is deemed apolitical.
B. INSTRUMENTALISM
Instrumentalism comprises a strong version of modernist lawyering. As
before, the modernist canon presupposes lawyer autonomy and cognitive
capacity, lawyer-client communicative rationality, and juridical stability.
Unlike the cohort of formalism, these abstract assumptions incite claims of
purposivism, practicality, translation, and indeterminacy in legal reasoning.
The claims denote a general theory of lawyering that is result-oriented and
value-laden. The embrace of a consequentialist orientation exposes lawyer
purposive judgments to political assault. The assault is ignited by the
merger of law and politics. With this merger, lawyer discretionary judg-
ments in case selection and strategy veer toward ethical illegitimacy.
1. Purposivism
The instrumentalist's claim to purposivism springs from the assumptions
of structural and subjective autonomy. On these assumptions, the law-
legality and justice-and its advocates matter. Because law matters, the
instrumentalist sits in judgment of its exercise. That judgment extends to
state action and client conduct. The act of judgment implies autonomy.
By definition, autonomy requires discretion. The coupling of autonomy
and discretion in the lawyering process yields the model of "ethical
discretion."245 In this model, the lawyer is cast as a post-Realist "hero" who
acts independently of the client and state to advance legality and justice. 46
245. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1083
(1988).
246. Gordon, supra note 88, at 67 ("[T]he Realist hero is the social engineer who
masterfully wields law as an instrument of policy." (footnote omitted)).
The model of "ethical discretion" approved explicitly by Simon and implicitly by Gordon
presents a curious genealogy. Both Simon and Gordon look upon "lawyers' work as
ideology." Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American
Enterprise 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 72, 78
(Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) [hereinafter Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice]
(describing the lawyer's crafting of legal forms and structures "as ideological activity");
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 198, at 36-38 (delineating the principles of the
"Ideology of Advocacy" as neutrality, partisanship, procedural justice, and professionalism).
Like Simon, Gordon spots ideology in the conduct of advocacy, particularly in the
attitudes, behavior, and discourse of lawyering. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice,
supra, at 36. For example, Gordon argues:
when a lawyer helps a client arrange a transaction so as to take maximum advantage
of the current legal framework, he or she becomes one of the army of agents who
confirm that framework by reinforcement and extend it by interpretation into many
niches of social life. The framework is an ideological one, i.e., a set of assertions,
arguments, and implicit assumptions about power and right.
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The "discretionary" approach to ethical decisionmaking is defended by
William Simon.2 47 Simon holds that "[l]awyers should have ethical discre-
tion to refuse to assist in the pursuit of legally permissible courses of action
and in the assertion of potentially enforceable legal claims." 4 8 Reasoning
from this principle of discretion, Simon deduces "a professional duty of
reflective judgment., 24 9 His notion of judgment is multi-dimensional. At
one level, it involves "an assessment of the relative merits of the client's
goals and claims and those of other people who might benefit from the
lawyer's services., 2 50 At another level, it entails "an attempt to reconcile
the conflicting considerations that bear on the internal merits of the client's
goals and claims."" t On both levels, Simon argues, "the basic consideration
should be whether assisting the client would further justice., 25 2
Simon's argument in defense of "ethical discretion" follows from a
traditional premise: "the ideal of direct participation by the individual
lawyer, independent of both client and state, in the elaboration and
implementation of legality and justice., 253 Simon praises this Brandeisian
Id. at 110. Moreover, both Simon and Gordon search for ways to devise a "socially
responsible law practice." Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV.
1, 1 n.** (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers]; Gordon, supra note 140,
at 290 (discussing legal training for "socially responsible practice"); Simon, Visions, supra
note 15, at 469, 485 (sketching a critical vision of practice animated by "an ideal of practice
as an activity that constitutes and transforms the actors and the system in which they act and
that thus implies both personal responsibility and political commitment").
Yet both Simon and Gordon endorse a practice regime they seem to find ideologically
discomfiting. See, e.g., Gordon, Corporate Law Practice, supra, at 288 ("Now I am well aware
that many people who share my implicit political agenda will think I have chosen a weird way
to promote it."); Simon, supra note 245, at 1084 n.1 ("I now think that I was mistaken to
argue in an earlier article that the critique of conventional advocacy presented there
required abandoning the lawyer's professional role."). The reasons for their unease are too
complex to be fully explored in this space.
247. Although Simon's masterly piece is widely cited, it has garnered little sustained
critical attention. For instructive criticisms, see Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, supra note 18, at
1064-65 ("[Tjhe very process of judging a client's worthiness involves the application of
universal principles in a broad context."); Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling, supra note
198, at 556, 558 ("Simon fails to explain adequately how lawyers can responsibly limit the
autonomy of all but the most powerful clients without imposing their values on them and
denying them the opportunity at least to seek vindication of hypothetically legal interests."
(footnote omitted)); Serena Steir, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHiO ST. L.J. 551,
581 n.114 (1991) ("Simon ... empties the [ethical] standards even further by claiming they
do not even permit discretion but only openings for the exercise of private norms which are
standardless and nonreviewable." (footnote omitted)).





253. Id. at 1144.
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ideal as "the most basic of the traditional ambitions of lawyers. ' 254 His
purpose in proposing the discretionary approach is not only "to redeem
the traditional ideal," but also "to vindicate legal merit and justice. 255
Simon's redemption bid begins with a basic maxim: "The lawyer should
take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the
particular case, seem most likely to promote justice., 25 6 He intends this
"seek justice" maxim to connote the "discretionary norms" of "flexibility
and complexity" employed in judicial decisionmaking. 257 Engrafting25 s
this discretionary style of decisionmaking onto the lawyer's role 259 requires
judgments concerning the relative and internal merits of the client's goals
and claims. 2
60
To judge relative merit, a lawyer must assess "the extent to which the
[client's] claims and goals are grounded in the law, the importance of the
interests involved, and the extent to which the representation would contrib-
ute to the equalization of access to the legal system., 261 The point of this
assessment is to address the unequal distribution of legal services in
society.26 2 For Simon, the maldistribution of such scarce resources dic-




255. Id. at 1084, 1144.
256. Id. at 1090.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1091. Simon may quarrel with my use of the term engraft, specifically the
implication that discretionary judgment is extrinsic, rather than intrinsic to ethical decision-
making. Id. at 1090. Contrary to this implication, Simon seems to suggest that discretionary
judgment is an immanent part of ethical decisionmaking. My usage is not indifferent to this
claim. As Simon mentions: "The preference for categorical reasoning in the lawyering
context reflects nothing more than a failure to carry through to the lawyering role the
critique of formalism, mechanical jurisprudence, and categorical reasoning that has been
applied to the judicial role throughout this century." Id.
259. Simon denies "collapsing the lawyer's role into the judge's," maintaining that the
proposed lawyer's role "complements the generally accepted understanding of the judge's
role." Id. at 1102.
260. Id. at 1091.
261. Id. at 1093.
262. Simon's factual supposition is that "most people are unable to enforce most of their
rights most of the time." Id. at 1092. On state welfare rights enforcement, see John Carrier
& Ian Kendall, Law and the Social Division of Welfare, 20 INT'L J. Soc. L. 61, 85 (1992)
("[T]he legal system could be a key arbiter in defining the welfare of populations, pronounc-
ing on questions of eligibility, rights, standards, access and the regulatory and resourcing
roles of the state.").
263. Simon, supra note 245, at 1094. Simon analogizes the judgment of relative merit to
the judgments of pro bono practice. He observes: "Lawyers who do pro bono work usually
choose cases in accordance with some estimate of the relative merits of the claims competing
for their services." Id.
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By comparison, to judge internal merit, a lawyer must assess the "conflict-
ing legal values implicated directly in the client's claim or goal., 264 Simon
finds these conflicts "in the form of overlapping tensions between sub-
stance and procedure, purpose and form, and broad and narrow framing.
2 65
The assessment of legal value requires the confrontation and resolution of
such tensions.
Simon declines to hold the lawyer fully responsible for "proper" norma-
tive resolution, apportioning a measure of responsibility to presumptively
reliable state decisionmakers.266 His presumption of reliability, however,
is rebuttable. When rebutted by evidence of bias or incompetence, the
reliance interest falls. When unrebutted, the reliance interest survives
backed by a "more flexible and demanding" lawyer duty to "facilitate" the
state decisionmaking process.
267
The heightened duty requirement of the discretionary approach evinces
Simon's competing proceduralist tilt: "the strongest assurance of a just
resolution is the soundness of the procedure that produced it."' 268 This
tendency reinforces the lawyer's facilitative duty "[to take] reasonably
available actions to make the procedure as effective as possible and to
forego actions that would reduce its efficacy." ' 269 Moreover, it bolsters
the lawyer's interventionist duty to "assume direct responsibility for the
substantive validity of the decision" when procedures prove to be defi-
270
cient.
The lawyer's discretionary duty to facilitate or intrude upon the state's
decisionmaking process requires complex judgments about procedural rules,
especially consideration of the purpose and form of the relevant legal
procedures. 271 According to Simon, "the clearer and less problematic the
relevant purposes, the more the lawyer should consider herself bound by
them., 2 72 Conversely, "the less clear and more problematic the relevant
purposes, the more justified the lawyer is in treating the relevant norms
formally." 27
3
264. Id. at 1096.
265. Id. (footnote omitted).
266. Simon's notion of institutional competence and reliability loosely encompasses deci-
sional accuracy, procedural fairness, and democratic legitimacy. Id. at 1097 n.36.
267. Id. at 1097.
268. Id. at 1098.
269. Id. at 1097-98 ("[T]he more reliable the relevant procedures and institutions, the less
direct responsibility the lawyer need assume for the substantive justice of the resolution .... ").
270. Id. at 1098 ("[T]he less reliable the procedures and institutions, the more direct
responsibility [the lawyer] need assume for substantive justice.").
271. Id. at 1102-03.
272. Id. at 1103.
273. Formalism, in this sense, operates "to permit any client goal not plainly precluded
by ... [rule specific] language." Id. at 1103-04.
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Discretionary judgments of procedural purpose and form rest on defini-
tional frameworks, both broad and narrow. Simon points out that the
framing of an issue influences the perception and resolution of a dispute.274
Hence, he "gives individual lawyers substantial responsibility for determin-
ing whether broad or narrow framing is appropriate in the particular
case."2 7 5 Furthermore, he enunciates "general standards of relevance
' 27 6
to guide the framing of issues. Those standards include interpretive plausi-
bility,277 practical impact, 278 knowledge, and institutional competence.
279
Simon's commitment to legal values-relative and internal merit, sub-
stance and procedure, purpose and form, broad and narrow framing-
grounds his proposed discretionary approach to ethical decisionmaking.
By delimiting a protected range of "ethical autonomy,, 28 this approach
enables the modernist lawyer to make "good faith" judgments about
legality and justice in the context of advocacy.281 In the absence of a
"shared" client "commitment" to the norms of legality and justice, Simon
calls for a minimum "coincidence of the client's goals with such norms.,
282
The search for lawyer-client agreement adumbrates two principles of
consensus: a first order principle of normative sharing and a second order
principle of normative-goal coincidence.
Simon's portrait of shared or coinciding lawyer-client normative commit-
ments to legality and justice depicts a weak version of the republican vision
of the "public ' 283 lawyer acting in the service of the "common good.,
284
Under a strong version of republicanism, 285 the meaning of the common
274. Id. at 1107. Simon explains: "If we define an issue narrowly in terms of a small
number of characteristics of the parties and their dispute, it will often look different than if
we define it to encompass the parties' identities, relationship, and social circumstances." Id.
275. Id. at 1108.
276. Id.
277. Id. ("[A] consideration is relevant if it is implicated by the most plausible interpreta-
tion of the applicable law.").
278. Id. at 1109 ("[A] consideration is relevant if it is likely to have a substantial practical
influence on the resolution.").
279. Id. ("[Kinowledge and institutional competence will affect the appropriate framing.").
280. Id. at 1128 n.97; cf Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism,
Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1228 (1992) (criticizing
relational feminists for the "devaluation of autonomy").
281. Simon, supra note 245, at 1134.
282. Id. at 1138.
283. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, supra note 246, at 14-16 (describing the
"traditional 'republican' ideal of the lawyer's public role"); Peter Margulies, The Mother
With Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Clinical
Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) (noting "civic republicanism's
reclaiming of the public realm").
284. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 250, 250-58 (1992) (examining the republican ideals embodied in
legal ethics codes and the lawyer's role).
285. For studies of the historical antecedents of republicanism, see generally BERNARD
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good is determined through communal dialogue2 6 and deliberation.287
Emphasis is placed on the "selection rather than implementation of
ends. 2
88
Simon's discretionary approach reflects the republican emphasis on the
shared selection of ends, albeit within the confines of the lawyer-client
relationship. His commitment to the legal values of internal merit under-
lines the importance of claim and goal selection. Because that commit-
ment is mitigated by a counterposing commitment to the ends-oriented
values of relative merit 289 and justice, the discretionary approach emulates
republican norms in only a weak sense.
Two affinities between Simon's approach and republicanism are notewor-
thy: client autonomy and lawyer-client consensus. Simon seems to take a
dim view of client autonomy. 290 Anticipating objections to the curtailment
of client autonomy in opposition to lawyer power, Simon asserts that "the
discretionary approach does not increase lawyer power because any in-
crease in the lawyer's capacity to frustrate client goals is exactly balanced by
a reduction in the lawyer's capacity to frustrate goals of third parties and
the public."29 '
Simon's balancing of the lawyer's public and private capacities serves to
justify the lawyer's infringement on the client's autonomy. This move
reveals Simon's instrumental rationality. Balancing is an instrumental
methodology rooted in realist jurisprudence.292 It generates outcomes by
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87 (1969).
286. Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 679,
719 ("[T]he meaning of the common good remains always in question, open to the communal
dialogue.").
287. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1555 (1988)
("The republican position is not that every issue is subject to political resolution; it is instead
that some questions can yield general agreement through deliberation.").
288. Id. at 1548.
289. Simon may fairly dispute the classification of relative merit as an ends-oriented
value. To fend off this classification, however, he must deal with two aspects of relative
merit that insinuate an ends-oriented calculus: cost efficiency and resource distribution.
290. Steven Gey attributes such a general view to the community focus of civic republican
theory. Steven C. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
801, 802-03, 831 (1992); cf. J. Wagona Makoba, On the Use and Application of Legal Concepts
in the Study of Non-Western Societies, 20 INT'L J. SOC. L. 201, 220 (1992) (contending that the
study of comparative legal anthropology in non-Western societies "show[s] that rights and
obligations do not only exist between individuals but between them and groups or the entire
community").
291. Simon, supra note 245, at 1127 (emphasis added); cf. Abel, supra note 107, at 58
("Increasing the autonomy of lawyers to choose their clients will further increase the
autonomy of clients.").
292. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 958 (1987) ("Balancing openly embraced a view of the law as purposeful, as a
means to an end; and it demanded a particularized, contextual scrutiny of the social interests
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an ad hoc "identification, evaluation, and comparison" of legal interests.293
Simon does not purport to repair balancing methodology. Nevertheless,
he tenders an argument rationalizing balancing as an exact utilitarian
solution, even though his own "empirical premises" elude verification.294
Even if Simon's empirical premises of counterbalanced lawyer power
survived verification, they lack intuitive force. To the extent that au-
tonomy is a categorical norm, it thwarts noncategorical judgment. Acknowl-
edging the incomparability of categorical295 and noncategorica 296 styles of
judgment, Simon seems to suggest that third party, public, and systemic
interests are the categorical equivalents of autonomy.297 Further, he im-
plies that balancing affords the only pragmatic method of resolving the
tension spawned by competing categorical claims of privilege. Simon
insists that lawyers are capable of making effective balancing decisions,
citing their possession of "a serviceable conception of normative
judgment." 298
In practice, the lawyer's instrumental balancing of discretionary norms
depends upon the client's shared commitment to the norms of legality and
justice, or on the correspondence of client goals and such norms. The key
at stake in a constitutional controversy."); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduc-
tion to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 507 (1986) ("The third element
in the Realists' constructive program was a method of legal analysis, the method of balancing.
Once the precise interests at stake have been identified and their relation to the broad social
values understood, decision-makers should balance the interests to arrive at an appropriate
decision.").
On the current application of balancing jurisprudence, see Frank M. Coffin, Judicial
Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 26-40 (1988) (defending a
form of balancing marked by "openness and specificity"); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the
Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1
(1987) (presenting a three-fold typology of judicial balancing divided into representative,
administrative, and zero-sum models).
293. Aleinikoff, supra note 292, at 982.
294. In an analogous situation of confidentiality, Simon concedes that his "rhetoric might
strike some as excessively utilitarian." Simon, supra note 245, at 1142, 1143 n.131. And yet
he persists in his defense of balancing. Id. at 1143 ("Reduced confidentiality would probably
entail some costs to clients, but the important issue is whether these costs outweigh the costs
to third parties and the legal system from the prohibition of disclosure." (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added)).
295. Simon argues that conventional models of ethical decisionmaking-"libertarian" and
"regulatory"-exhibit a common "categorical" style of reasoning. Id. at 1086. This style is
marked by "the practice of restrictively specifying the factors that a decisionmaker may
consider when she confronts a particular problem." Id. The factors are rule-based. In
application, the decisionmaker bears "no discretion to consider factors she encounters that
are not specified or to evaluate specified factors in any way other than that given in the
rule." Id.
296. Simon assigns a discretionary or pragmatic meaning to noncategorical judgment. Id.
at 1090.
297. Id. at 1088-89.
298. Id. at 1122.
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to the joinder or coincidence of lawyer-client normative commitments is
consensus. Under republican theory, consensus is reached through rea-
soned, noncoercive, and inclusive deliberation.299 Simon impliedly adopts
the republican view of cooperative consensus.3"' Unfortunately, his adop-
tion makes no mention of denaturalized views of consensus that stress the
suppression of minority voices.3" 1
Simon's omission problematizes the notion of consensus, uncovering the
republican tendencies towards coercion and exclusion in consensus forma-
tion. These tendencies dilute the conceptual integrity of consensus. Admit-
tedly, the model of ethical discretion does not require consensus in a
strong sense. Recall, for example, Simon's second order principle of
normative-goal coincidence. This principle demands consensus, however,
at least in a weak sense. Neither an incoherent nor a false sense of
consensus satisfies the demand for normative-goal coincidence.
Simon's republican faith obscures the strains of coercion and exclusion
embedded in the instrumentalist notion of consensus. Coerced consensus
permits the modern poverty lawyer to overreach her ethical autonomy
under the pretext of shared or coinciding client ends. The consequence of
overreaching is unfettered, rather than guided, discretion.
The Johnson case provides ample opportunity for the modernist lawyer
to pursue instrumental discretion. In her case, lawyer discretion will be
channelled by political principles of legality and justice, rather than by
lawyer-client consensus. For purposes of ethical decisionmaking, these
principles may promote efficient, egalitarian, communitarian, redistribu-
299. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988) ("[R]epubli-
can constitutional thought is not indissolubly tied to any such static, parochial, or coercive
communitarianism; ... indeed, reconsideration of republicanism's deeper constitutional im-
plications can remind us of how the renovation of political communities, by inclusion of
those who have been excluded, enhances everyone's political freedom.").
300. Simon's adoption of the republican consensus thesis locates him within a romantic
tradition of dissent. See Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J.
1671-72 (1988) (asserting "the continuous presence throughout the history of American
dissent of the rhetoric of a commonwealth of cooperation and civic virtue.").
301. See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97
YALE L.J. 1609, 1610-11 (1988). Bell and Bansal explain:
Republicanism, through its faith in the existence of shared values and the possibil-
ity of a common good, assumes at base that a social consensus will emerge from
"reasoned" deliberation by individuals who think "rationally" and who are capable
of abstracting from their private experiences. For centuries in this country, how-
ever, blacks have served as the group whose experiences and private needs have
been suppressed in order to promote the "common good" of whites.
Id. at 1610-11 (footnotes omitted); see also Feldman, supra note 286, at 700 ("To facilitate
reaching a consensus about the common good ... some voices might be silenced-especially
the voices of minorities and others who sometimes tend to experience and to perceive the
world differently from the majority."). See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM
OF THE WELL (1992).
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tive, or rights-based solutions. Efficiency principles, here of a redistribu-
tive sort, focus on disability benefits as an income transfer to Johnson, and
thus, as a means to maximize her satisfaction or wealth.30 2 Egalitarian
principles direct attention to the racial animus
3 3 and discrimination 30 4
302. See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE. L.J. 53, 57, 92-96 (1992)
(examining alternative conceptions of efficiency).
Principles of institutional efficiency also favor Johnson. A legal aid program may procure
state subsidies for disability advocacy by participating in Disability Advocacy Projects
(DAPs). DAPs are state-administered programs that fund private attorneys and legal
services providers to supply legal representation to public assistance recipients "who are
unable to work because of long-term disabilities and who are likely to become eligible for
SSI disability." Jane Hardin, Disability Advocacy Projects: Programs that Assist Low-Income
Clients and Ease State Government Fiscal Problems, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 776, 777 (1992);
see also Michael B. Glomb & Jane Hardin, Alternative Funding Mechanisms for Legal Services
Providers, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 484, 488 (1991) ("Typically, the state funds legal services
programs to help state-funded GA recipients to establish their eligibility for federal disabil-
ity benefits."). The representation may occur at both preappeal and appeal stages of
disability determination.
Moreover, a legal aid program may obtain attorneys' fees awards for disability representa-
tion on judicial review under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1992). For
studies of different forms of economic incentives affecting advocacy in underserved communi-
ties, see Richard E. Levy, Social Security Claimants with Developmental Disabilities: Problems
of Policy and Practice, 39 KAN. L. REV. 529, 580-81 (1992) ("Attorneys fees are also a factor
affecting the ability to pursue, and the likely success of, judicial review."); Jill Norgren,
Lawyers and the Legal Business of the Cherokee Republic in Courts of the United States,
1829-1835, 10 LAW & HIST. REV. 253, 313 (1992) ("For political and economic reasons,
attorneys made their services available [to the Cherokee Nation].").
303. A recent federal study found evidence of de facto racial animus in the disability
determination process. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Security: Racial Differ-
ence in Disability Decisions Warrants Further Investigation, GAO/HRD-92-56 at 14 (Apr. 21,
1992) ("In the 30 years since 1961 for which applicants' race has been examined, blacks
under the DI program have had a lower allowance rate than whites in initial as well as
appeals decisions. Available information, within the past 5 years, on initial disability
decisions under the SSI program shows a racial difference in allowance rates comparable
with those under the DI program."(footnotes omitted)); see also Stephen Labaton, Benefits
Are Refused More Often To Disabled Blacks, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at Al
("While the Social Security Administration questioned the study of the two Social Security
programs for people with severe disabilities, the Disability Insurance and Supplemental
Security Income programs, it said the report had already prompted it to begin an investiga-
tion to make sure its decisions were not motivated by race.").
For a discussion of gender bias in the disability determination process, see Linda G. Mills,
A Calculus for Bias: How Malingering Females and Dependent Housewives Fare in the Social
Security Disability System, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 211, 213 (1993) (illustrating "manifesta-
tions of unequal treatment based on gender in Social Security disability hearing transcripts
and decisions" (footnote omitted)). Mills detected an ALJ tendency to essentialize women's
biological differences, personality traits, and behaviors. Id. at 226. As a consequence, Mills
concluded, "the very outcomes of disability cases reflect sexual stereotypes." Id. at 227; cf
Selina Redman et al., The Effects of Gender on Diagnosis of Psychological Disturbance, 14 J.
BEHAV. MED. 527 (1991) (documenting the tendency of medical practitioners to overesti-
mate the diagnostic prevalence of psychological disturbance among female patients).
304. Discrimination is also associated with differential mortality rates. See Frolik &
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infecting the disability determination process. Communitarian principles
address the group,3 °5 community,30 6 and institutional3. 7 dimensions of
disability programs. Redistributive principles concentrate on altering the
impoverished status of disability applicants and shifting their necessary
reliance off of various forms of public welfare.3 °8 Rights-based prin-
ciples 30 9 operate to vindicate procedural and substantive norms, in contro-
versy in Johnson's case over the application of the treating physician rule
Barnes, supra note 66, at 692. Frolik and Barnes observe:
[T]he shorter life expectancies of African Americans and Hispanics mean that
benefit programs for the elderly disproportionately favor whites. For example,
although all employees regardless of their race or gender pay Social Security taxes,
because of their higher death rates, many minorities will not live long enough to
collect retirement benefits.
Id.
305. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1714 (1988)
(arguing "for a conception of politics as the interaction of groups that are more than simple
aggregations of individual preferences, but less than components of a single common good");
see also Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities,
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615, 658 (1992) ("It is within groups that constitutive narratives
(cultures) are produced and through groups that sense is made of the social world.");
Pamela J. Smith, We Are Not Sisters: African American Women and the Freedom to Associate
and Disassociate, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1493 ("Associating with those who share common
experiences also serves a rehabilitative and political function.").
306. Compare Steven Fishbach, Connecting Organizing and Litigation to Preserve Public
Housing, 49 GUILD PRAC. 104, 104, 109 (1992) (describing the "Tenant Advocacy and
Litigation" approach employed by public housing tenants in conjunction with community
organizers and local legal services lawyers in Providence, Rhode Island to "improve condi-
tions in public housing, and to prevent the demolition of viable public housing units") with
Gey, supra note 290, at 806 ("[C]ivic republicans argue that the constitution provides the
framework for an organic community composed of socially constructed individuals, who join
together in government to identify and pursue civic virtue.").
307. See Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1605 (1988) (noting
the potential contribution of local political institutions to the "development of a self-
conscious, normatively-based, deliberative popular politics").
308. Public welfare benefit levels fail to overcome the forces of impoverishment, espe-
cially for women. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, The New Paternalism: Welfare's War on Women,
45 GUILD PRAC. 97, 103 (1992) ("[T]he only effective way to combat poverty, for women as
well as men, is to improve services, increase job opportunities, improve transitional benefits,
enhance child support enforcement and increase income supports to a livable level.");
Richard McIntyre & Michael Hillard, Stressed Families, Impoverished Families: Crises in the
Household and in the Reproduction of the Working Class, 24 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 17, 22
(1992) ("Because of the pre-existing inadequacy of women's wages and of income levels
under existing transfer programs such as AFDC and food stamps, and the low levels and
widespread non-collection of child support, the rapid growth of female-headed households
with children has been synonymous with the growth of poor and near-poor households.").
309. But see Joseph Allegretti, Rights, Roles, Relationships: The Wisdom of Solomon and
the Ethics of Lawyers, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1119, 1130 (1992) ("[A] commitment to rights,
no matter how laudable an end, can degenerate into a cruel legalism unless balanced by a
concern for preserving relationships and avoiding or minimizing harm.").
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in light of HHS's newly promulgated consultative examiner regulation. 311
The instrumentalist lawyer's deployment of abstract legal principles
signals the universalist quality of her ethical judgment in case selection and
strategy. Without meaningful reciprocal notions of client autonomy and
consensus, the judgments of instrumental rationality devolve into enlight-
ened permutations of state-sanctioned paternalism.311 These variants on
paternalism--"paternalism with a legalistic face' '312 -also infect the instru-
mentalist's claim to practicality embodied in the justification of winning.313
310. This regulatory controversy raises larger issues regarding the relevance of the doctor-
patient relationship in medically underserved communities. For discussion of medical care
access and utilization in impoverished urban and rural communities, see EDITH M. DAVIS &
MICHAEL L. MILLMAN, HEALTH CARE FOR THE URBAN POOR 86-140 (1983); KAREN DAVIS
& CATHY SCHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR ON POVERTY 18-48 (1978); CHARLES J. DOUGH-
ERTY, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 3-15 (1988); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, HEALTH STATUS OF MINORITIES AND LOW-INCOME GROUPS 325-42 (1991);
Lawrence Bergner & Alonzo S. Yerby, Low Income and Barriers to Use of Health Services, in
THE HEALTH GAP: MEDICAL SERVICES AND THE POOR 27-39 (Robert L. Kane et al. eds.,
1976); Jean L. Elliott, Cultural Barriers to the Utilization of Health Services, in THE HEALTH
GAP: MEDICAL SERVICES AND THE POOR, supra, at 59-72; Anselm L. Strauss, Medical
Organization, Medical Care, and Lower Income Groups, in THE HEALTH GAP:
MEDICAL SERVICES AND THE POOR, supra, at 126-73; see also Amasa B. Ford et al.,
Race-Related Differences Among Elderly Urban Residents: A Cohort Study, 1975-1984, 45 J.
GERONTOLOGY S163 (1990) (observing race-related differences in morbidity, disability, and
service rates); Jan E. Mutchler & Jeffrey A. Burr, Racial Differences in Health and Health
Care Service Utilization in Later Life: The Effect of Socioeconomic Status, 32 J. HEALTH &
SOCIAL BEHAV. 342 (1991) (correlating differences in white and black health status and
health care utilization to socioeconomic status); Jane Perkins, Race Discrimination in America's
Health Care System, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 371 (1993) (reviewing class and racial dispari-
ties in health care delivery); Steven P. Wallace, Race Versus Class in the Health Care of
African-American Elderly, 37 Soc. PROBS. 517 (1990) (finding "continuing racial segregation
in the institutional medical care of the elderly").
311. The LSC statute grants poverty lawyers the "full freedom" of paternalistic authority
"to protect the best interests of their clients." 42 U.S.C. § 2996(6) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
On state forms of disability paternalism, see Margaret G. Farrell, Administrative Patemalismr Social
Security's Representative Payment Program and Two Models of Justice, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 283 (1992)
(exploring the SSA's policy of paternalism embodied in the representative payee program).
312. I borrow the phrase from Clive Unsworth. See Clive Unsworth, Mental Disorder and the
Tutelary Relationship: From Pre-to Post-Carceral Legal Order, 18 J.L. & Soc'Y 254, 257 (1991).
313. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 2, at 2146 (" '[W]inning' may
often hold a different meaning in the poverty law context. Here, outcome may extend
beyond material benefits and compensation to encompass deeper ideals of political and
socioeconomic progress, and affirmation of individual or group identity and dignity.");
Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 19, at 2492 ("[I]t can be a mistake to assume
that a client is interested only in 'winning' the case rather than in understanding both 'what
happened' and what is happening."); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The
Critical Practice of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 916
(" 'Winning the case' is not always what disempowered clients want and need-how the
client's story is told and how the client's harm is named may be more important."); cf.
Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403,
435 (1992) ("[P]rosecutors and defense lawyers ... generally consider themselves aggressive
advocates in pursuit of that most important goal-winning the case." (footnote omitted)).
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2. Practicality
The instrumentalist claim to practicality emerges in a roughhewn fash-
ion from the jurisprudence of pragmatism. 3  The claim provides a perfor-
314. Prominent figures in American pragmatism include John Dewey, William James, and
Charles Sanders Peirce. See JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC 487-535 (1938); JOHN DEWEY, EXPERI-
ENCE & NATURE 394-437 (1929); JOHN DEWEY & JAMES H. TUFTS, ETHICS 212-14, 306-63
(1909); John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924); William James,
What Pragmatism Means, in THE WORKS OF WILLIAMS JAMES: PRAGMATISM 27-44 (1975);
William James, Pragmatism's Conception of Truth, in THE WORKS OF WILLIAMS JAMES:
PRAGMATISM, supra, at 95-113; Charles S. Pierce, What Pragmatism Is, in COLLECTED PAPERS
OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: VOL. V 411-37 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds.,
1965).
For beneficial readings, see generally JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM: FROM PEIRCE TO
DAVIDSON (1990); PEIRCE AND LAW (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1991); R.W. SLEEPER, THE
NECESSITY OF PRAGMATISM: JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY (1986); ELLEN
KAPPY SUCKIEL, THE PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM JAMES (1982); CORNEL WEST,
THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM (1989); Cathar-
ine W. Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 541 (1988) (tracking the influence of Peirce's
philosophical writings on Holmes' views); Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan
Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671 (1990) (exploring Dewey's social and moral philosophy).
The revival of American pragmatism is led by the writings of Richard Rorty. See RICHARD
RORTY, CONSEOUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY,
AND SOLIDARITY (1989); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE
(1979); cf. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 342-55 (1989) (summarizing
anti-foundationalism); Lynn A. Baker, "Just Do It": Pragmatism and Progressive Social
Change, 78 VA. L. REV. 697, 712 (1992) (contending that "Rorty does not convincingly
establish that a cultural shift to anti-foundationalism would be advantageous for realizing
even his own utopian vision"); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of
Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 710 (1992) (classifying Rorty as a "metaethical
communitarian"); Thomas C. Grey, The Colin Raugh Thomas O'Fallon Memorial Lecture on
Law and American Culture: Holmes, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 71 OR. L. REV. 521, 538
(1992) (defining Rorty as "a very Holmesian kind of pragmatist democrat"); Michael S.
Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871,
901 (1989) (describing Rorty as a "garden variety idealist metaphysician"); Thomas Morawetz,
Understanding Disagreement, the Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying Wittgenstein to Positiv-
ism, Critical Theory, and Judging, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 371, 449 n.224 (1992) (arguing that
Rorty "is inconsistent in holding that ordinary language is the only language we have, while
at the same time taking a skeptical and revisionary stance toward the concepts of truth and
objectivity"); John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 343 (1986)
(chiding critical legal nihilists for their "misuse" of Rorty); Peter D. Swan, Critical Legal
Theory and The Politics of Pragmatism, 12 DALHOUSIE L.J. 349, 372 (1989) (citing Rorty's
"dependen[ce] on the existing state of liberal democracies for [his] social vision"); William
G. Weaver, Richard Rorty and the Radical Left, 78 VA. L. REV. 729, 740 (1992) (identifying
Rorty as "the first strong voice within the practice of philosophy to turn the pragmatist
tradition against the projects central to his own profession"); Allan C. Hutchinson, The
Three 'Rs': ReadingIRorty/Radically, 103 HARV. L. REV. 555, 558 (1989) (book review)
(attempting "to show the consonance of Rorty's non-foundational arguments to a more
radically democratic political theory"); Joseph W. Singer, Should Lawyers Care About Philoso-
phy, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1752, 1754 (1989) (book review) (accusing Rorty of "marginaliz[ing]
the enterprise of philosophy, thereby depriving pragmatism of any critical bite"); see gener-
ally KONSTANTIN KOLENDA, RORTY'S HUMANISTIC PRAGMATISM (1990).
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mative315 account of legal reasoning as a "practical enterprise. 3 16 This
neopragmatist 317 account describes legal thought as situated and instrumen-
tal.318
For the pragmatist, legal thought is situated in context.3 9 Thus situ-
ated, the truth of a proposition (e.g., disability) is contextually contingent.320
315. On the performativity of practice, see Steven L. Winter, Without Privilege, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 1063, 1065 (1991) ("A practice is not a unitary, static, or invariable 'thing,' but a
dynamic pattern of performance.").
316. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 805 (1989).
317. The advance of neopragmatism is evident across doctrinal fields. For applications,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (proposing a model of statutory construction based on
practical reasoning); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1331 (1988) (demonstrating a pragmatist basis for the constitutional right to abortion);
Radin, supra note 234, at 816 (illustrating a pragmatic normative understanding of the
constitution as "not merely a document but rather that which 'constitutes' us as a political
community" (footnote omitted)); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and
Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2589 (1992) (arguing that
"[p]ragmatism may now represent the principal theoretical approach to statutory interpreta-
tion in legal scholarship" (footnote omitted)); Joseph W. Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to
Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731, 757-818 (1990) (elaborating a choice-of-law interpretive
method attentive to competing versions of both party interests and relations, and multistate
norms and policies); Robin L. West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765, 791
(1992) (approving the use of "pragmatic knowledge" in constitutional discourse and theory).
318. Grey, supra note 316, at 802 ("Thought or inquiry is instrumental as well as situated
in practice. Reflective, deliberative, even contemplative thinking originates in the practical
need to solve real problems."); Hutchinson, supra note 314, at 576 ("Instrumentality and
situatedness are the watchwords of the pragmatic revival."); see also Schnably, supra note 11,
at 348 (" '[P]ragmatism' suggests, if nothing else, a focus on context and practice .... ).
319. Grey, supra note 316, at 805 ("[L]aw is constituted of practices--contextual, situated,
rooted in custom and shared expectations."); see also Swan, supra note 314, at 363 (denoting
Singer's view of legal reasoning as a "context dependent practical political enterprise");
Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 432 (1990) ("[Pjragmatist
philosophers have taken the lead in arguing that experience is never concept-free, and that
thinking is always historically and culturally situated." (footnote omitted)).
320. For Thomas Grey, contingency fosters "perspectival pluralism." Grey, supra note
316, at 805.
The pragmatist recognizes that the best account of a phenomenon (such as law)
from one angle, for one purpose, at one time, might not serve as well from another
perspective, rooted in another temporal context, and aimed at different goals. In its
mature vision, as Dewey stated it, pragmatism rejects the assumption that there
must exist a comprehensive and final account of "reality" that, if attained, would
bring the process of scientific and philosophical inquiry to a close.
A pragmatic legal theorist will embed questions about law in a context and
address them for a purpose, and so may reach different and apparently inconsistent
answers as context and purpose vary.
Id. at 804-05 (footnote omitted); cf. Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to
Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1224 (1989) (complaining of the degeneration of pragmatism
into "a sort of unquestioning pluralist consciousness that surrenders to the received descrip-
tion and understanding of the world" (footnote omitted)); Pierre Schlag, Stances, 139 U.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:2567
Contingency connotes change. Truth changes in response to "human
creation, ',12 not discovery. Accordingly, it is mistaken to speak of poverty
lawyers as truthgivers. Under the rule of law, there are only truthmakers.322
Moreover, for the pragmatist, legal thought is instrumental in purpose.
3 23
It serves as a means to an end.32 4 Instrumental judgments require
PA. L. REV. 1059, 1061 (1991) ("Even as it raises an intractable problem of privilege among
competing positions, none of which can claim foundations, pragmatism hides from itself, its
own pre-scripted, conventional answer."); Smith, supra note 319, at 423 ("Legal pragmatists
like to claim that their movement is antifoundational, but pragmatism itself is in one sense a
kind of foundation for political and legal discussion." (footnote omitted)); Pierre Schlag,
Contradiction and Denial, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1216, 1221 n.14 (1989) (book review) ("So either
the pragmatic invitation to look to context is a little vacant or it is an invitation to surrender
to whatever customs, traditions, and values the market and bureaucracy produce.").
321. Joseph Singer affixes pragmatic truth to human creation. Singer, supra note 314, at
1753.
Pragmatists ... emphasize that truth is not something we discover that is either
external to us or intuitively self-evident. Rather, truth is a human creation-what is
true depends partly on our purposes and partly on how we, individually and as a
society, choose to describe the world. What is true is not simply given, there for us
to discover; it is, at least partly, made by people, and therefore, changeable.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Morawetz, supra note 314, at 452 (asserting that "[t]ruth is
nothing more than a label for the interpretive strategy that happens to persuade and prevail
in the conversation"); Richard Rorty, What Can You Expect From Anti-Foundationalist
Philosophers?: A Reply to Lynn Baker, 78 VA. L. REV. 719, 723 (1992) (contending that "truth
and power are linked"); Schanck, supra note 317, at 2540 (mentioning "two key elements of
pragmatism: (1) a denial of objective truth (a rejection of the correspondence theory of
knowledge, according to which we can be said to know something when our thoughts or
assertions correspond to the reality 'out there'); and (2) an instrumental conception of truth
(the identification of 'truth' with the practical effect of a proposition or with that which
'works')." (footnote omitted)).
322. Margaret Radin's pragmatic reinterpretation of the rule of law is instructive on this
point. See Radin, supra note 317, at 814. Radin asserts:
A pragmatic reinterpretation of the Rule of Law would at least deny that law
consists of formally realizable rules in the traditional sense. More controversially,
perhaps, I believe such a reinterpretation would deny that law consists quintessen-
tially of rules at all, as well as the notion that rules are separate from cases and
logically pre-exist their application. Such a reinterpretation would also deny the
strict division of people into rule-givers and rule-followers, and the conception of
judges as rule-appliers rather than rule-makers.
Id.
323. Grey mentions the Darwinian flooring of pragmatic instrumentalism. He explains:
[T]he pragmatists regarded thinking as an adaptive function of an organism, practi-
cal in the sense that it was instrumental. It had evolved as a problem-solving
capacity, oriented toward survival. In its most developed form, thinking functioned
to help resolve, by means of conscious reflection and experimental revision, the real
problems and live doubts that arose in the course of acting on unreflective and
habitual practices.
Grey, supra note 316, at 798.
324. Id. at 805 ("[Law] is instrumental, a means for achieving socially desired ends, and
available to be adapted to their service."); see also Smith, supra note 319, at 412 ("Legal
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means-ends calculations. 325 Means-oriented calculation stipulates326 deci-
sion procedures in case selection and strategy. Ends-oriented computation
privileges moral and political virtues.12 ' Both involve the "normative
activity' 3 28 of ethical judgment.
The modernist poverty lawyer is a pragmatist in two ways: first, she
develops a normative theory of morality and politics "situated in and
reflective upon practice;" and second, she evaluates that normative theory
"as an instrument for serving human purposes., 329 Engaging in situated
and instrumental rationality assumes a prophetic, problem-solving capacity.
In that capacity, the lawyer performs as a kind of prophet.
330
The poverty lawyer speaks prophetically about practical solutions.33 1
Infused with the "rhetoric of practicality and compromise, '33 2 the prophe-
pragmatism is frequently depicted as an instrumental, forward-looking approach to law."
(footnote omitted)).
325. Singer points to the instability of the means-ends distinction. Singer, supra note 314,
at 1760. Singer explains:
[Olnce we get down to the political task of implementing justice, of specifying what
those institutions are and how they should work, all kinds of disagreements arise,
both about how to conceptualize justice and how to implement it. Moreover, these
disagreements are not merely technical questions about the best way to implement
shared ends; rather, they implicate the ends themselves. Indeed, the very distinc-
tion between means and ends is contentious; one person's means is another person's
end.
Id. (footnote omitted). But see Swan, supra note 314, at 351 (suggesting that Singer's
"disavowal of any rational standards for evaluating competing positions undermines the
normative basis of his own project for developing a more pragmatic legal theory").
326. See Sotirios A. Barber, Stanley Fish and the Future of Pragmatism in Legal Theory, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1991) (discussing pragmatism in terms of "political stipulation").
327. See Robert Westmoreland, Dworkin and Legal Pragmatism, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 174, 176 (1991) (matching legal pragmatism and moral theories).
328. Radin, supra note 234, at 813 (viewing law as a "pragmatic normative activity").
329. This analysis follows Grey's more general discussion. Grey, supra note 316, at 836.
330. Rorty distinguishes between a "good kind" and a "wrong kind" of prophet. Rorty,
supra note 321, at 719. To Rorty, "[t]he good kind of prophet thinks of herself as just
someone who has a better idea .... Good prophets say that if we all got together and did
such and such, we would probably like the results." Id. By contrast, "the wrong kind of
prophet [is] the kind who thinks herself the voice of something bigger and more authoritative
than the possible consequences of the application of her ideas." Id.
Less ambitiously, Steven Smith imagines the pragmatist as "a kind of preacher." See
Smith, supra note 319, at 411, 446 (conjecturing about the "exhortatory function of legal
pragmatism").
331. Grey, supra note 316, at 802 ("For pragmatists, the capacity for reason is best suited
to practical concerns because it arises from our efforts to deal with those concerns."
(footnote omitted)); see also Schanck, supra note 317, at 2569 ("[Tlhe substitution of
concrete analyses of issues together with practical solutions in place of the traditional
abstract, conceptual formulations has often been perceived by those outside academic
philosophy to be the essence of pragmatism." (footnote omitted)).
332. Simon, Visions, supra note 15, at 505.
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cies contain normative prescriptions, for example, justice,333 utility, 334 self-
determination, 33 5 and individual desert. 336  These well-intentioned
prescriptions conceptualize the Johnson case as the site of situated and
instrumental inquiry. This conceptualization conceals the exercise of power
by the modernist poverty lawyer over Bertie Johnson.33 7
The pragmatic inquiry-here whether to accept Johnson's case-is a
patent act of power. The act embodies epistemological and discursive
forms of power. 338 Epistemologically, the poverty lawyer presupposes her
ability to describe and evaluate Johnson's sociolegal experience of disability.
This presupposition goes beyond conventional claims of rationality,339
professional competence, 4' and "decisional maturity ' '1 41 to reach towards
weak claims of scientific positivism.3 42 The positivist tradition persuades
333. See Morawetz, supra note 314, at 453 ("Pragmatism ... reflects the individual decision-
maker's commitment to a particular stake in justice as well as her awareness of deliberation
as an instrumental practice serving controversial ends.").
334. See David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36
STAN. L. REV. 575, 581 (1984) ("[Plragmatists look for ways to talk about the world that are
useful for specific purposes.").
335. Cf Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice,
Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 739 (1992) (asserting the "individual's power
of self-determination" as a base of morality).
336. Cf Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy
and Politics, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299, 317 (1992) (discussing the tension between philosophi-
cal liberalism and notions of individual desert and responsibility).
337. On the concealment of power in conceptualization, see Singer, supra note 314, at
1755 ("The way we conceptualize both social relationships and moral inquiry affects legal
analysis. To the extent that those conceptions conceal the workings of power, the legal
system helps perpetuate social injustice."); see also Handler, supra note 36, at 703 ("The
pragmatists are concerned about the relationship between knowledge, power, and economic
organization and the ways in which discourses, whether in science, politics, or ethics are
linked to structures of domination." (footnotes omitted)).
338. On categorical and discursive embodiments of power, see Singer, supra note 314, at
1769 ("We need to focus on the ways in which our categories, discourse, and modes of
analysis reinforce illegitimate power relationships by embodying the perspectives and con-
cerns of those who are powerful and suppressing members of oppressed groups." (footnote
omitted)).
339. On the requirements of rationality, see Stephen M. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of
Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 16 (1992) ("Rationality requires a
combination of aptitude, training, and appropriate skepticism .. ").
340. Id. at 19 (defining professional competence as a form of rationality that is "tradi-
tional, experimental, intuitive, and pragmatic").
341. Joel J. Finer, Toward Guidelines for Compelling Cesarean Surgery: Of Rights, Responsi-
bility, and Decisional Authenticity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 239, 285-89 (1992) (defining "decisional
maturity" to include the qualities of voluntariness, authenticity, awareness, and understand-
ing).
342. Grey explains the neopragmatist attraction to positivism:
[T]he new pragmatists can be seen as still working within the scientific empiricist
tradition broadly conceived. They tend to reject both the pervasive relativism and
the oppositional stance toward natural science that many European philosophers
and social thinkers have adopted, and they accept the spirit of scientific inquiry, in
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the poverty lawyer to consider the legality and justice of Johnson's case to
be empirically verifiable. Evidence supplies the factual corroboration re-
quired by legality. Prediction-whether courts will find Johnson disabled-
confirms the justice of Johnson's cause. Success is measured by the accuracy
of that prediction. 343 Practical success is thus self-confirming.
Discursively, the poverty lawyer addresses the Johnson case unilaterally.
She does not stir "cross-cultural conversations.",344 Nor does she treat the
lawyer-client relationship as an "extra-curial" site for the "republican
practices of engaged deliberation and genuine participation as economic
equals., 345 At most, she seeks tacit forms of agreement.
3 46
Poverty lawyers stung by charges of epistemological and discursive domi-
nance respond that a moderate empiricism and a weak interpretivism are
necessary entailments of practice. Reciting oppressive sociolegal condi-
tions, they argue that radical antifoundationalist and dialogic notions are
inapposite to the concrete demands of practice. What matters, they say, is
success. In this instance, success is measured, in the shortrun, by the
vindication of Johnson's right to disability benefits and, in the longrun, by
the invalidation of the HHS consultative examiner regulation.
Plainly, practical constraints impinge upon the poverty lawyer's ethical
judgment in deciding to select and chart strategy in the Johnson case. The
constraints need not limit her epistemological and discursive choices solely
to conventional ways of thinking and speaking. The "interdependence of
which theory is tested against experience by a reflective and critical community of
inquirers. Pragmatists see even natural scientific inquiry as having unavoidably
interpretive and culturally conditioned aspects; at the same time they believe that
humanistic and explicitly evaluative inquiry can be pursued rationally and with the
reasonable hope of progress.
Grey, supra note 316, at 790-91 (footnote omitted).
343. Id. at 804 (describing "general criterion" of success gauged in terms of "helping
people cope with the world").
344. Reed E. Loder, Out From Uncertainty: A Model of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 2 S.
CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 89, 92 (1993) ("Pragmatist philosophers have promoted cross-
cultural conversations as a way of expressing historicity and preserving diversity, and others
have applied these pragmatist images to law." (footnote omitted)); see also Smith, supra note
319, at 434 ("Pragmatists also stress the importance of 'dialogue' in evaluating experience
and in constructing and criticizing theories." (footnote omitted)).
Compare Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical
Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1040 (1991) (noting the dialogist's tendency towards
"overconfidence, unexamined trust, in the extent to which 'we' can all talk meaningfully,
persuasively, and yet nondominatively to each other" (footnote omitted)).
345. Hutchinson, supra note 314, at 583.
346. Moore, supra note 314, at 895 ("Interpretivism and pragmatism share the view that
agreement is all there is to attain with conversation, that interpreting those agreements is all
there is to do, realizing that each interpretation is itself an offer of a new agreement as much
as an interpretation of an old agreement.").
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choice and constraint" '347 is apparent in impoverished communities. Deter-
mining the "presence or absence of choice" in particular situations, how-
ever, is a controversial political judgment.348
The ethical judgment required to ascertain the range of practical choices
available to poverty lawyers and their clients is burdened by contextual and
instrumental complexity.3 4 9 To lessen complexity, poverty lawyers deploy a
cluster of heuristic moves.35 ° The first move is the assertion of contextual
uniformity among subordinate groups.351 This generalized assertion decon-
textualizes clients and their communities, creating a mock uniformity of
interests and circumstances. The second move is the presumption of
instrumental consensus. 35 2 This presumption establishes the plausibility of
reciprocal or mutual understanding reached through reasoned, goal-
347. Martha Minow, Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall, 80 GEO. L.J.
2093, 2102, 2107 (1992) (asserting that "choices are situated within constraints.... [A]ny
evaluation of someone who has choice must involve assessing both the degree of choice left
by the particular constraints and the costs incurred by exercising the actual ambit for choice").
348. See id. at 2105; see, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in
Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (1992) (arguing
that the emphasis on agency, choice, and exit in love and work "directs attention to
individual misbehavior and individual response, concealing relations of power in the family
and the workplace-male domination of women, and a legal regime of work without rights in
a job or protection against most forms of abuse"); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women
and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (elaborating an account of
gender and work that explodes the "choice" explanation framed by conservative courts in
affirming workplace sex segregation).
349. Singer anticipates this difficulty. See Singer, supra note 314, at 1783 (asking whether
"engaging in politics and intellectual inquiry with people of multiple perspectives makes
political and legal analysis too complex").
350. The "pragmatically minded critic," intoned by Margaret Radin and Frank Michel-
man, might condemn these moves as "characteristic kinds of errors or biases that recur when
target discourses are deployed by nonideal-incompletely committed and assiduous-
practitioners caught in specific cultural environments." Radin & Michelman, supra note 344,
at 1031 (footnote omitted).
351. Subordinate groups, in fact, experience alternative visions and survival strategies.
See Linda R. Hirshman, The Book of "'A," 70 TEX. L. REV. 971, 976 (1992) ("Linked to
feminism in Radin's vision ... pragmatism must include the viewpoints and experience of
persons rather removed from the social-epistemological hegemony, who provide a much-
needed source of alternative vision." (footnote omitted)); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist
Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 632 (1990) ("To further the substantive objectives
that critical feminism seeks, its greatest challenge lies at the pragmatic level; its task is to
design frameworks more responsive to the experiences of subordinate groups."); Joseph W.
Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical and Complacent
Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1838 (1990) (reviewing the "complex set of strategies for
community empowerment and self-determination" implemented by Native American nations).
352. The claim is that consensus follows from instrumental reasoning. See Handler, supra
note 36, at 704 ("[Pragmatic c]onsensus is reached by discursive and argumentative
practices."); Swan, supra note 314, at 365 ("Consensus ... is not something which remains
out there waiting to be discovered, it is something which must be created and recreated
politically in continuous encounter and discourse with others." (footnote omitted)). But see
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oriented lawyer-client deliberation. The third move is the charge of incho-
ate autonomy. 353 This charge avers that the client lacks a fully developed
or mature sense of agency and efficacy. The fourth move is the claim of
immutability. 354 This claim describes relational and institutional contexts
as static and unchanging. The fifth move is the retreat to unaccountability.355
This retreat denies the need for elaborate schemes of ethical justification.
This battery of moves alleviates some of the complexity accompanying
situated and instrumental inquiry. In the Johnson case, for example, the
assumption of contextual uniformity blunts the need for situated investiga-
tion of Johnson's family, labor, and migration histories, even though each
connects her to larger and potentially significant communities. Similarly,
the combined assumptions of instrumental consensus and inchoate au-
tonomy avert the need for dialogic negotiation with Johnson concerning
case selection or strategy. Likewise, the assumption of immutability obvi-
ates the need for innovative case selection or advocacy practices. Even if
these assumptions are deflected, the lawyer responsible for the inquiry into
Johnson's case remains unaccountable for her judgment.
Although the Johnson case inquiry presents a somewhat crass instrumen-
talist version of pragmatism, it is sufficient to test the progressive 356 force
Schnably, supra note 11, at 371 ("[A] focus on consensus simply cannot deliver what it
promises: a relatively uncontroversial basis for legal rules and decisionmaking.").
353. The contention is that autonomy is undeveloped or undervalued among subordinate
groups. But see Rhode, supra note 351, at 635 ("[H]owever manipulable, the rubric of
autonomy and equality have made enormous practical differences in the lives of subordinate
groups."); Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1778 (1990) ("[T]he record ... reveals that subordinated people do make history,
particularly when their political practice gives them a consciousness of their position.").
354. The argument is sometimes couched in necessitarian terms. See, e.g., Simon, Visions,
supra note 15, at 503 ("[P]ragmatism ... holds that practice is constrained by ungrounded or
unconscious premises about social or moral necessity .. " (footnote omitted)); Grey, supra
note 314, at 801 ("The pragmatist thesis is that human thought always and necessarily arises
in a situated complex of beliefs; on any given occasion, the great mass of these beliefs must
be left tacit and simply used, not made explicit and subject to doubt, if thought is to proceed
at all."); Margaret J. Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 409, 421 (1993) ("Some contexts must remain fast in order for others to be transcended.
Some conceptions must be taken for granted in order for others to be moved.").
355. Unaccountability discounts the need for justification. Compare Moore, supra note
314, at 904 ("Telling us we must choose and that some choices will seem better than others,
without giving any reasons why we should choose one way or the other or why the 'seeming-
better' should be taken to be better, does not engage us.") and Swan, supra note 314, at 366
("The articulation of a political vision cannot be separated from its justification.") with
Weaver, supra note 314, at 748 ("Pragmatism's whole project was to overcome our felt need
to philosophically justify political institutions-whether for those that exist or ones envi-
sioned as better alternatives.").
356. Simon expressed early optimism on this score. Simon argues:
If pragmatism connotes a style of practice that is wary of unexamined and untested
presuppositions, that adopts a tentative and experimental attitude toward strategy,
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of pragmatism in the entrenched field of poverty law.3 57 In the political
context of advocacy on behalf of impoverished communities, good practi-
cal intentions are not enough.358 More practice in the theory of political
judgment, vision, and justification is required.359 What practice or theory
justifies accepting Johnson's case? I submit that something more than a
lawyer's vague utilitarian 360 or best alternative36t ideal of legality and
justice. What is the theory of that ideal and how is it to be imple-
that is willing to combine activities conventionally held apart or separate activities
conventionally associated, that has an open and expansive view of the range of
possibly relevant knowledge, and that is committed to learn and revise in the light
of experience, then the style of political practice most compatible with Critical legal
writing is a pragmatist one.
Simon, Visions, supra note 15, at 506.
But see Baker, supra note 314, at 697, 717 ("[P]ragmatism is of scant use for achieving
progressive social change."); Frederic R. Kellogg, Legal Scholarship in the Temple of Doom:
Pragmatism's Response to Critical Legal Studies, 65 TUL. L. REV. 15, 56 (1990) ("[P]ragmatism
undermines the CLS challenge to the legitimacy of legal decisions by reducing critical theory
to a set of objections to current theory and practice."); Rorty, supra note 321, at 723 ("The
left finds pragmatism disappointing and wants philosophical thought that is more 'radical'
than that of James and Dewey, because less 'complacent'-as if a really powerful philosophy
could break down all the resistance to radical social change by dissolving all the old fears
and prejudices."); Swan, supra note 314, at 367 ("To the extent that it focuses on the
formation of a procedural framework for the promotion of democratic discursive practices,
contemporary pragmatism may be seen as a real alternative to the conceptions of political
and legal praxis that prevail in the work of the first generation of CLS thinkers." (footnote
omitted)); Weaver, supra note 314, at 743 ("To the extent the radical Left argues pragma-
tism necessarily entails a particular political view, they become vulnerable to the very
pragmatism they seek to employ-for necessary entailment is one of the things pragmatism
argues against.").
357. The progressive force of pragmatism in entrenched fields is disputed. Compare
Handler, supra note 36, at 704 ("By emphasizing 'common sense,' pragmatism runs the
temptation of accepting the status quo."); Hirshman, supra note 351, at 976 (1992) ("[P]rag-
matism, dependent as it is on real experience, is often criticized for its epistemological and
normative conservatism." (footnote omitted)) and Simon, Visions, supra note 15, at 504
("[Plragmatism is entirely in agreement with critical legal writing that ... homely, common
sense 'practical' judgments and 'compromises' presuppose theories about the way the society
is structured and what it permits.") with Schnably, supra note 11, at 404 ("There seems to be
no intrinsic reason why a [pragmatist] focus on social context and practices should produce a
bias toward the existing social order.").
358. Hutchinson, supra note 314, at 565 ("Individuals must go beyond good intentions to
transform the political contexts that translate dominant interests into neutral standards, that
turn momentary ideas into naturalistic assumptions, and that transform good intentions into
bad effects.").
359. Radin, supra note 354, at 411 ("As a pragmatist ... I do not think there is any
methodology that can tell us a priori when dominant conceptions should be disrupted and
when they should be used in other ways.").
360. On utilitarian rationality, see Grey, supra note 314, at 531.
361. Gardbaum, supra note 314, at 709 (discussing the yardstick of the "best practical
alternative").
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mented?3 62 The absence of a pragmatic justification,3 63 coupled with the
lack of a transitional vision of community integration,364 leaves only contex-
tual365 discretion as a mode of persuasion.366 The claim to translation, offered
both as a mode of understanding and persuasion, extends the instrumentalist's
ethical discretion to the institutional setting (e.g., the AJ hearing) of advocacy.
3. Translation
The instrumentalist claim to translation 367 arises out of discontent with
362. Radin's answer is pragmatic: "We have to look and see, judging each particular case
in context, deciding whether it will hurt too much to try to put the ideal into practice now,
and re-deciding the particular case when circumstances change." Radin, supra note 354, at 413.
363. Smith, supra note 319, at 429 ("[P]ragmatists cannot offer any method or criterion for
theorizing different from the methods and criteria already employed by nonpragmatists.").
364. Radin articulates a transitional vision of pragmatic politics. Radin, supra note 317, at 816.
In th[e] pragmatic view of politics, we are always attempting to accomplish a
transition from today's nonideal world to the better world of our vision, and it is a
transition that never ends. Moreover, our visions and our nonideal reality paradoxi-
cally constitute each other: what we can formulate as being better depends upon
where we are now, and the way we understand where we are now depends upon our
vision of what should be.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Ruth A. Putnam, Justice in Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1797,
1805 (1990) (claiming that "what enables the pragmatist as judge, legislator, or plain citizen
to make progress and to change her or his conceptions of justice, of oppression, of legitimate
power, etc. is the fact that the world changes for the better as well as for the worse"); Radin,
supra note 354, at 413 (contending that "theory is immanent and evolving; its development is
interdependent with practice"); Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of
Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811, 1819 (1990) (noting pragmatism's standing as "a visionary tradition").
365. See, e.g., Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1597, 1600 (1990) ("[W]e mean to signal with 'context' a readiness, indeed an eagerness, to
recognize patterns of differences that have been used historically to distinguish among
people, among places, and among problems.").
366. Both feminists and pragmatists embrace a context-based discretionary mode of
persuasion. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 314, at 862 (citing the "important parallels between
pragmatism and contemporary feminist thought" manifested in a "practical and contextual
approach to law"); Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1699, 1699-1704 (1990) (splicing theoretical connections between feminism and pragma-
tism); Rhode, supra note 351, at 632 (asserting that "a critical feminist approach to
procedural values demands contextual judgment"); Marion Smiley, Pragmatism as a Political
Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1843, 1853 (1990) (maintaining that "feminist theory has begun to
generate a set of political questions that any responsible pragmatist should feel obliged to
take into consideration before embarking on contextual analysis"); cf. Baker, supra note 314,
at 697, 717 ("Rorty convinces one only that if highly intellectual feminists redescribe
themselves and their project in anti-foundationalist terms, they might free themselves from
the 'philosophical' demand for a 'general theory of oppression.' "); Radin & Michelman,
supra note 344, at 1049 ("Like their pragmatist neighbors, feminists can be tempted into
disabling radical particularism." (footnote omitted)).
367. The instrumentalist claim of translation is pressed by Clark Cunningham. See
Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 19, at 1299; Cunningham, A Tale of Two
Clients, supra note 19, at 2459. In pressing this claim, Cunningham draws inspiration from
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the formalist vision of "lawyering as representation. 3 68 The source of that
discontent is the "deeply ambiguous" nature of representation lodged in
the tension between the creation and the "re-presentation" of meaning.
3 69
Citing this ambiguity370 and its attendant silencing,371 Clark Cunningham
broaches an alternative vision of "lawyering as a form of translation. 372
the work of James Boyd White. Compare JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 254
(1990) (describing translation as "a process by which one seeks to attune oneself to
another's text and language, to appropriate them yet to respect their difference and au-
tonomy as well") with Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 19, at 1335 ("In
applying the word 'translation' to the practice of law, I have been influenced by James Boyd
White's presentation of translation as a complex and creative practice requiring of the
translator both high art and a demanding ethic." (footnote omitted)).
In contrast to Cunningham, White is careful to install a "proper measure" of translation.
WHITE, supra, at 255. On this measure, success is not gauged by the full reproduction of
meaning-"the setting over of meaning from one non-existent linguistic abstraction into
another"-but by the responsiveness of textual composition. Id. at 254-55. White justifies
this less radical sense of translation on the ground of textual appropriateness. He argues:
[I]f we think of translation instead as the composition of one text in response to
another, as a way of establishing relations by reciprocal gesture, to be judged by
criteria of appropriateness, translation can of course "succeed" and do so in ways
beyond number. There is no single appropriate response to the text of another, nor
even a finite appropriate set of responses; what is called for is a kind of imaginative
self-assertion in relation to another. It will be judged by its coherence, by the kinds
of fidelity it establishes with the original, and by the ethical and cultural meaning it
performs as a gesture of its own.
Id. at 255-56.
368. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 19, at 2460 ("The central activity of
lawyering is generally described as representing clients." (footnote omitted)).
369. Id. at 2492. Cunningham notes:
It is easier either to just re-present or to create your own representation. If the
lawyer merely re-presents, then the client's experience may not gain legal
significance. But if the lawyer "creates a representation," the legal significance may
not be rooted in the client's own experience. Either way, both client and judge are
poorly served because the failure of communication is a loss of potential new
knowledge.
Id.
370. Id. at 2460 (pronouncing "the profound ambiguities created by describing lawyering
as representation").
371. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 19, at 1301 ("[O]ne can under-
stand at least some of the silencing of the client's voice as the lawyer's failure to recognize
and implement the art and ethic of the good translator-a translator who shows conscious
awareness of shifts in meaning and who collaborates with the speaker in managing these
changes.").
372. Id. at 1299 ("I offer the metaphor of the lawyer as translator as a way of both
understanding and altering the ways lawyers change the meanings of their clients' stories.");
Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 19, at 2459 ("The concept of lawyering as
translation is ... presented as rising out of my actual experiences as a lawyer and being
tested through a process of talking about those experiences which requires a dynamic




At the "core" of Cunningham's vision is the merger of lawyer-client
identity: "the achievement of two persons somehow speaking with one
voice. 3 73 For Cunningham, univocalism is the key to translation.374
Unlike "re-presentation" and "creating a representation," the idea of
translation captures that elusive sense of two persons speaking with one
voice. If language is intimately bound up with the way we think about
experience, then talking about experience in a different language neces-
sarily entails knowing that experience in a somewhat different way. Thus
the translator must give new meaning in the process of translation, yet at
the same time the translator strives to speak, not as herself, but as
another.375
Cunningham acknowledges that "the metaphor of lawyering as transla-
tion cannot fully express the meaning of the lawyer's experience," espe-
cially regarding the "narrow and purposive" instrumental pursuits of
advocacy and counseling.3 76 Yet, he argues, the metaphor can "help,
3 77
the lawyer by enlarging her awareness "of how, in the process of represent-
ing a client to others, meaning is created and lost.
378
Cunningham points to two domains in which meaning is created and
lost. The first is the realm of language and categorization.379
For an examination of the modern-postmodern strains in Cunningham's translation thesis,
see Alfieri, supra note 35, at 1235-41.
373. Cunningham,A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 19, at 2461.
374. Cunningham's later work suggests a weaker sense of univocalism. See Cunningham,
The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 19, at 1299-1300. He states:
The translator does not silence the speaker but rather seeks to enhance the
speaker's voice by adding her own. The good translator does not alter the speaker's
meaning without the speaker's consent, and may even collaborate with the speaker
to produce a statement in the foreign language that is more meaningful than the
speaker's original utterance. Thus, translation offers both an image of the con-
straints upon a lawyer's ability to represent fully his client's story and a model for
recognizing and managing the inevitable changes in meaning in a way that may
empower rather than subjugate the client.
Id. at 1300 (footnote omitted).
375. Cunningham,A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 19, at 2483.
376. Id. at 2491.
377. Help arrives in the professional form of a translator's "ethic." Cunningham, The
Lawyer as Translator, supra note 19, at 1338. To Cunningham, "[t]he translator's ethic
compels a continuing cycle in which the translator must continually confront the flaws of the
expression he is creating in the second language, return to the 'other' in the first language,
and then begin the endeavor anew." Id. (footnote omitted).
378. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 19, at 2491.
379. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 19, at 1332 ("[L]anguage plays a
central role in the constitution of knowledge out of experience. The very process of naming
reduces the particularity of experience to reveal inherent factors of form and relation, and
then formalizes and stabilizes them." (footnote omitted)).
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Like more familiar forms of language, law creates knowledge by dividing
up the spectrum of human experience into basic categories. But this new
knowledge, like all forms of knowledge, involves a loss, a reduction of the
particularity of experience and the perspectives of other understand-
ings.3 8 °
To rectify this loss, "the lawyer [as translator] must identify and cross the
gap between what the client says and what can be said in the language of
the law.",3
81
The second is the sphere of lawyer-client and client-state relations.382
Cunningham urges the lawyer to engage "both the client and the law-
speaking other party in dialogue that enables each to expand what they
know so as to meet on common ground. 383 Doing so requires a "constant
process" of education concerning the linguistic creation and loss of mean-
ing.3 a This education must simultaneously encompass the lawyer-self, the
client-other, and the state.385
Cunningham's recognition of the linguistic, categorical, and relational
determinants of meaning in the lawyering process has prompted some
scholars to ponder the utility of the metaphor of translation in the context
of poverty law.3 86 Their work suggests that the metaphor is, in fact,
polycentric, encompassing translation, narrative, voice, and storytelling.387
380. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 19, at 2491 (footnote omitted); see
also Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 19, at 1332 ("Knowledge is neither
independent of nor simply dependent on experience; rather, the conceptual world is consti-
tuted out of the elements of experience.").
381. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 19, at 2491.
382. Cunningham includes both relations in a single sphere. See id. at 2492 ("The
metaphor of translation thus challenges the lawyer to a constant process of educating
herself, her client, and the other legal actors to the ways in which both lay and legal language
diminish and expand what we know about experience.").
383. Id. at 2491. Cunningham imagines client representation "as a series of dialogues:
both between the client and the lawyer and between the lawyer and other legal actors such
as opposing lawyers and a judge." Id. at 2482. To him, "[e]ach dialogue replicates the
internal mental dynamic between experience and knowledge inwhich language both consti-
tutes concepts out of experience and reconstitutes experience by use of concepts." Id.
384. Id. at 2492.
385. Id.
386. See, e.g., Gilkerson, supra note 313, at 911 (exploring "the interconnections between
the limits of traditional representation and the possibilities of the translator approach to
poverty law practice"); cf White, supra note 195, at 544 ("The legal culture might define the
attorney's core role as that of a translator who serves to shape her client's experiences into
claims, arguments and remedies that both the client and the judge can understand."
(footnote omitted)).
387. The concepts of narrative, voice, and storytelling have provoked heated controversy.
Compare Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745
(1989) (challenging the claim of racial distinctiveness in critical race scholarship) and Mark
Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251, 251 (1992) (complain-
ing that "stories may go wrong: they may reveal facts about their narrators that ought to
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Christopher Gilkerson's handling of the concept of the "lawyer as
translator" illustrates the polycentric view. His springboard is the meta-
phor of "law as narrative." Gilkerson contends that the "lawyer as
translator" seeks to unravel the client's story from the silencing entangle-
ments of universalized legal narratives.388 Once authentic story and dissem-
bling narrative are disentangled, the lawyer-translator attempts rhetorically
and strategically to tell the client's story "through the client's voice and
narrative.,"389 This attempt elicits the metaphor of the "lawyer as
storyteller."
According to Gilkerson, the client's experience, viewed through the
client's narrative perspective, directs the "lawyer as storyteller., 390 The
task is to preserve narrative from the silencing language and procedure of
legal advocacy.391' Fulfilling this task demands an "equal knowledge of
law's discourse and rituals" and of the "client's language, meanings, and
values. '
392
Gilkerson's sympathetic extension of Cunningham's "translation" thesis
ends with the demarcation of goals. For Gilkerson, "the goal of transla-
tion is not for lawyer and client to 'speak with one voice.' ,393 To the
contrary, "the goal is for the lawyer to position the client's voice within the
legal proceeding, to evoke rather than re-present the client's narratives. 3
94
Repositioning client voice and narrative, Gilkerson maintains, facilitates
"dialogue" between the client and the legal decisionmaker-in this case,
the ALJ. 3 95 Abandoning the role of advocate or intermediary for the role
of facilitator, the lawyer acts "to establish connection and understanding
between clients and decisionmakers by confronting the latter as human
beings susceptible to enlightenment. ' 396 The enlightenment of transla-
tion, Gilkerson insists, is "an imperative for poverty law practice. 397
trouble us, or they may reflect a flawed understanding of the relation between stories and
law" (footnote omitted)) with Richard Delgado, When A Story Is Just A Story: Does Voice
Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990) (castigating Randall Kennedy's appraisal of "voice"
scholarship) and Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEo. L.J. 313,
315 (1992) (censuring Mark Tushnet's "hostile" analysis of narrative jurisprudence).
For a cautious evaluation of narrative scholarship, see Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of
Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991).
388. Gilkerson, supra note 313, at 915.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 916 (footnote omitted).
391. Id.
392. Id. (footnote omitted).
393. Id. (footnote omitted).
394. Id. at 916-17 (footnotes omitted).
395. Id. at 917.
396. Id. (footnote omitted).
397. Id.
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Under Gilkerson's revised version of translation, the opportunity for
enlightenment occurs in the gap between universalized narrative and client
story. He argues: "The job of poverty lawyers should be to fill that
gap. ' 398 The job of gap-filling, in turn, commands lawyers to challenge,
rather than concede, universalized narrative.399 Mounting such challenges
entails critique, resistance, and normative reinterpretation.400 Gilkerson's
vision of "the lawyer's role as translator" instigates a process of "interpret-
ing, understanding, and then revealing the relationship between the client's
perspective and the law.
40 1
To Gilkerson, lawyer translation "expose[s] unstated assumptions in
universalized narratives," thereby revealing the "dissonance of the client's
narrative. ' ,402 Narrative dissonance results from the exclusions of legal
doctrine, procedure, and decisionmaking. Notwithstanding this disso-
nance, Gilkerson targets administrative decisionmaking as an important
site of translation. 40 3  He claims that within the administrative hearing
"the lawyer as translator can bring client and decisionmaker together in
face-to-face dialogue. ',4 ' Dialogue may enable the decisionmaker to "hear"
and "learn" from the "meanings and values" of client narrative.40 5 In this
way, dialogue fosters the substantive 406 goal of informed decisionmaking
and the "process" goal of empathic decisionmaking.4 °7
398. Id.
399. Id. ("[Challenge] means examining poor clients' narrative accounts of their injuries
and asking what it would mean for the law and the legal system to take those accounts
seriously." (footnote omitted)).
400. Id.
401. Id. (footnote omitted).
402. Id. at 918.
403. Id. at 923 ("The hearing as a forum for translating client narratives has become
increasingly important as substantive developments in poverty law in the 1980s have shifted
decisionmaking from federal regulatory practice to state program, design, operation, and
control." (footnote omitted)).
404. Id. at 922, 924-25 ("In translating client narratives, the hearing (whether formal or
informal) should be neither the means nor the end of the representational strategy; rather,
the hearing is the setting for bringing together client and decisionmaker in an effort to call
upon the latter to take account of and learn from the former's perspective and voice.").
405. Id. at 923 ("[T]he lawyer's translation is an attempt to compel the decisionmaker to
hear the client's voice, understand the client's perspective, and feel the client's injury."). Id.
at 925; see also Eskridge, supra note 220, at 385-86 ("Narratives can rectify stereotypical
misconceptions about us and can educate society about our legitimate concerns and needs,
and the unjustified ways social mores and policies hurt us. Narratives can also help others
identify with us and our concerns, creating conditions of empathy and emotional connection."
(footnote omitted)).
406. The path from dialogue to substantive resolution is unclear. See Abrams, supra note
307, at 1600 ("It is not evident how one progresses from taking the viewpoint of another to
agreeing on a particular resolution.").
407. Gilkerson, supra note 313, at 925 (footnote omitted).
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Gilkerson defines the "empathic understanding" of legal decisionmak-
ers in terms of "comprehension and identification with 'the other'-her
perspective, identity, history, motives, and purpose., 40 8 Richard Delgado
and Jean Stefancic deprecate the belief that "we can somehow control our
consciousness despite limitations of time and positionality. '40 9 The term
they designate for this belief is the "empathic fallacy., 41° They explain:
[T]he empathic fallacy[] consists of believing that we can enlarge our
sympathies through linguistic means alone. By exposing ourselves to
ennobling narratives, we broaden our experience, deepen our empathy,
and achieve new levels of sensitivity and fellow-feeling. We can, in short,
think, talk, read, and write our way out of bigotry and narrow-
mindedness, out of our limitations of experience and perspective.41
To Delgado and Stefancic, empathic understanding is plausible "only to a
very limited extent.,
4 12
To escape these limitations, Gilkerson appeals to the "inherent abilities
of decisionmakers to hear, balance, and use discretion., 413 This appeal is
part of a wider effort, encouraged by Lucie White, to rethink the practice
of administrative decisionmaking "from a ground of empathy rather than
of contest., 414 In this way, "the task of process, be it political or adjudica-
tive, would be to sustain a complex, multivocal conversation., 415 White
contends:
Such process would encourage participants to interpret their "conflicting
interests" as varying perspectives on what are ultimately common human
problems. That is, the process would engage participants in reflecting on
408. Id. at 926 (footnote omitted).
409. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1261
(1992) (footnote omitted).
410. Id. at 1261.
411. Id.
412. Id. Derrick Bell recapitulates this point in the context of court enforced "racial
equality." Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 364 (1992) (viewing the law
and courts "as instruments for preserving the status quo and only periodically and unpredict-
ably serving as a refuge of oppressed people").
413. Gilkerson, supra note 313, at 926; see Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some
Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (1992) (noting the "increased resort to
administrative discretion as a dominant legal modality" (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)).
414. Lucie E. White, Revaluing Politics: A Reply to Professor Strauss, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1331, 1338 (1992). For early strands of White's hypothesis, see Joel F. Handler, Continuing
Relationships and the Administrative Process; Social Welfare, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 687 (exploring
administrative models of cooperative decisionmaking in special education, public welfare,
and social insurance programs).
415. White, supra note 414, at 1338.
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their own positions, seeking not so much to "sell" their interests to the
decision-maker, but rather to reformulate those interests in light of the
others' histories, the others' passions, and the others' needs.
41 6
White admits that "[t]hese efforts would never fully succeed. 4 1 7 To
Bertie Johnson, such aspirational efforts might smack of folly. Whether or
not guided by the "aspirational norm, 418 of empathy, the supposedly
herculean abilities of HHS legal decisionmakers are nowhere visible to
Johnson. Johnson's failure to appreciate the proficiency of HHS decision-
makers, especially the performance of the presiding AU, should not be
attributed to cognitive,419 affective,42 ° or depressive42" ' disorders, notwith-
standing medical evidence of her nervousness and depression. Although
her physical impairments and functional limitations may have engendered
symptoms of nervousness and depression, Johnson's criticism of the AU
and her opposition to the consultative examination raise credible objec-
tions to the process and substance of HHS administrative decisionmaking
in her case.
Like Gilkerson's client-other, Johnson possesses her own perspective,
identity, history, motives, and purpose.4 2 Her objections flow from the
identity-making experiences of age, class, gender, labor, migration, and
416. Id. (footnote omitted).
417. Id. at 1339.
418. Id.
419. See, e.g., Patricia J. Dunston, Stress, Coping, and Social Support: Their Effects on
Black Women, in HANDBOOK OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL DISORDER AMONG BLACK
AMERICANS 133, 136 (Dorothy S. Ruiz ed., 1990) ("An individual's reaction to the type and
intensity of a stressor may also vary in relation to physiological change and cognitive
appraisal."); Paul Willner, Cognitive Functioning in Depression: A Review of Theory and
Research, 14 PSYCHOL. MED. 807, 817 (1984) ("Not only are pleasant events less frequent in
depression, and unpleasant events more frequent, but also the affective quality of both is
biased in the aversive direction; there are also reciprocal inter-relationships between the
frequency of one type of event and the affective quality of the other.").
420. See, e.g., P.E. Bebbington et al., Misfortune and Resilience: A Community Study of
Women, 14 PSYCHOL. MED. 347 (1984) (studying affective disorders among working class
women with young children); Paul R. Jackson & Peter B. Warr, Unemployment and Psychologi-
cal Ill-Health: The Moderating Role of Duration and Age, 14 PSYCHOL. MED. 605 (1984)
(studying psychological ill-health among unemployed working class men); cf. Christina
Newhill, The Role of Culture in the Development of Paranoid Symptomatology, 60 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCH. 176 (1990) (examining influence of cultural and societal forces on develop-
ment and manifestation of paranoid illnesses).
421. See, e.g., Deborah Belle et al., Mental Health Problems and Their Treatment, in LIVES
IN STRESS: WOMEN AND DEPRESSION 197 (Deborah Belle ed., 1982) (finding "a high rate of
depressive symptoms and other mental health problems" among low income mothers); D.M.
Fergusson & L.J. Horwood, Life Events and Depression in Women: A Structural Equation
Model, 14 PSYCHOL. MED. 881, 881 (1984) ("The general and robust nature of the correla-
tion between life events and depression strongly suggests that life events play a role in the
etiology of depression[.]").
422. See Gilkerson, supra note 313, at 926 (footnote omitted).
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race. The nature and extent of the objections communicate Johnson's
frustration with the effort to bring her story to the attention of HHS
decisionmakers.42 3 The inability of HHS decisionmakers to hear and learn
from the meanings and values of Johnson's story demonstrates the inad-
equacy of the dominant cognitive modality of administrative decisionmak-
ing in the field of disability (i.e., intuitionism), 424 and the insufficiency of
the alternative modality of empathic conversationalism. 425 Gilkerson's
vision of normative dialogue is ultimately frustrated 426 by the institutional
subordination of'a laboring, black, impoverished woman. The instrumental-
ist claim to indeterminacy, and the purposive political judgments that
follow from weakening the strictures of law and legal reasoning, do not
save Johnson from institutional subordination. Instead, by emphasizing
and exploiting the manipulability of legal regimes, the claim enlarges the
instrumentalist's gatekeeping role, extending her discretionary judgment
to deciding the political purpose of such regimes.
4. Indeterminacy
The instrumentalist claim to indeterminacy emanates from the jurispru-
dence of legal realism. 427 The historical mainstay of the realist critique is
423. Eskridge states: "[W]e must bring our personal stories and histories to the attention
of law and society." Eskridge, supra note 220, at 385.
424. See Bersoff, supra note 174, at 350 ("[lIncorrect intuitive judgments result from the
use of simplifying heuristic strategies in all situations where decisionmakers' cognitive
capacities cannot otherwise efficiently process information.").
425. See Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics and an Infinity-Based Response: Will
Endless Talking Cure America's Racial Ills? 80 GEO. L.J. 1879, 1889 (1992) ("A fault of
conversationalism is that we assign it the efficacy it would have if we (the right-thinking
conversationalists) were to prevail in every case. But the dominant narrative changes very
slowly."). Delgado's bleak assessment of conversationalism is informed by his analysis of
racism. He remarks:
Racism is not merely common, it is natural and normal-the ordinary state of
affairs. It informs all our preconceptions and mental pictures. It is the 'normal
science' of our day, part of the baseline, the from-which-we-reason. Conversation
begins with racist premises. Indeed, talking will likely just rehearse the dominant
narrative, inscribing its supremacist message even more deeply.
Id. at 1880 (footnotes omitted).
426. See id. at 1887 ("The trouble is that highly normative talk-full of importuning,
pleading, imploring, and pronouncements of this or that course of action as wrong and
evil-is likely to fail, and very possibly make matters worse.").
427. This is not the place for a full-blown survey of the literature of realist jurisprudence.
For historical surveys, see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-60 (1986);
WILFRED E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968). Yet, even for this limited
inquiry, two mileposts are noteworthy. The first chalks the start of the realist literature: the
sociological jurisprudence of Benjamin Cardozo and Oliver Wendell Holmes. See generally
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1963); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1897); G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
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an attack on formalistic or mechanical theories of judicial decisionmaking128
Postrealist scholars, especially those affiliated with the critical legal studies
movement,429 continue this attack, besieging a broad range of doctrinal
judgments.43" A principal thrust of this attack is the charge of indetermi-
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999
(1972).
The second marks the fracturing of the late literature: the debate aligning Karl Llewellyn,
and to a lesser extent Jerome Frank, against Roscoe Pound. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A
Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Karl N. Llewellyn,
Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931);
Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); see also
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
On the repercussions of the Llewellyn-Pound debate and the decline of realism, see
generally N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A Prequel to the
Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1302; N.E.H. Hull, Some
Realism about the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Realism: The Newly Uncovered Private
Correspondence, 1927-1931, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 921; G. Edward White, From Realism to
Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819, 821-25 (1986).
428. Edward Purcell observes: "The rejection of the orthodox theory of judicial decision
was the central point of the realist critique .. " PURCELL, supra note 186, at 89. For early
and late examples of that rejection, see Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM.
L. REV. 605 (1908); see also Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 810 (1935).
429. On the realist underpinnings of critical legal studies, see KELMAN, supra note 88, at
12 (mentioning critical legal studies' "emphasis on the indeterminacy of case results and the
manipulability of precedent as a continuation of the Realist project"); James Boyle, The
Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685,
705-06 (1985) (indicating that "[liegal realism provided critical legal scholars with many of
their arguments"); Richard M. Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 505, 524 (1987) (tying legal realism and critical legal studies to a "progressive
political critique" couched in a "skeptical jurisprudence"); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985) (untangling the critical and constructive strands
of legal realism); G. Edward White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 649, 650 (1984) (noting the "self-conscious identification of Realism as a progenitor of,
or an inspiration for, the CLS movement"); Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 467 (1988) (book review) (showing partial integration of legal realism and critical
theory); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1680 (1982) (citing critical legal scholars' tendency
to "employ[] the analytic techniques of the Realists at a higher level of abstraction to
expose the assumptions underlying traditional legal discourse as contradictory and inco-
herent").
430. See, e.g., James Boyle, Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller's Public Jurispru-
dence of Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1993) (exploring
the relationship of legal realism to the rhetoric and theory of contractarian traditions); Clare
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985)
(contract law); Richard M. Fischl, Self Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected
Protest Activities under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789 (1989) (labor
law); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591 (1981) (criminal law); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) (contract and tort law); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (family
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nacy.43 1
Postrealist jurisprudence presents strong and weak accounts of the
indeterminacy charge. Each account aspires to descriptive or empirical
veracity. The strong account claims that legal regimes (i.e., rules, argu-
ments, and institutions) are radically indeterminate.432 The weak account
contends that legal regimes are, at most, moderately indeterminate.
433
law); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393 (1991)
(property law).
431. Robert Gordon's attempt to harmonize the theory of indeterminacy and the practice
regularities of sociolegal regimes is well known. Gordon, supra note 88, at 125. Gordon
claims that "there are plenty of short- and medium-run stable regularities in social life,
including regularities in the interpretation and application, in given contexts, of legal rules."
Id. He points out, for example, that lawyers "are constantly making predictions for their
clients on the basis of these regularities." Id. He insists, however, that "none of these
regularities are necessary consequences of the adoption of a given regime of rules." Id. In
his "critical" view, "[t]he rule-system could also have generated a different set of stabilizing
conventions leading to exactly the opposite results and may, upon a shift in the direction of
political winds, switch to those opposing conventions at any time." Id.; see also KELMAN,
supra note 88, at 245 ("The claim of legal indeterminacy emphasizes not so much the degree
to which any set of legal practices is so inexorably internally contradictory that one would be
hard pressed even to state an accurate summary of prevailing practice, but rather the degree
to which we would find it impossible to match up prevailing practices (to the extent that we
can discern them) with particular social conditions."); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, On the
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 462 (1987) ("What I
call the indeterminacy thesis goes roughly like this: the existing body of legal doctrines-
statutes, administrative regulations, and court decisions-permits a judge to justify any
result she desires in any particular case .... [T]he idea is that a competent adjudicator can
square a decision in favor of either side in any given lawsuit with the existing body of legal
rules.").
432. In his exegetical study of critical legal studies (CLS), Mark Kelman explains:
Th[e] stronger CLS claim [of legal indeterminacy] is that the legal system is
invariably simultaneously philosophically committed to mirror-image contradictory
norms, each of which dictates the opposite result in any case (no matter how "easy"
the case first appears). While settled practice is not unattainable, the CLS claim is
that settled justificatory schemes are in fact unattainable. Efforts at norm legitima-
tion are radically indeterminate not because the source of authority cannot speak
clearly (though, rather incidentally, she often cannot) but because if pressed, she
would not want to.
KELMAN, supra note 88, at 13; see also Joseph Singer, The Player and The Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1984) (arguing that "legal reasoning is indeterminate and
contradictory" (footnote omitted)); Charles Yablon, Timeless Rules: Can Normative Closure
and Legal Indeterminacy Be Reconciled?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1605, 1608 (1992) ("[Legal
indeterminacy] contends that the norms that constitute the legal system are so diverse, and
so contradictory in scope, purpose, and level of generality that a skilled lawyer or judge can
invariably invoke an authoritative legal rule to justify any outcome they [sic] wish in a
particular case."); cf. Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 639, 690 (1990) [hereinafter Bull Durham] ("[Tlhe relative indeterminacy of legal
doctrine is complex, yielding patterns of both stability and flexibility."); Winter, Transcenden-
tal Nonsense, supra note 13, at 1195-98 (categorizing three forms of relative indeterminacy:
indeterminacy of extension, indeterminacy of paradigm, and substantive indeterminacy).
433. Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 336 (1989); see also Kent
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Both strong and weak accounts of indeterminacy address adjudica-
tion,4 34 rather than lawyering.4 35 When lawyering is mentioned, it is cited
to buttress 436 or deflect4 37 evidence of stable legal practices. Neither
Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 29 (1990) ("I defend here a
modest claim about determinacy: many legal questions have determinate answers that 1)
would be arrived at by virtually all those with an understanding of the legal system and 2) are
unopposed by powerful arguments, consonant with the premises of the system, for contrary
results."); Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 134, 146
(1990) ("[I]n law metaphysical indeterminacy is at most moderate."); John A. Miller,
Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation,
68 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993) (encouraging general rules of application guided by principles of
fairness and flexibility); Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The
Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200, 216 (1984) ("The power of construc-
tive thought can be brought to bear to hold to an acceptable minimum the instances where
law is not determinate."); Stick, supra note 314, at 358 (claiming that "the predictability of
practical legal reasoning" arising out of "convention and common sense" shows that "legal
practice is not irrational").
434. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179,
181 (1986-87).
435. For an exception to the postrealist preoccupation with adjudication, see Winter, Bull
Durham, supra note 432, at 687 ("Competent lawyering is a constant effort at transperspectiv-
ity that requires the advocate to entertain and consider many conflicting perspectives and
beliefs simultaneously."). This preoccupation, I submit, has sapped the transformative
potential of critical legal studies. Compare Richard M. Fischl, The Question That Killed
Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 779, 783 (1992) ("Th[e] obsession with
normativity has distorted the mainstream understanding of critical scholarship in a particu-
lar and systematic way, leading many readers to conclude that the refusal of cls scholars to
engage the What would you put in its place? question is at best an irresponsible act of naive
utopianism, and at worst a strategic move designed to hide a covert commitment to some
sort of Stalinist totalitarianism.") with Note, supra note 429, at 1685 ("Abstract doctrinal
criticism, particularly if disassociated from demonstrations of existing social injustice and
unaccompanied by a substantive vision that suggests avenues for its implementation, is likely
to be disregarded." (footnote omitted)).
436. John Stick argues that "the profession is confident that a good lawyer can often be
reasonably certain" about the quality of legal arguments-"whether particular arguments
are good or bad"-and about the outcome of judicial judgments-"how a judge is likely to
rule." Stick, supra note 314, at 354. According to Stick, this professional confidence is not
irrational, but firmly grounded on "legal culture, conventions, and common sense." Id. at
355. Insofar as this groundwork establishes that "the law as practiced is generally
predictable," Stick maintains that "the nihilists' claim that legal practice is indeterminate is
defeated." Id. at 358.
437. Joseph Singer realizes that the claim of radical indeterminacy "seems to be contra-
dicted by the ability of experienced litigators and court watchers often to predict with
surprising accuracy what judges are going to do." Singer, supra note 432, at 10. To salvage
this claim, he distinguishes the indeterminacy of arguments from the arbitrariness of choices.
Id. at 20 ("The indeterminacy of arguments is logically distinct from the arbitrariness of
choices." (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted)). For Singer, legal regimes may follow
"predictable patterns of behavior and decisionmaking even though the arguments advanced
to justify the choices do not determine the outcomes." Id. Although arbitrary, the sub-
stance of such "considered choices" is predictable in a contextual sense. Id. at 20-21. The
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treatment is satisfactory. What is lacking is a "systematic investigation of
the effect" of the indeterminacy critique on traditional understandings of
the lawyer's ethical role.438
Troubled by the implications of the realist critical legacy, David Wilkins
launches precisely such an investigation.439 Wilkins argues that the indeter-
minacy critique undermines the traditional model of legal ethics. Under
this model, the lawyer assumes both a private partisan and a public
regulatory role. In her private role, the lawyer serves as "an advocate for
the private interest of particular clients. ' 440 In her public role, the lawyer
stands "as an 'officer of the court' with a separate duty of loyalty to the fair
and efficient administration of justice. 441
The contours of the traditional model of ethics are well mapped. 4 2
More intriguing is the "boundary claim ' 44 3 partitioning the lawyer's public-
private 444 role. Wilkins detects this boundary claim in the commands of
contextual framing of normative choices occurs within institutional settings dominated by
custom, role, and ideology. Id. at 21. Hence, Singer reasons, "[c]ustom, rather than reason,
narrows the choices and suggests the result." Id. at 25.
438. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 469 (1990).
439. Id. at 470 ("[W]e need to understand what legal realism means for lawyers and how
legal ethics should respond to that reality.").
440. Id. at 471 (footnote omitted); see David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?,
105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 815 (1992) ("As an advocate, a lawyer is expected to keep the client
informed, safeguard the client's secrets, provide competent and diligent services at a
reasonable fee, and abide by the client's wishes concerning the purposes of the attorney-
client relationship." (footnotes omitted)); see also Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in
a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116, 170-89 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988)) (contending that Luban's defense of
client manipulation in political lawyering undercuts the principle of client control); Michael
K. McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 367 (1992) (exploring the
balance of moral considerations underlying the lawyer's obligation of client loyalty); M.B.E.
Smith, Should Lawyers Listen to Philosophers About Legal Ethics? 9 LAW & PHIL. 67 (1990)
(construing the lawyer's professional obligation to the client as a strong prima facie moral
obligation).
441. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 471 (footnote omitted); see also Wilkins, supra note 440, at
815 ("As an officer of the court ... a lawyer should not counsel or assist the client in
fraudulent conduct, file frivolous claims or defenses, unreasonably delay litigation, intention-
ally fail to follow the rules of the tribunal, or unnecessarily embarrass or burden third
parties." (footnotes omitted)); see also LUBAN, supra note 147, at 317-40 (examining problem
of client manipulation in public interest lawyering); David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and
Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1004 (1990) (defending a "moral activism" conception of the lawyer's role); Peter Margulies,
"Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and
the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990) (asserting the lawyer's duty to counsel
clients on nonlegal issues-morality, psychology, and policy-and nonclient-third party and
public-interests).
442. See, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 198, at 39-113; Simon, Visions,
supra note 15, at 470-84.
443. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 471.
444. Wilkins abstains from the debate surrounding the public-private distinction. For an
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the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the injunction
directing the lawyer to represent his client within the bounds of the law.445
Under the traditional model of ethics, this injunction acts as a mediating
device conciliating the "lawyer's private duty to clients and her public
commitments to the legal framework.
4 a4 6
Wilkins proposes to challenge and reposition the boundary truss binding
the private and public components of traditional ethics. The realist indeter-
minacy critique is the engine of his challenge. Mindful of the postrealist
impasse on the exact reach of indeterminacy, Wilkins moves adroitly to
establish that " 'lawyer's law' is not radically indeterminate. 44 7
Wilkins's endorsement of a weak indeterminacy account is rhetorically
advantageous. The weak account is generally accepted by scholars and
practitioners. Moreover, the account erodes the normative foundations of
traditional ethics and obviates the need to break the postrealist defini-
tional stalemate over indeterminacy. 448 Wilkins diligently parses the norma-
tive threads of the traditional claim that the "bounds of the law" properly
"define the limits of the lawyer's responsibility to clients." '44 9 To provide a
reasonably determinate constraint on lawyer conduct, he observes that the
boundaries of legal rules must be "objective, consistent, and legitimate. 450
In order to meet these conditions, the boundaries must be identifiable,
external, evenhanded, and authoritative.45'
Wilkins topples the straw claims to determinacy of the traditional model.
Tightening the indeterminacy critique, he fixes on "how lawyers experi-
ence indeterminacy in the law and how that experience either affirms or
undermines the boundary claim., 45 2 Even under a weak account of the
realist critique, Wilkins isolates three sources of ambiguity in legal prac-
introduction to the polemics of that debate, see generally Alan Freeman & Elizabeth
Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237
(1987) (assessing the provinces of private and state action); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the
Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) (examining the feminist internal and
external challenges to the public-private distinction); Symposium on the Public/Private Distinc-
tion, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
445. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1993) ("A Lawyer Should
Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."); cf. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1992) ("A lawyer ... may take whatever lawful and
ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.").
446. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 470, 471.
447. Id. at 470.
448. Id. at 477 ("[W]e need not resolve the larger jurisprudential debate about whether
the law is radically or only marginally indeterminate." (footnote omitted)).
449. Id. at 472.
450. Id. at 474.
451. Id. at 472-73.
452. Id. at 477.
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tice. 5 3 The first stems from the multiple theories of law,45 4 overlapping
legal materials, 455 and alternative lines of investigation open to the lawyer.
456
The second derives from the "vague, open-ended language" of legal author-
ity.457 The third springs from the uncertainty of issue framing and rule
application.458 This uncertainty extends to factual characterization.459
To Wilkins, the lawyer's experience of ambiguity is intensified by the
principle of partisanship. Wilkins argues that partisanship, a bedrock
principle of the traditional model, 46° compels the lawyer to "discover[]
gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in the relevant legal materials.",46' This
compulsion, he worries, "encourages lawyers to exploit indeterminacy.,
462
Wilkins fears the logical expanse of the indeterminacy critique is an
unbounded field where "there are no restrictions on zealous advocacy.
4 63
On that unbounded field, "argumentative nihilism" ' 464 is free to reign.
Wilkins avers two ethical consequences of nihilism: either the lawyer's
public regulatory duty will collapse into a private partisan duty, or her
public regulatory duty will be subordinated to "personal moral and politi-
cal discretion., 465 Both outcomes appear unacceptable.
Wilkins's disdain of ethical regimes which privilege private partisan or
morally discretionary lawyering duties requires him to cabin his indeterminacy
critique. He makes two moves toward that end, but each falls short.
453. Id. at 478.
454. Id. at 478-79 ("[M]any areas of the law contain competing, and sometimes conflict-
ing, rules that might be applied to the facts of any case.").
455. Id. at 479 ("[W]ithin any particular field, a vast array of legal materials may be
relevant to any given problem.").
456. Id. at 478 ("Specific legal questions often present lawyers with many potential
avenues of investigation.").
457. Id. at 480.
458. Id. at 481 ("[I]ndeterminacy may result from a dispute over the level of generality at
which a legal issue should be framed or the manner in which a chosen rule should be applied
to a particular case.").
459. Id. at 482-83 ("[F]requent ambiguity as to the proper characterization of the facts
contributes to the problem of indeterminacy.").
460. See, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 198, at 36. Simon considers
partisanship a basic principle of lawyer conduct: "Th[e] principle prescribes that the lawyer
work aggressively to advance his client's ends. The lawyer will employ means on behalf of
his client which he would not consider proper in a non-professional context even to advance
his own ends. These means may involve deception, obfuscation, or delay." Id.
461. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 483. Wilkins complains that the partisan conception of
professional role actually "exacerbates the problems of indeterminacy by encouraging the
lawyer to discover doctrinal gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities[.]" Id. at 505.
462. Id. at 483 (footnote omitted).
463. Id. at 484 (footnote omitted).
464. Id. at 484 n.73. Wilkins defines "argumentative nihilism" to "mean a regime in which
it would be impossible for anyone to claim that any legal argument was better than any other
legal argument." Id.
465. Id. at 484.
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Initially, he cites the "widespread realities" of legal practice: sound judgment, 6
and reasonable prediction." 7 Next, he infers "some meaningful" interpretive
constraints from the factors of legal culture,' prediction," 69 and practicality.
47 °
Having reviewed the "widespread realities" of legal judgment, culture,
prediction, and practicality, Wilkins confesses that these practice con-
straints "do not support the normative vision underlying the boundary
claim." '471 The constraints fail on three grounds. Cultural norms suffer
from subjectivity and contextual inconsistency. 47 Prediction carries "uncer-
tainties and biases., 473 And practical considerations rest on ad hoc calcula-
tions of time and money, as well as the machinations of routine.474
Wilkins's stymied effort to bridle the indeterminacy critique, and thus
avoid the slide into argumentative nihilism, leads him to recommend "abandon-
ing partisanship as the reference point for interpreting legal boundaries. 475
Partisanship, Wilkins laments, affords lawyers "both the power and the incen-
tive to manipulate the very boundaries that are supposed to provide an indepen-
dent source of constraint., 476 In place of partisanship, Wilkins proposes "a
general command to uphold the public purposes of legal rules."
477
466. Id. ("By all accounts, most lawyers feel quite capable of judging what constitutes a
'good' legal argument." (footnote omitted)).
467. Id. at 485 ("[L]awyers depend on the ability to make reasonably accurate predictions
about how particular legal disputes will be resolved."); see also PURCELL, supra note 186, at
76 ("By the law, Holmes declared, he meant... only the 'incidence of the public force
through the instrumentality of the courts.' The lawyer's sole duty was to predict how the
courts would use that force, and hence to advise his clients most effectively." (footnote
omitted)); Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 181 (1990)
(" 'Law' in this view means only a lawyer's prediction that on such-and-such facts a court will
decide with a certain percentage probability for the client." (footnote omitted)).
468. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 486 ("Legal culture undoubtedly constrains lawyer conduct.
The bar's prevailing norms and practices substantially reduce the number of interpretations
that any set of legal materials can plausibly support." (footnote omitted)).
469. Id. at 493 ("Prediction may. . . bring stability to the world of the practicing lawyer.").
Compare Greenawalt, supra note 433, at 2 ("To most lawyers, it may seem self-evident that
many legal questions do have determinate answers; and that indeed is what I believe.") with
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 819 (1983) ("[T]he limits of craft are so broad that in any
interesting case any reasonably skilled lawyer can reach whatever result he or she wants.")
(footnote omitted).
470. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 493 ("Indeterminacy is ... limited by the lawyer's practi-
cal desire and ability to engage in the work of legal argument.").
471. Id. at 496.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 497.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 498.
476. Id. at 497.
477. Id. at 498, 499-505. In making this proposal, Wilkins rebuffs conventional remedial
measures-tighter rules, better guidance, and increased enforcement-to restore the coher-
ence of the traditional model.
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Wilkins's move to a public purposes4 78 framework-a vision of profession-
alism he calls "purposivism "479-recalls Robert Gordon's recent work on
lawyer independence.480 Gordon's model of purposive lawyering seeks to
integrate the client's interest and the purposes of the overarching "legal
framework."48' This integration prompts the lawyer to unify her public
and private roles.482 Unity requires both strong and weak devotions.
Strong devotions entail the commitment "to maintain the spirit of the laws
both inside and outside the context of representation," and furthermore,
"to assist in carrying out their 'essential purposes' or 'social functions.' ,"483
Weak devotions involve the willingness "at the very least to refrain from
acting so as to subvert and nullify the purposes of the rules.
484
Gordon admits that his model of purposive lawyering necessitates "politi-
cal judgments."485 Indeed, political judgment is the nub of the purposive
exercise of discretion.486 Wilkins, however, is reluctant to join in this
admission. Instead, he shifts to the republican vision of lawyers as indepen-
487 48dent-minded487 public citizens. In that vision, the "limitations on adver-
478. Id. at 505.
479. Id.
480. See Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, supra note 246, at 22-30. Simon's pathbreak-
ing study of ideology set out the sociolegal attributes of purposivism. See Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 198, at 62-91.
481. For Gordon, legal frameworks impose express practice obligations. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, supra note 246, at 23-24.
Purposive lawyers must repair damage to the framework done by factional interests and
their advocacy-minded lawyers, assist in reforming the legal structure to meet its purposes
when conditions change, and serve as an official and unofficial policy intelligentsia. They
should be the social curators of the values of legalism-promoting understanding and respect
for the values of human rights, due process, equal legal treatment, universal access to
justice, and coming to the aid of persons injured by the deprivation of these rights.
Id. at 24.
482. Id. at 23 ("The purposive lawyer does not split private and public roles, but rather
tries to unify them by seeking ways to harmonize the client's business plans with the
purposes of the legal framework." (footnote omitted)).
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 26 ("[P]olitical judgments are virtually inescapable."). Gordon's admission is somewhat
obscured by his use of the term virtually. This term suggests that at least some ethical judgments elide
politics, a proposition that seems untenable given Gordon's own proffered analysis.
486. Id at 28-29 ("[Elvery exercise of... [counseling] discretion entails making 'political' decisions.").
487. Wilkins envisions an explicit model of professional independence. He explains:
[T]he model is of a person who has fully integrated the values of the legal system-including
all of the conflicts and ambiguities-and is honestly struggling to discover and implement the
approach that best effectuates its underlying purposes. Independence, therefore, is
primarily an "attitude" or a habit of mind as opposed to a structural condition.
Wilkins, supra note 440, at 862 (footnotes omitted).
488. See also Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, supra note 246, at 24 (discussing the
"image of lawyers as 'republican' citizens having public duties").
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sarial zeal" descend, not from an adversarial framework, but from a legal
framework.489 This schematic inversion49 ° elevates public purposes to "a
higher priority in lawyer decisionmaking."
491
Although he is hesitant to confront the ineluctable political judgments
of purposive lawyering, Wilkins is careful to pronounce the regulatory
choices available in such an advocacy regime.492 The choices are two: a
centralized, rule-based approach 493 or a decentralized, standards-based
approach.494 The first approach relies on external rules to regulate ethical
decisionmaking. 495 The second approach depends upon the self-regula-
tion of "good faith" lawyer discretion.496
Unsettled by rule-based indeterminacy, and distressed by untrammeled stan-
dards-based discretion, Wilkins grasps at a compromise: "simultaneously incor-
porate two ethical perspectives., 497 In this compromise, "individual discretion
is acknowledged as both necessary and necessary to constrain. 498 To be mean-
ingful, Wilkins warns, ethical constraint must be contextually, rather than univer-
489. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 506. Wilkins comments that the prevailing rules of
professional conduct "value" both private and public modes of professional independence.
In the public mode as "officers of the court," he notes, lawyers "must independently assess
whether the client's actions are likely to contravene the bounds of the law or otherwise
improperly interfere with the lawyer's obligations to the legal framework." Wilkins, supra
note 440, at 816 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
490. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 507 ("[P]urposivist reasoning reverses the traditional
model's arguable permission to exploit indeterminacy for the narrow advantage of particular
clients.").
491. Id. at 506 (footnote omitted).
492. Wilkins confines his choices to the conventional rule-standard dichotomy. Id. at 507.
For opposing treatments of this dichotomy, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (detecting rhetorical correlates in
the form-rules and standards-and substance-individualism and altruism-of private law
categories); see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992) (offering an economic analysis of rules and standards); Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985) (deconstructing conventional accounts of the
rules-standards dichotomy); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (examining substantive and jurisprudential implica-
tions of rules-standards discourse).
493. The centralized, rule-based approach "consists of relatively narrow rules instructing
lawyers how and under what circumstances the interests of clients should be 'harmonize[d]
... with the purposes of the legal framework.' " Wilkins, supra note 438, at 507 (footnote
omitted) (quoting Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, supra note 246, at 23).
494. The decentralized, standards-based approach "consist[s] of a few general standards
designed to allow an individual lawyer maximum discretion to determine the requirements of
purposivist' advocacy case by case." Wilkins, supra note 438, at 507.
495. Wilkins equates this structure to the "rule-of-law values" rhetorically embodied in
the traditional model of ethics. Id. at 508-09.
496. Id. at 508-09, 514.





The proposed fusion of discretion and constraint pushes Wilkins to
formulate "middle-level rules of professional conduct."5 °° In developing
these rules, he strives to accommodate difference and, at the same time,
compel compliance. 50 ' Balancing those imperatives drags Wilkins into a
morass of definitional 5 2 and jurisdictional5 3 problems. Although famil-
iar,50 4 the problems of defining and applying "relevant contextual factors' 50 5
in a clearcut fashion foil his efforts. By his own estimate, he is able only to
minimize such problems.50 6
Wilkins's efforts to establish a middle-level, contextual approach to
ethical decisionmaking, effectively balancing private partisan and public
regulatory interests, falter on both theoretical and contextual planes. On
a theoretical plane, Wilkins errs in four respects. First, he diminishes the
507postrealist indeterminacy critique, particularly regarding normative dis-course. 50 8 Second, he reentrenches the public-private distinction, in spite
499. Id. at 515 ("Context must replace universality as the touchstone of system design.").
500. Id. at 517.
501. Id. at 516. Wilkins concedes that "no enforcement system can ensure perfect
compliance, particularly given the level of conflict and ambiguity in the current rules of
professional conduct." Wilkins, supra note 440, at 814. Scanning the rules, he adds that the
goal of compliance is impliedly "separate" from, and perhaps secondary to, the goal of
"preserving" professional independence. Id. at 813.
502. Wilkins creates five broad categories of contextual factors: task, subject matter,
status, professional organization, and client characteristics. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 517.
503. Id. at 518 ("A complex system of specific rules inevitably generates 'jurisdictional'
disputes over which rule should apply in borderline cases." (footnote omitted)).
504. The definitional and jurisdictional problems with which Wilkins grapples recur partly
as a function of systemic complexity. See Schuck, supra note 413, at 3 (defining a legal
system as complex when its "rules, processes, institutions, and supporting culture possess
four features: density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy or uncertainty").
505. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 516-17.
506. Id. at 519-23.
507. Wilkins wavers in his postrealist analysis. On the subject of lawyer discretion and
independence, for example, he speaks of the "literal commands of clear rules." Wilkins,
supra note 440, at 861. At the same time, he t'alks of "ambiguous situations." Id. at 862.
Even under a weak account of indeterminacy, this distinction is suspect. The postrealist
critique destabilizes the commands of rules exposing an ambiguity common to relational
contexts.
508. Compare Delgado, supra note 425, at 1887 ("Normative discourse, in short, is
indeterminate and manipulable.") with Thomas McCarthy, Interaction, Indeterminacy, Norma-
tivity: Comments on Gumbrecht, Yablon, and Cornell, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1625, 1627 (1992)
("Whatever the sources of legal indeterminacy, one of the consequences of legal indetermi-
nacy is that adjudication in hard cases is not unambiguously dictated by or calculable from
the relevant legal materials; it is situated in a space of possibilities where moral-ethical
conceptions may also be at play.") and Michelman, supra note 299, at 1528-29 ("The legal
form of plurality is indeterminacy-the susceptibility of the received body of normative
material to a plurality of interpretive distillations, pointing toward differing resolutions of
pending cases and, through them, toward differing normative futures." (footnote omitted))-
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of his own demonstration that the lawyer's public and private roles are
conceptually unstable.509 Third, he reinstalls a balancing methodology, 1 °
yet underestimates the problems of categorization and incommensurability
that muddle that jurisprudence. Finally, he posits a duality of "true"
versus "merely articulated" client interests, appealing to the objectivist
precept of independent judgment and detachment as a means to resolve
the tension.5 1 '
On a contextual plane, Wilkins errs three times. Throughout, he under-
states the political nature of discretionary judgments. In the context of
poverty law, political judgments are endemic to discretionary acts of case
selection and strategy. Because many poor clients are repeat players, the
political import of lawyer discretionary judgments accrues only gradually
over a prolonged period.5 12 Isolated incidents of ethical discretion that
Wilkins cites, therefore, do not grasp the full import of repeated judg-
ments.
In fairness, Wilkins does not address the phenomenon of repeated
discretionary judgments in poverty law. Given his analysis, he is likely to
concur that the repetitive nature of individual client matters arises jurisdic-
tionally and institutionally.5 13 Jurisdictional repetition occurs when a client's
509. Wilkins uses the metaphor of "collapse" to describe the instability of the lawyer's
public-private roles. Wilkins, supra note 438, at 484. He shows that this instability is
bipolar: the private role may collapse into the public role; or alternatively, the public role
may collapse into the private role. Because his concern lies "with the lawyer's public
responsibilities as an officer of the legal system," Wilkins privileges the move toward the
public role. Id. at 470.
510. Id. at 471 n.8 ("This Article focuses on th[e] balancing of public and private interests
during the course of client representation.").
511. Wilkins's catchword for objectivity is detachment. He contends that the lawyer may
employ a "somewhat detached perspective ... to discover creative avenues for harmonizing
competing concerns in a manner that accomplishes as much of the client's purposes as
possible while at the same time promoting long-term legal values." Wilkins, supra note 440,
at 862 (footnote omitted).
In the past, I condoned a similar notion of detachment. See Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn,
supra note 2, at 644-45 ("Detachment furnishes the poverty lawyer a means of separating
from practices which privilege a subordinated vision of client. Discarding privileged record-
ings of the history of client advocacy is essential to safeguarding the potential for client
autonomy. Without such revision, the self-evidence of client dependency remains a compel-
ling memory." (footnotes omitted)). I now consider that notion far too unstable to be useful
without substantial qualification.
512. See, e.g., Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, The Only Justice Is in the Halls, in 1
THE POLmCS OF INFORMAL JUST=CE: THE AMEmcAN EXPERIENCE 119, 119-63 (Richard L. Abel ed.,
1982) (documenting legal services lawyers' procedural strategy for opposing housing court evictions).
513. The concepts of jurisdictional and institutional repetition challenge the conventional
view of poor clients as "non-repeat" players. See, e.g., Jerome E. Carlin & Jan Howard,
Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 UCLA L. REV. 381, 385 (1965) (mentioning
"non-repeating character" of poor client matters); Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 107 (1974)
(categorizing welfare clients as "one-shotters").
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case presents claims that overspill discrete subject matter boundaries. A
homeless case, for example, may raise welfare and housing claims.51 4
Institutional repetition occurs when a client's case, as here, becomes
enmeshed in ongoing litigation at recurrent stages of administrative or
judicial review. Federal statutory provisions requiring a "continuing" re-
view of program eligibility subject individual disability recipients to an
additional form of institutional repetition in which lawyer intervention is
needed.5 t5
Wilkins's more narrow account of poverty law-based ethical discretion
causes him to underdraw the magnitude of lawyer power and correspond-
ing professional independence in impoverished communities. In the con-
text of poverty law, professional power is magnified with respect to both
individual51 6 and group 517 clients. Wilkins aptly recognizes the gap in
"experience and sophistication" between corporate and individual clients.5" 8
This gap, he argues, produces differential "access to information," and
therefore, an unequal ability to "understand[] and evaluat[e] lawyer
conduct., 51
9
Wilkins's attempt to show that client multiformity and information
discrepancy produces unevenly distributed capacities to understand and
evaluate lawyer conduct proves too much. To be sure, information bears
on the client's ability to understand and evaluate conduct. Human under-
standing and evaluation, however, are thickly layered concepts. By focus-
ing on information as the key to understanding and evaluation, Wilkins
underestimates the potential for clients and communities to understand
and evaluate lawyer judgments in contexts in which information is scant.
Poverty law practice is a context in which client and community access to
information is sparse. Scarcity of information need not rob an impover-
ished client of the capacity to understand or evaluate lawyer conduct.
514. See, e.g., Gilkerson, supra note 313, at 926-43 (discussing homeless families' claims to
AFDC and public housing).
515. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(l) (1991).
516. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 2, at 2118-30 (locating the
exercise of power in interpretive practices).
517. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 15, at 512 ("[Sjome civil rights lawyers ... are making
decisions, setting priorities, and undertaking responsibilities that should be determined by
their clients and shaped by the community."); Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Mutiplied, supra
note 15, at 1106 ("[Tlhere is an inevitable danger that the lawyer who sets out to help
disadvantaged people as members of groups may inadvertently succeed in oppressing them
(or some of them) as individuals."); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34
STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1205 (1982) ("An attorney active in institutional reform class actions is
subject to a variety of financial, tactical, and professional pressures that constrain his
response to class conflicts.").
518. Wilkins, supra note 440, at 816-17.
519. Id.
1993] 2659
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Understanding and evaluation may occur independent of information. At
issue is the scope of that understanding and the criteria of evaluation.
Wilkins seems to overlook the incentives (e.g., increasing direct service
and law reform representation) to regulate client access to information
that are embedded in the instrumental rationality of poverty law practice.52°
Paradoxically, that instrumental structure resembles Wilkins's middle-
level, purposive approach to discretionary ethics. Indeed, instrumental
poverty lawyers are chiefly motivated by the public purposes of legal
frameworks. In Johnson's case, for example, the public purposes of the
Social Security Act and the legal framework of the treating physician
rule-as well as procedural fairness, racial and gender equality, and social
insurance-are all factors relevant to the decision whether or not to
represent Johnson.
Wilkins's entreaty that lawyers exercise independence and "resist both
public and client pressures ' 521 offers little incentive to abjure the "public
aspects of legal practice" that favor the poverty lawyer's purposivist gate-
keeping role.5 2 At the same time, such incentive is unlikely to come from
individual clients who, as Wilkins points out, already are "doubly
vulnerable" both to lawyer "self-interest and incompetence" and to lawyer
controls. 5 23 Because it is imbued with the same instrumental rationality of
political judgment, Wilkins's middle-level approach reinforces, rather than
decenters, the poverty lawyer's gatekeeping role5 24 in case selection and
strategy.
520. See, e.g., Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 113, at 341 ("Public interest lawyers have
the capacity (and sometimes the motivation) to exercise considerable influence over their
client's choices and objectives." (footnote omitted)).
521. Wilkins, supra note 440, at 864 ("To exercise independent judgment and to act on the
basis of what that judgment appears to require, lawyers must resist both public and client
pressures."). Wilkins proposes two forms of lawyer resistance: "client motivated" indepen-
dence and "publicly motivated" independence. Id. at 865. Client motivated independence
demands that the lawyer "sometimes resist state authority and public opinion to resolve
ambiguities in favor of preserving her client's rights." Id. Publicly motivated independence
dictates that the lawyer "sometimes resist any public or private actor, including her client,
who seeks to pressure her into resolving an ambiguous legal command in a manner that
undermines its fundamental purposes or otherwise damages the legal framework." Id.
522. Id. at 866 (footnote omitted).
523. Id. at 872, 879 ("[I]ndividual clients, although no less willing to press their lawyers
for strategic gain, are less able to do so in the face of strong competing pressure, just as they
are generally less capable of ensuring that their lawyer zealously pursue their goals in the
first instance.").
524. On the legal services gatekeeping model, see Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based
Ethic, supra note 16, at 1110-16; cf. Gordon & Simon, supra note 31, at 230, 256 (arguing that
"the most efficient regulatory regime for some contexts may be one that creates 'gatekeeper'
obligations, one that directly conscripts the lawyers as regulatory agents by requiring them to
monitor certain company transactions, investigate underlying facts, certify conditions, and





This article extends the study of the lawyering process in the field of
poverty law to an internal critique of ethical judgment in case selection
and strategy. The critique is neither resolved nor final. It is ongoing and
uncertain. The subject of the critique-Bertie Johnson-is betrayed. She,
like other entire communities of impoverished people, is treated as an
object of ethical inquiry.
The article leaves Johnson silent. It tells her story. Her story is the
backdrop against which to observe the modernist lawyer. This heuristic
figure acts out two visions of practice: formalist and instrumentalist. The
formalist vision incorporates claims to neutrality, objectivity, empathy, and
determinacy. The instrumentalist vision comprises claims to purposivism,
practicality, translation, and indeterminacy. In many respects, the claims
are interconnected, even supplemental, in their endorsement of lawyer
moral and political discretionary judgment.
The article observes the modernist lawyer from a postmodern stance.
The stance is unsteady: it tilts toward foundationalism and normativity.
This tilt shadows the text. In describing Johnson's administrative and
judicial proceedings, personal and employment history, medical impair-
ments and history, and daily life, the tilt is representational. The descrip-
tion embodies nonsituated claims of social reality.
In examining formalist claims to neutrality, objectivity, empathy, and
determinacy, the tilt is foundational. The examination shows that formal-
ism consists of false moral constructions and deceptive objectivist practices.
This showing suggests the plausibility of true moral constructions and
honest objectivist practices, and thereby assumes extant foundational bases
for morality, social construction, and objectivity.
In analyzing instrumentalist claims to purposivism, practicality, transla-
tion, and indeterminacy, the tilt is normative. This analysis demonstrates
that instrumentalism contains inadequate notions of autonomy, consensus,
and discretion and, in turn, implies the viability of autonomy, consensus,
and discretion. This implication presumes the normative values of individu-
alism, mutual choice, and independent judgment.
Paradoxically, the foundational and normative stance of the instant
critique prefigures the canons of liberal legalism: structural autonomy of
law and the subjective autonomy of lawyers. To the extent that modernism
ratifies liberal legalism, canonical prefiguration is a byproduct of internal
critique. The paradox of internal modernist critique-the collapse of
subject-object positions-afflicts critical legal theory. That collapse emerges
as the infirmity of privileged positions.
The privileging of epistemic and discursive practices is the central prob-
lematic of critical legal theory. To combat privilege, theoreticians of
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practice must develop counterstrategies of interpretation. Kendall Tho-
mas, working in the genre of critical race theory, proposes the strategy of
"double reading." 52 Thomas argues that "a legal text must be subjected
to a process of double reading: a reading that both scans the text for what
it says and rescans it for what it says within what it leaves unsaid.,
52 6
Strategic experimentation in the techniques of interpreting texts--oral,
written, social, visual-is characteristic of modernism.2 7 Indeed, the pro-
cedural strategy of "double reading" is consistent with the "modern
perfection" of technique.5 28 This consistency is significant. For the modern-
ist, technique appeals to the tradition of scientific positivism and to the
constitutive claims of neutrality, objectivity, universalism, and stability.
Thomas implicitly challenges the representational logic and order of mod-
ernism as fictive.529 Yet, by reintrenching the elitist notion of a specialized
expert, he surrenders to the modernist "authoritarian temptation ''530 to
reinscribe meaning.
This article too succumbs to the authoritarian temptation of modernist
inquiry. Its internal method of critique destabilizes a range of moral and
political practices only to reprivilege alternative forms of the same practices.
Reprivileging preserves the rationality of liberal legalism as a totalizing
account of ethical judgment in poverty law case selection and strategy, an
account committed to preserving the lawyer's gatekeeping discretion to
make moral and political evaluations of client character and interest.
Neither formal nor instrumental rationality reorganizes the founda-
tional and normative commitments of liberal legalism. Disengaging from
these commitments requires emancipatory, rather than technical, forms of
ethical judgment. Emancipatory rationality demands a postmodern recog-
nition of practice as an arena of community power and resistance.531
Inside this arena, the interpretive communities of the privileged and the
525. Kendall Thomas, ROUGE ET NomR Reread: A Popular Constitutional History of the
Angelo Herndon Case, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2599, 2668 (1992).
526. Id. at 2668.
527. See Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction, 4
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 351, 354 (1992) (characterizing "high Modernism" partially in terms of
"innovative experimentation with the technical means specific to each cultural medium").
528. Id. at 367, 369 (discussing the modernist lawyer's "uncritical faith in procedural
technique").
529. Thomas, supra note 525, at 2659 ("Insofar as the historiographical representation of
an event or set of events in terms of a single theme presupposes that the past possesses a
unitary logic or rationality, it imposes an order on its object that is more fictive than real.").
530. This phrase is culled from Berman, supra note 527, at 380.
531. See, e.g., Sally E. Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 889, 917 (1991)
(review essay) ("Law often serves as the handmaiden for processes of domination, helping to
create new systems of control and regulation. At the same time, it constrains these systems
and provides arenas for resistance.").
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subordinated "push" and are "pushed by the situated dialogue" of legal-
political discourse. 2
Postmodern inquiry of the formal and instrumental enactments of ethi-
cal judgment in the arena of practice is not a move to transcendence. On
the contrary, the postmodern move in practice is a move to discursive
contexts5 33 in which sociolegal forces may be actively engaged.5 34 Modern-
ist practice traditions are likely to frame the terms and tools of this
engagement. As Unger remarks, "the disintegrating traditions have forged
many of the instruments required for their transformation. ,13' To what
extent postmodern transformation must entail foundational and normative
commitments to the poverty lawyer's gatekeeping role of moral and politi-
cal prophet is the question ahead.536
532. Mootz, supra note 29, at 525. According to Mootz, "[t]here is no postmodern inquiry
outside of or prior to this dialogue."
533. On the enactment of meaning in discursive contexts, see generally Elizabeth Mertz,
Creative Acts of Translation: James Boyd White's Intellectual Integration, 4 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 165, 175-85 (1992) (book review).
534. See Mootz, supra note 29, at 522 ("Practicing lawyers are no more able than legal
theorists to grasp the material forces of social life from a distance; a postmodern legal
practice is defined by an open comportment within legal dialogue rather than a conscious,
rational seizing of the whole situation.").
535. UNGER, supra note 8, at 143. Cf Jabbari, supra note 88, at 507 ("[M]odern theorists
attempt to show that programmes of social change may be engineered by developing the
potential for such change that lies within existing legal rules and doctrines, and not by other
non-legal means."); Alessandra Lippucci, Surprised by Fish, 63 COLO. L. REV. 1, 15 (1992)
("To say that change itself is governed by conventions is merely to acknowledge that all
thought departs from and is dependent upon conceptual categories initially derived from the
community but alterable by praxis." (footnote omitted)).
536. My surmise is that such commitments represent the lasting marks or traces of
modernism. See also Berman, supra note 70, at 1903 ("[O]ur postmodernity is characterized
not by our transcendence of modernism but by our ambivalent, though ineluctable, attach-
ment to it.").
